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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D.

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THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

Nos. 9 & 10. DECEMBER, 1926. Vol. XVI.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Vatican and Marriage.

The publication of the Vatican decree disannulling the Churchill—Vanderbilt marriage has caused no little misgiving to those Anglo-Catholics who desire reunion with Rome. While seeing clearly the defects in their own Church, they are ever disposed, mainly owing to their ignorance of the history, polity and actual conditions of the Roman Church, to regard the latter as the unfailing guardian of Christian faith and morals. Ready to take Roman pretensions at their face value, these people have often acclaimed Rome's superior morality because it refuses to sanction divorce. The Churchill—Vanderbilt marriage dissolution accords ill with declarations which affirm the sacredness and indissolubility of marriage. Whilst on the one hand the Roman Church prohibits the marriage of second cousins, of godparent and godchild, of godparents of the same godchild, of a man to a woman who has been engaged to his deceased brother, of a widower with his deceased wife's cousin, yet on the other hand it can dare to disannul a marriage where the parties in all good faith have cohabited as married people for years and children have been born. In whatever way we may describe this action, it is impossible to regard it as in agreement with the mind of Christ. Some will be most pained by the outrage on the Christian marriage standard; others by the casuistical tergiversation by which dispensations to marry and annulments of marriage are granted by the Roman authorities.

Dean Inge in a recent volume[1] relates that a prominent English Bishop in giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Divorce expressed a desire to make marriage absolutely indissoluble, whereupon one of the Commissioners, a Scotch judge, said :

> ' I observe, my lord, that you approve of the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church that marriage is indissoluble. May I ask whether you also approve of the *subterfuges* to which that Church notoriously has recourse when it wishes to evade the rigour of the law? '

The Vatican decree should bring home to the supporters of the Malines Conferences that there are not only theological and ecclesiastical but also serious moral differences between the English and Roman Churches, and that until there is much greater prospect than at present appears of these differences being overcome, the English Church authorities would be much better employed from every point of view in expending their time and energy in other directions.

The *Nation and Athenaeum* of Nov. 27th (p. 289) directs attention to another though not less significant aspect of the disannulment affair :

> In the correspondence columns of the *Times* for November 18th a letter appeared, signed ' Denis Parry,' discussing certain implications of the Marlborough case, and ending with the words : ' Many Catholic heads ache, including my own.' On the 19th Mr. Parry wrote again, and this letter (which appeared in the *Times* of November 22nd) must be quoted in full :—
>
> > ' Sir,—In view of a communication I have received I hasten to withdraw unreservedly all the imputations made against the just and proper functioning of the Catholic marriage laws in any letter of mine to your paper. I admit that my questions were hasty, ill-considered, wanting in proper respect, and apt to cause pain and scandal amongst my co-religionists. Also I acknowledge, further, that the Catholic, Roman, and Apostolic Church is the sole judge and arbiter on all matters concerning Christian Faith and morals, and that I was guilty of a grievous sin in seeming to question her infallible judgments in these matters. This *amende honorable* I make of my own free will, hoping you will, as an act of justice, accord it the same publicity as my first letter, which appeared under date November 18.'
>
> It would be interesting to see the communication which provoked this ' free-will ' recantation.

Rome understands how to maintain discipline—*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento; Hae tibi erunt artes.* This

[1] *Lay Thoughts of a Dean*, p. 254.

sort of thing may promise the empire of the kingdoms of this world, but it accords ill with St. Paul's ideal of Christian freedom with which, he declared, Christ has Himself set us free.

The Faith of the English People.

The Archbishop's Commission on Doctrine, which includes a representative group of English Modernists, appointed to consider the reformulation of Church doctrine, reports optimistically. Not only do the representatives of the various theological schools find themselves able to join in frank, free and friendly discussion, but they hope to be able to produce a report which will enable the adherents of these schools to realize with a new depth of appreciation the reality of their oneness in faith and doctrine despite their differences of approach and emphasis. This is all to the good, and we trust that the report will be published shortly, for there is urgent need of it.

We hope, however, that while the Commission is keeping in view, as it plainly is, the need for securing more harmony between the various schools of English theologians, it is not losing sight of a greater and even more pressing need, namely, the presentation of Christian doctrine in so simple, truthful and convincing a form that it will win back to the Christian faith vast numbers of English people of good will who have become agnostic or secularist.

The evidences of this lapse from traditional Christianity are wide-spread. It is not merely the lessening congregations and the decreasing number of ordinands which point to it. It is even more apparent in our press and in popular fiction, although, owing to the organizing ability of the ecclesiastical journalists, the press gives more space to Church news, and is more sympathetic in its presentation of it, than used to be the case. Whilst there is much interest in religion, the increasing departure from traditionalism is visible on all sides.

Last year some ten well-known writers of imaginative literature, which did not include in their number Mr. Thomas Hardy, Mr. Bernard Shaw or Mr. H. G. Wells, were induced to publish statements of their religious belief.[2] With the exception of one

[2] *My Religion*, published by Hutchinson & Co.

who is a Roman Catholic, nine out of the ten were unorthodox. Of these nine, one is the son of an Anglican bishop. Yet each of these writers held to a moral and spiritual interpretation of the Universe as his working hypothesis, and was essentially Christian in his moral ideals.

Last September the *Daily News* issued a religious *questionnaire*. Some 70 per cent. of those who replied to it were theists, yet a number of those who declared they were Church workers stated that they did not believe in a personal God. The same *questionnaire* issued later by the *Nation* secured somewhat different results. To the question: 'Do you believe in a personal God?' only some 40 per cent. in the *Nation* replied in the affirmative. To the question: 'Do you regard the Bible as inspired in an unique sense?' the answer 'Yes' was given by 64 per cent. in the *Daily News*, but by only 30 per cent. in the *Nation*. A general comparison of the answers in the *Daily News* and *Nation* seems to indicate clearly that there is less traditionalism among the educated than among the uneducated. This is a very serious matter for traditionalism.

In Mr. Harold Begbie's recent book, *Broken Lights: a Short Study in the Varieties of Christian Opinion*,[3] he exhibits the increasing perplexity of the ordinary man in the theological sphere; yet, adds Mr. Begbie, 'he (the ordinary man) does not disbelieve in the existence of God; while in the Character of Jesus Christ he finds the highest ideal of manhood' (p. 134).

There are no doubt many reasons, economic and social, political and educational, for this growing departure from traditionalist Christianity. These differences and hindrances are not merely intellectual; some of them are certainly moral; nevertheless the intellectual difficulties have great weight with many, and in times of temptation turn the scale not only against Christian faith but against Christian conduct. Mr. Begbie seems to think that only public opinion can force the theologians into agreement. He is mistaken. It is only rigorous and open-minded research and reflection that can do it—and even then the unity can only be secured on a few great central truths. The rest will have to be abandoned as *credenda* by the Church. In other words, the orthodoxy of the future will have to be con-

[3] Published in March, 1926, by Mills & Boon, price 5/- net.

fined to only two or three essential affirmations as was the case in the Primitive Church; all the rest of our theological *impedimenta* must be relegated, if not to the world's great lumber-room, at least to the sphere of things which are unnecessary and unobjectionable. Moreover to be convincing in the sphere of spiritual and moral truth it is not needful to use ingenious or intricate arguments. The human soul is naturally Christian. It needs only profound and luminous declarations.

We look then to the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine to secure for the English Church this blessed consummation. A convincing modern theology needs to jettison ruthlessly all dubious history, ethics and metaphysics. In the economic world it is a law of currency that bad money drives out good, and in the world of dogma the same principle holds. Dubious dogmas kill belief in sound dogmas. It is fatal to the influence of the Christian Religion to have its clergy constantly harping on the theme:

> 'O let us never, never doubt
> What nobody is sure about.'

The Sepulchres of the Prophets.

A tablet to the late Dean of Carlisle has been erected in the cloisters of New College, Oxford. It is inscribed as follows:

In Memory of
HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.D., F.B.A.
1858—1924
Scholar, Fellow, and Tutor
and Honorary Fellow,
of New College
and Dean of Carlisle.
Historian, Philosopher, Theologian.
In Thought fearless,
In Learning various and profound,
Generous, Affectionate, Rich in humour,
In his Books, in his Teaching,
In his Public Duties,
He brought to the Service of his Age
A rare passion
for Virtue, Knowledge, and Truth.

This epitaph exhibits a fine eighteenth century quality. It is *teres atque rotundus*. Of many such it has been sarcastically written,

> 'When all is read
> Upon his tomb is seen,
> Not what he was,
> But what he might have been.'

The criticism bears no sting in this case.

Those who knew the late Dean of Carlisle intimately will appreciate the insight and justice of his epitaph. To no one does the Modernist cause in the English Church owe more. Though many-sided he was thoroughly consistent. He combined courage with a profound sense of responsibility, learning with lucidity, gravity with humour; English to the core, he seemed to reflect aspects of both Bishop Butler and Dr. Johnson.

His biography, we are glad to know, is being prepared for the press by Mr. P. E. Matheson, a Fellow of his own College.

A tablet with the following inscription has been dedicated recently in Cumnor Church, near Oxford, to the memory of Miss Dougall:

In grateful memory of

LILY DOUGALL

author of PRO CHRISTO ET ECCLESIA *and other adventures in religious thought, also of* BEGGARS ALL *and other stories, who lived and wrote at Cutts End, Cumnor,*

1911—1923.

'Whatever is true is God's way of revealing Himself.'—L.D.

This in its simplicity is a felicitous example of the twentieth century epitaph.

We are glad to learn that Canon Streeter is bringing out shortly a memoir of Miss Dougall.

A Fearless New Testament Scholar.

The death of Dr. Edwin Abbott, at the age of 87, one of the greatest of the many great Victorian schoolmasters, has led not a few to express in the press their admiration of his qualities, and gratitude for his services. Modern Churchmen owe him much. A brilliant classical scholar who added to his classical studies those of Shakespeare, Bacon, and the New Testament, he practically terminated his clerical career in the eighties by attacking Biblical and ecclesiastical miracles. This led to his inhibition and rendered promotion impossible, but it neither checked his teaching nor embittered his mind. He believed in a non-miraculous supernatural Christ. In this, we venture to think, he anticipated the whole course of modern Christological development. His conviction is best summarized in the following quotation from his *Apologia* published in 1907 :

> 'The new believer feels that he must supplement his knowledge of the Word incarnate as Christ on earth by an ever-growing knowledge of the Word pre-incarnate and post-incarnate—the Word manifested in all His works, but especially in the wonderful development of human nature from sinless animalism through sin to righteousness; and in God's revelations of Himself to man from the first dawn of human consciousness up to the present day' (p. 66).

In the same volume he asserts :

> 'The real "divergence" between the two pictures of the Saviour seems to me to be this. The former, the miraculous one, requires less faith than the latter, the non-miraculous. The former does not so greatly need to be supplemented by faith in the evolution of all things culminating in the evolution of a Son of Man seated at the right hand of God' (p. 66).

The important results arising from the modern critical comparative study of the Gospels, in contrast to the ancient harmonizing comparative study of them, we owe in this country first and foremost to Dr. Edwin Abbott. It was his old pupil, W. G. Rushbrooke, Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge, who in 1880 produced the sumptuous and invaluable *Synopticon* with this dedication :

TO

EDWIN ABBOTT ABBOTT, D.D.

THE FIRST SUGGESTER OF THIS WORK

WHO TO SUGGESTION ADDED ENCOURAGEMENT

AND TO ENCOURAGEMENT COUNSEL AND ASSISTANCE

THESE PAGES ARE NOW DEDICATED

BY HIS FORMER PUPIL.

Dr. Abbott himself in his eighteen volumes of *Diatessarica* or Gospel studies, with their remarkable combination of originality and exact and curious learning, did much to carry forward the impetus given by the publication of Rushbrooke's *Synopticon.*

The ordinary readers will get most, not from *Diatessarica*, but from Dr. Abbott's delightful trilogy *Philochristus*, *Onesimus*, and *Silanus the Christian.* These three volumes were published at wide intervals of time, but their theme is one. They show in the first volume how a disciple of the Rabbis, in the second a poor debased Phrygian slave, in the third a noble Roman, a student in the lecture-room of Epictetus, could become Christian. The last may be usefully compared with Pater's *Marius the Epicurean.* Of *Diatessarica*, it may be said that it seems as learned as it is; but of the trilogy, it is more learned than it seems. What the unknowing reader might innocently regard as ingenious imagination is usually translation from ancient texts. Unfortunately *Onesimus* is hard to procure, and *Philochristus* has become very scarce. If the three could be re-published in a light and handy volume, we believe they would command a wide circulation and do much amongst young men and women of the educated classes to present the Christian religion in a way which would not conflict with their historical and scientific studies.

The Bishop of Birmingham and St. Francis.

On the occasion of the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Francis of Assisi, the Bishop of Birmingham preached a sermon in St. Martin's, Birmingham, on the real value of the Saint's life-work. The traditionalist Church press, Romanist and Anglican, seized the opportunity grievously to misrepresent the Bishop's utterance and so gravely to mislead their readers who had not heard the sermon. The Bishop was accused of belittling the Saint and of condemning him because he had sought to imitate Christ, a charge on which, it was urged, the Bishop himself would never be condemned. This widely-published accusation arose out of some remarks which the Bishop made with reference to the *stigmata*, in which he expressed the belief that under the nursing conditions of a modern

hospital St. Francis could not have developed the *stigmata*, which were a product of semi-ecstasy, semi-delirium, and dirt.

The Bishop also criticized the Franciscan Rule in its insistence on absolute poverty. He said of St. Francis:

> 'He took certain passages from the Gospels and with them as a basis made obligations for his followers which were precise and severe. "I enjoin strictly," he said, a few years before he died, "upon all the brethren that in no wise they receive money or coin, either directly or through a third person." A few weeks before he died he pleaded passionately that his followers should never relax their ideal of absolute poverty, nor suffer glosses on his absolutely plain rule.
>
> What are we to make of this command which is far removed from Christ's strong and still much-needed protests against selfish wealth? If absolute poverty is, in truth, the Christian ideal, then we are committed to a Communism which would rapidly degenerate into barbarism. The Christian Church in its early years made an experiment in Communism, which, as New Testament records show, was not a success. It was during the second century, when Communism had been abandoned and the Church was still strong in its condemnation of the selfish misuse of wealth, that its finest work and most rapid expansion were accomplished. Francis was wrong: not poverty, but unselfishness, is the true ideal. The piety to-day which finds it "so romantic for St. Francis to have embraced poverty like a lover" is usually conjoined with a horror of Communism—it is, in fact, worthless sentiment.'

On one other point the Bishop criticized St. Francis, and not unnaturally. He said:

> 'Francis was an enthusiast rather than a thinker. Against the semi-paganised religion of his day he made no protests. Such reform waited for Wycliffe a century and a half later.'

It is always difficult to criticize the great and good, especially when it serves a powerful ecclesiastical propaganda that they should seem to be even greater and better than they were. The Bishop desired to find inspiration for his hearers, not in sentiment, but in the simple truth. His deep reverence for St. Francis appears in such paragraphs as the following:

> 'Francis was born in 1182. He was converted in early manhood. He died at the early age of forty-four. Long life is seldom given to those in whom the spirit beats strongly against the bars of the flesh. He was a man of extraordinary personal magnetism, sincere, humorous, lovable, without guile. By his transparent honesty he impressed men. He won them by his sheer goodness. His personality created a religious movement which was of great value to Europe. He is often compared with Christ, and undoubtedly there was much in the nobility of his character which was Christlike.'
>
> 'I have spoken frankly to-day of St. Francis and the great men of his Order. Does the blunt truth not inspire us? I summarize its

teaching. Try to make goodness supreme with the simple sincerity of the Saint of Assisi. Show, as he showed, love to God and your fellow-men. Enjoy the gifts of God—the beauty of Nature and animal life—with St. Francis' simplicity. And, moreover, seek truth with the courage of the great thinkers who were bred by the Order which Francis founded. Then you will make your life a centre from which spreads the Spirit of Christ.'

The active propaganda of mean and deliberately malicious detraction directed against the Bishop in what are believed to be the interests of Catholicism is in most cases better met by silence than by reasoned confutation. We do not propose to refer to it again, but speaking as to shrewd men we would say: 'From this instance judge all.'

A Notable Parish Priest.

The retirement of the Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard on account of ill-health is a matter of deep regret. What he has achieved at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields is known to all, and it is as well known that there is no other clergyman in England who could have done it equally well. Once again we see that no task is too difficult of accomplishment if the right man can be got to undertake it. Courage and courtesy, tact and humour, energy and originality, wide sympathies and deep convictions, have been remarkably combined in the leader who has raised St. Martin's to its present position of vigorous and many-sided influence for good. For others this success may have other lessons to teach; for ourselves it is a cheering indication of what a sane and sympathetic English Modernism can achieve.

In connection with the Bi-centenary of the Consecration of the present Church a Thank Offering was inaugurated to be divided among all Christian churches at present within the parish as constituted in 1726. Our readers may be interested to see the following extracts from letters received from two of these churches:

From the Society of Friends, St. Martin's Lane.

I wish to thank you very much for your letter offering us, the Society of Friends, a portion of the Fund which you have raised in commemoration of your two-hundredth anniversary.

I shall hope to bring the matter before our members next Sunday, and I have little doubt that we shall desire to accept the gift—not because of any monetary value, but because we so greatly value the generous thought, and also breadth of thought, which it expresses.

From the Congregational Chapel, Orange Street.

It is with much gratitude that I acknowledge your most kind and generous note. I was aware of the Vicar's kind and most Catholic intention to grant a portion of the Thank-Offering Fund to Churches within St. Martin's Parish. Your action in this matter is the most striking illustration I have ever known of real Christian unity. I read your kind letter to my Church officers, and they most heartily and gratefully unite with me for so practical an evidence of sympathy with us in our Christian work.

The 'Church' was established by the Huguenots in 1685. They used liturgical services. It afterwards passed to the Church of England, and Toplady was the incumbent. The Anglican period was brief but very brilliant. For the last 140 years it has been held by the Congregationalists.

In a recent interview published in the *Guardian*, Mr. Sheppard gives some account of his parochial methods. Two seem particularly worth noting:

'To create in the Church the kind of atmosphere that will make strangers feel at home, and show them a practical exposition of fellowship in every part of our Church life.'

'Our chief rules of membership are that everybody who joins is pledged to consider such opportunities for service as may be put before him or her, and each one of our fourteen-hundred members has made the promise . . . We make no enquiries of any kind as to a candidate's religious convictions.'

In the same interview the Vicar made the following statement:

'I find it extraordinarily hard to understand exactly the condition of mind and heart of the young people: it almost defies analysis. Roughly, I should say that there has never been a time at which there was more idealism and less achievement, or more people ready to applaud an expression of the highest sentiments and fewer willing to give a hand in putting them into practice.'

We hope that complete rest will quickly fit Mr. Sheppard for further service in a Church that has need of him.

The Church Assembly and Breakers Ahead.

It needs no very acute powers of observation to perceive that the Church Assembly, notwithstanding the claims which some make for it of possessing a sapience but little short of infallibility, is ceasing to command confidence in the country. The defeat of the Shrewsbury Bishopric Measure in the House of Lords by a narrow majority, followed by the crushing defeat in the House of Commons of the City Churches Measure, are visible signs of this in the world of Parliament. But the sense of apprehension is not confined to Parliament: a growing num-

ber of the clergy feel that, ground between the upper millstone of the Diocesan authorities and the nether millstone of the parochial authorities, both of whom are steadily becoming more powerful, their former position of independence and initiative will be lost. No doubt in the case of clergymen lacking high personal qualifications this will be the case, but it may be entirely to the Church's advantage that it should be so. Able and devoted clergymen, possessed of a spirit of love and wisdom will never have cause to complain of loss of influence and initiative as the result of constitutional action by the diocesan or parochial authorities.

The danger which threatens the National Assembly is due to its eagerness to pass highly controversial measures, which a number of sober Churchmen regard as originating in the organizing ability of a small body of able and fanatical agitators who are ready to subvert the constitution of the Church of England if it does not conform to their ecclesiastical ideals.

The measures which this party are resolved to pass concern the administration of Church patronage, the constitution of the higher ecclesiastical courts, and the method of appointing bishops.

We believe it would show a high standard of political wisdom if, for some years to come, the Church Assembly declined to deal with these three highly controversial matters. There are great and unavoidable difficulties ahead connected with Prayer-Book Revision, the restoration of clerical discipline, and the reformulation of Church doctrine which will tax the unity, wisdom, patience and strength of the Church to the utmost.

If the Church Assembly proceeds with measures for the reform of (1) the administration of Church patronage, (2) the constitution of the ecclesiastical courts, and (3) the method of appointing bishops, it will shortly be facing the demand for Disestablishment voiced by the Anglo-Catholics, and, in that case, Disendowment demanded by their Church opponents with resolute insistence that all cathedrals and parish churches should be taken from the Disestablished Church and scheduled as national property. Such a situation would prove a disaster. Cannot the episcopate, by emulating the tactics of Fabius Cunctator, restore the situation? Ten years is nothing in the

life of the Church, yet ten years hence it should be easier to see where as a Church we are going. Let the Zealots take as their motto *Festina lente*, and let the Church Assembly have time to recover its breath, and if possible the confidence of the country.

The Reform of Church Patronage.

At the meeting of the Council of the Churchmen's Union held at the Church House, Westminster, on October 20th, at which there was a large and representative attendance, the following Report on the official proposals for the reform of Church Patronage was received and passed for publication:

1. *Criticism of the Official Proposals.*

With the recommendations of N.A. 73 and the Measure entitled 'The Benefices Act, 1898 (Amendment), Measure, 1923,' which has since passed into Law, we are in entire agreement. We regret, however, that we are unable to express agreement with the proposals of the Second Report of the Patronage Committee (C.A. 128) and the two Measures (C.A. 193 and 194) drafted with the object of incorporating the principles and aims of the Report.

Our first and main objection to the Report (C.A. 128) is that it provides by its proposals no real remedy for what it confesses is the principal defect in the existing system of Patronage, namely, that the parochial laity have no real influence in the selection of the incumbent of their parish. All the power which it is proposed by C.A. 193 to give to the laity is (*a*) the right to have two members on a Diocesan Board of Patronage of eleven members on the occasion of filling a vacancy in their parish; and (*b*) (by C.A. 194) the Parochial Council is permitted to make such representations to the Patron and to the Bishop as it may think fit as to the needs of the parish, but without power to name any particular clerk as suitable to fill the vacancy. It seems to us that we have here the creation of a cumbersome and complicated piece of bureaucratic machinery which promises with a maximum of effort to produce a minimum of result. Considering the number of years that the laity have been kept waiting, and the way in which their support has been elicited for various proposals as preliminary to the granting of a reform in which they are profoundly interested, it is to be deeply regretted that they are here offered merely the semblance of a remedy.

Our second objection is to the serious infringement of the existing rights of the clergy under C.A. 194, Section (2), which reads: 'A Patron shall not present to a benefice any clerk who is, in the opinion of the bishop given under the provisions of this section, not fitted for the adequate discharge of the duties of that particular benefice, unless such presentation shall be authorised upon an appeal brought by the patron, within fourteen days after such opinion has been notified to him, to the archbishop of the province in which the benefice is situated, whose determination of the matter shall be final and conclusive and

not subject to further appeal to any court.' By this provision, a clerk may be subjected to the stigma of being rejected [1] by a Diocesan Board of which his Bishop is Chairman for reasons which he cannot claim to have delivered to him in writing and without any right of appeal such as every Englishman possesses to the civil courts of justice in a matter where he is conscious of having suffered grievous injury in his reputation and professional prospects. This seems to us so contrary to the spirit of English justice that we cannot conceive of Parliament sanctioning it.

Our third objection concerns the serious infringement of the existing rights of Patrons. Under C.A. 194 the whole of the Patronage of the Church of England (with the exception of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) is subjected to the veto of the Bishop of the Diocese without any right of appeal whatsoever, except to the Archbishop. When it is recalled that the Second Report of the Patronage Committee (C.A. 128), on which this measure is largely based, speaks extremely favourably of the present administration of existing forms of Patronage,[2] and even goes so far as to note how difficult it is 'to give the parishioners any effective voice (as to the appointment of their incumbent) without interfering gravely with the rights of the Patrons,' it is amazing that proposals should be made which so gravely impair the rights of Patrons, without giving the parishioners any effective voice in the choice of their incumbent. Moreover, we are of opinion, the admittedly conscientious discharge of their responsibilities by the vast majority of Patrons will be weakened in view of the possible revision of their choice by the diocesan authority. Considering the large amount of Patronage already vested in the Bishops, it seems to us in the highest degree injudicious in a Church which stands for the principle of a moderate, as against an absolutist, episcopacy to place so great an increase of power in the hands of the Bishops.

In view of possible changes, such as are now advocated, in the method of appointing Bishops, whereby the Bishop to be appointed becomes the nominee of the dominant ecclesiastical party in the Diocese, any large increase in the powers of the Bishops might prove a danger to constitutional freedom in the Church.

Perceiving, as we do, these dangers to the interests of the clergy, and to the rights of Patrons, without any compensating advantage to the laity, we can only urge a policy of uncompromising opposition to the Measures which seek to embody them (C.A. 193 and C.A. 194).

[1] Report C.A. 128, p. 7 (par. 9), recognises the 'danger of casting an undeserved slur upon the clerk whose name has been put forward only to be rejected.'

[2] C.A. 128, p. 11. 'The Patronage of Crown Livings is, and has for many years past, been exercised carefully and well' (*cf.* p. 17). 'If it were possible forthwith to transfer all private patronage into the hands of ecclesiastical authorities, we should feel unable to recommend such a change, however much it might facilitate a logical plan of promotion' (p. 17, par. 37). 'On the whole, we think that variety of private patronage is productive of good results. It tends to prevent the domination of any one party in the Church. It enlists the interests of the laity, and in many cases ensures consideration for special requirements connected with long tradition, preponderant interests or local associations. . . . Moreover, a large proportion of private patrons reside in the parish or in the neighbourhood, and have means of ascertaining the wishes of parishioners and the needs of the parish' (p. 18, par. 38). 'We are agreed, therefore, that private patronage ought to be retained' (p. 6, par. 7). 'We do not recommend any drastic or fundamental change in the general distribution of patronage as it exists at the preesnt day. . . . The system which we have inherited . . . works on the whole well.'

2. *An Alternative Proposal.*

Lest we be charged with a purely negative attitude towards proposals for Patronage Reform, we desire here to set forth a simple and practical means by which the professed principal aims of the Second Report of the Patronage Committee (C.A. 128) could be secured.

Patronage Boards of five members to be constituted for every parish in every Diocese. Of such a Board two members, who may be either clerical or lay (to be called Diocesan Representatives), to be elected for each Archdeaconry or Rural Deanery annually by the Diocesan Conference; two members to be elected by the Annual Parochial Church Meeting (to be called Parochial Representatives). The Patron, or his representative, to be the Chairman and Convener of the Board; four to constitute a quorum. On receiving intimation of a vacancy in the benefice, it shall be the duty of a Patron to convene the Patronage Board and name the clerk whom he desires to be appointed to the benefice. No clerk may be named by any member of the Board, except by the Patron. If the clerk named receive the votes of not less than three of the Diocesan and Parochial Representatives, the Patron shall with the consent of the clerk nominate him to the Bishop for presentation to the vacant benefice, and the Bishop shall forthwith appoint him unless he gives in writing to the said clerk and Patron his reasons for refusal. If no nomination be made to the Bishop within six months from the date of the beginning of the vacancy of the benefice, the Patronage shall lapse to the Bishop for that turn.

The Final Court of Appeal in Ecclesiastical Causes.

At the same meeting of the Council of the Churchmen's Union a Report was received on the Report of the Church Assembly's Commission dealing with Ecclesiastical Courts, and was passed for publication.

While the Report of the Churchmen's Union urged 'the staunchest opposition' to the main proposals of the Report of the Church Assembly's Commission, it showed a willingness to compromise on minor issues. The following extracts indicate to what extent.

The Commission condemns the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground that 'it does not command the general assent and confidence of the Church' (para. 4). This we cannot accept as a statement of fact. We believe that the present agitation against the Judicial Committee is initiated and supported by a small but active minority in the Church of England, and that the present Judicial Committee, as a final court of appeal in ecclesiastical matters, receives the confidence of the Church as a whole. None the less, as practical men we have to reckon with the fact that there is some dissatisfaction with present conditions, and we are impressed by the circumstance that, in harmony with the evolution of the final court of appeal, there appears to us to be an alternative which might form the basis of an agreed settlement.

To sum up, we recommend that the Council should pass the following resolutions :—

1. That, while still of opinion that the Judicial Committee as at present constituted is the best final court of appeal in ecclesiastical disputes, in the interests of peace within the Church the Churchmen's Union is willing to agree to some re-modelling of the constitution of the Judicial Committee so as to provide for the inclusion of ecclesiastical and theologically-expert members who shall sit as equal members when the Committee sits in ecclesiastical causes.

2. That it should be an essential feature of any change in the constitution of the final court of appeal that the Court should sit as a single Court without any separation between the functions of its lay and clerical members.

3. That no test of Church membership should be applied to the members of the final court of appeal.

4. That decisions of the final court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes should be on the same footing, so far as their binding nature is concerned, as the decisions of the Judicial Committee in other branches of law.

5. That any enactment that the existing decisions of the Judicial Committee should be open to reconsideration would be an unwarranted interference with the normal course of justice and would lead to uncertainty in the law and provoke needless litigation.

6. That any changes should be passed through Parliament in the ordinary course of legislation.

In conclusion we would direct attention to the following admirable paragraph in the Report :—

> 'The large variety in the presentation of its teaching and in the conduct of its public worship which has marked the course of the Church of England in the last century, and especially within recent years, has been mainly due to the widening of the thought and outlook of men, to the advance of science, to increased knowledge of the history and liturgies of the Church, to inevitable changes in the social and educational life of the people, to the needs and demands of each new generation. In this respect it is a sign of health in the body, and of the inward vitality which prompts a living organism to adapt itself to a changing environment' (para. 3).

We regard this passage as an excellent justification of the Modernist position, and also as a reason for retaining the principle embodied in the present system under which the highest judges of the land adjudicate ecclesiastical disputes.

THE ETERNAL SPIRIT OF NATURE AS SEEN BY A STUDENT OF SCIENCE

By J. George Adami, C.B.E., M.D., F.R.S., etc., late Vice-Chancellor of the University of Liverpool.

IN appearing before this Congress,[1] the student of science or natural philosophy is at a great disadvantage as compared with other speakers. Those others, of known point of view, need waste no time in explaining themselves; they can launch immediately into their subject. But even to-day, as for the last fifty years, there prevail such wholly erroneous views as to what science really is, what are its methods, what its standpoint, that as a student of science I cannot embark upon my subject proper —the Eternal Spirit in Nature—before I make quite clear to you the nature of scientific thought, with the result that much of the limited time at my disposal must be devoted to prolegomena. I shall, however, be amply repaid if I can demonstrate to this great audience that, contrary to the teaching of the market place, science and religion are essentially, or shall I say basally, at one as regards the greater things.

This oneness is by no means universally admitted even by leaders in the world of science. I remember, as vividly as if it were yesterday, sitting at *déjeuner* one mid-day in late April in a little Parisian courtyard on the *rive gauche*, with the sun glinting on the silver and glass ware and the shadows of the thin spring foliage playing over the table linen. That was just thirty-five years ago. I was working then at the Institut Pasteur, and my host was Emile Roux, Pasteur's great first lieutenant, who a few years later was to succeed his master as head of the Institut and as leader of the French bacteriologists. Knowing the long and intimate association between the two great men, I put to my host a matter which had puzzled me: 'Why was it that in all his series of notable communications to the Academie on immunity, arrest of disease and the amelioration of the lot of man and the animal creation, Pasteur never once referred to matters spiritual? With his imagination and enthusiasm, opening out as he was a new world of possibilities, it seemed natural

[1] This paper was read at the recent Liverpool Church Congress.

that he could not be silent on these matters. Was he an agnostic?' Nor shall I ever forget Roux's reply. 'Pasteur an agnostic! Pasteur, the man of simple faith, whose home life was a revelation of an exquisite piety, husband, wife and all the household carrying out devotedly, so far as laymen might, the rules and offices of the Church. No, most assuredly not. But as to his never referring to religion in his addresses and published papers that was quite true. He did not, but this for a very definite reason. M. Pasteur held firmly that the spiritual life and the material life were wholly apart; that it was an impertinence, not to say an impiety, to seek to explain the one in terms of the other; that our science is lamentably limited, lamentably imperfect, and, what is more, is liable to profound change from generation to generation. What can we, inhabitants of one of the smallest satellites of one of the smallest suns, presume to know about the ordering and the meaning of the vast universe: how dare we presume to criticize our faith in terms of our presumed knowledge?' These, of course, are not Roux's *ipsissima verba*: they are my memory of the gist of the argument. And still to-day the fervent Catholic must, I imagine, uphold Pasteur's attitude.

Per contra, there exist men high in the world of science, men often leading singularly lofty lives, who decline to acknowledge the existence of anything that cannot be proved by material tests, who fail to find evidence of the existence of God or of a world of the spirit. Their philosophy may be summed up in the phrase 'If you are in the game, play it.' They are almost wistfully tender towards those who possess faith. We thus admittedly have these two strongly contrasted groups. But between them there is a notable and constantly augmented number of students to whom neither of these extreme views make any appeal. And it is the attitude of this intermediate group, as I see it, that I want to put before you to-day.

Equally with the man of religion and the deductive or speculative philosopher, the student of science is a seeker after the truth, but his mode of procedure is, I think, not generally understood. Certainly it was not understood or taught by the dominant scientists of the mid-Victorian era. Those held that the laws which had been discovered regarding material pheno-

mena had been tested and proved, and were therefore fixed and immutable, representing the exact truth upon which they could proceed to build a sound superstructure. *This* century has brought home to us the soundness of Pasteur's contention that matters accepted as fact by one generation are found not to be fact by the next, or, more accurately, are to be accepted as facts only within certain definite limits.

When we come to enquire more carefully into the scientific method we find that at most it is based upon a series of *approximations to the truth.* As Professor Field has recently emphasized, the first great step in science is classification, *i.e.* the recognition that phenomena at first sight so widely remote as, to give a familiar example, the fall of an apple from the tree to the ground and the revolution of the planets round the sun, belong to the same category. Yet the second, and equally essential, if not more important, step is to find a formula which will express the nature of these relationships. And now the man of science proceeds to use his imagination and to make and test and reject one assumption after another, until finally, if he is fortunate, he discovers some one assumption or hypothesis which, when tested, is found to cover and satisfy all cases of a common category known to him. And if other workers find that it satisfies all their cases also, then it becomes accepted as a 'natural law' and becomes used for further advance.

What I want you to grasp is this: *first*, that all natural laws are based upon assumptions and therefore do not and cannot pretend to be truth absolute: at most they are approximations to the truth; and, *secondly*, that where one solitary fact is discovered which does not conform with a hitherto established natural law, not the fact but the law has to disappear, or, rather, has to be modified to conform with the fact.

Time forbids that I do more than glance, as it were, at illustrations supporting these two conclusions. As regards the first, all of you who recall vestiges of your Euclid will remember that the oldest of all the sciences—plane and solid geometry—is based upon axioms of self-evident truth and *postulates* or assumptions—or laws—which must be taken for granted since they are not capable of proof by the ordinary processes of logic. You will remember also that in his *Principia*, upon which we

base the whole vast development of physics and astronomy of the last two centuries, Newton did not pretend to lay down what gravitation was : he merely said, if you will accept these assumptions of mine, you will find that all known cases of attraction of solid bodies one to the other will fall into line; and what is more, you will, I trust, be able to solve all kinds of problems regarding the movements of bodies in space. And, sure enough, during two centuries and more Newton's laws were tested and not found wanting. And then, since the beginning of this century, comes Einstein and shows that Newton's laws are all very well for a world of three dimensions, but let us assume that there is a fourth, a time-space dimension, and then we must predicate a wholly different series of relationships. This he proceeded to do, and as you all know, observers in different parts of the world have tested and confirmed Einstein's theory.

This brings me to illustrations of my second point. Einstein's work in itself, and this confirmation by independent observers, has, as it were at a blow, rendered Euclid's postulates and Newton's laws only relatively, and no longer, as we used to think, absolutely, correct. The same fate, since the beginning of this century, has affected another great law, namely, John Dalton's Atomic Law, to which we owe very largely the vast development of synthetic and analytic chemistry during the nineteenth century. Dalton assumed that ultimately each element is composed of indivisible units, or atoms, each unit possessing a specific weight, and that every chemical compound is made up of an exact number of atoms of one element combined with an exact number of atoms of another element or elements. But now during these last few years J. J. Thomson, and Rutherford and his school, have shown that the atom, far from being an ultimate and indivisible unit, is a most complicated constellation of positive and negative electrons or charges of electricity : that an element like radium is constantly breaking down and liberating another element, helium. Thus Dalton's law is now seen to be only valid under a limited group of conditions, and our views upon the nature of matter are entirely altered.

The method of science, or natural or practical philosophy, is thus that of the search after truth by progressive assumptions.

The method of ordinary or speculative philosophy is to eschew assumptions, and to seek to arrive at exact truth not by imagination but by ratiocinative methods alone.

Let me propound to you a parable. As a boy I looked out from my bedroom window at the top of the house over the wide ees or water meadows of the Mersey, with the sluggish river meandering through them in wide curves, to where, some half mile away, the old Bridgewater canal crossed both ees and river—the first canal to be constructed in England, the better part of two centuries ago. Presently I found out the significant history of just that section of the canal. It was here that Brindley, the Duke of Bridgewater's self-taught engineer, encountered what appeared to be an impossible state of affairs that presaged the complete failure of the undertaking. No sooner was earth placed to form an embankment to carry the canal across the ees than it was swallowed up, cartload after cartload, by the quicksands. This was long before the days of caissons and cement. The Duke was thrifty and his capital limited. To suck out the quicksands by huge pumps, or by any other means to get down to rock bottom and then build a solid causeway across the river bed, was wholly beyond either the engineering or the financial resources of those days. So Brindley, after his habit, took to his bed, if I remember aright, for the better part of a week : then he rose and ordered some thousands of loads of brushwood to be brought. These he laid down over the ees, and in this way floated his embankment and his canal across the water meadows. Generations have passed, and still that canal remains fulfilling its functions, carrying coal and heavy merchandise between Worsley and Manchester, and Runcorn and the sea.

This is the parable of science and of metaphysics. If you wait until you have reached the rock bottom of absolute truth upon which to build, you may wait — I admit in most distinguished company, from Plato to Bosanquet—but you will wait in vain, for you will still be where you were, in the quicksands. At most, in the process of much digging you may sharpen your tools to an extraordinary degree. If, on the other hand, you study and take advantage of the properties of quicksands you may build over them, and advance.

And here, taking leave of the *speculative* philosophers, let me insist that the method of the pragmatist or *practical* philosopher and the scientist is the same. He accepts as truths, adequate for present purposes, that which when tested is found to satisfy, or solve most satisfactorily, the problems to which it is applied. He accepts ideas, or assumptions, which by processes of logic appear to be incapable of proof, but which are shown to be adequate, and to this extent valid, when put to the test of experience; and he works on these, and by scientific discipline establishes progressively a series of laws which may be accepted by all workers. He employs, in fact, the method of Newton, who did not attempt to prove the existence of attraction between solid bodies, but showed that when certain assumptions had been made and worked up, *all* cases of the movements and mutual relationships of solid bodies, from the stars downwards, fell into order.

So in the case of religion. My part has been to show that the methods of approach to science and religion are identical. I want to make it clear that the scientist may come to a clear knowledge of religious truth by the very methods he has employed at his own work. A man's faith is not built upon reason, but upon conviction, and that conviction may rise from a series of assumptions made and accepted as in the case of natural laws. In brief, we cannot prove that there is a God, but our conviction of His existence may be arrived at by progressive assumptions.

But you will object :—A great gulf is fixed between Science and Religion : the assumptions of the former are proved valid by actual material experiment; in matters spiritual, experiment is impossible; at most we fall back upon experience to establish the validity of our convictions; and experiment and experience, while analogous, are not the same. Quite so, but it must be remembered that most of the sciences of to-day depend upon experience—some of them entirely—as a means of advance. It is only the exact sciences, mathematics and the physico-chemical group, that base themselves in their entirety upon experiment. The more modern sciences—of language, for example, of sociology and political economy—are entirely based upon experience. As to the relative value and dependability of experiment

and experience, I would say this: that whereas a single experiment is most often to be trusted, a single personal experience is largely valueless. It is the summation of a vast number of concordant experiences that has scientific value, and in the absence of direct experiment this, and this only, can be depended upon for the establishment of natural laws.

So in the spiritual world. A man may come to a knowledge of God by a series of assumptions which point to one end, and which tested by experience stand firm and throw other spiritual truths into place. In such a way his whole faith may be built up. This, I would contend, may be the reverent attitude of the student of science. But let me emphasize, in all humility, that the truth revealed is not absolute but approximate, whether in the matter of experiment and experience, whether in science or religion. In this world we can see but through a glass darkly; we must wait for further revelation and fuller knowledge.

. . . . . .

And thus it is that at long last I come to the subject matter of this address, namely, the Spirit of God in Nature as realized by a student of science. I have purposely spent time in defining his approach to God, in showing it as a rational and a personal approach which can stand the test of experience. If my treatment of the subject proper has to be somewhat concentrated in consequence, it will I trust be clear and definite.

To begin at the beginning, that student is faced with the three primary assumptions: (1) that there is no God; (2) that there are many Gods; and (3) that there is one God governing all things. He is forced to dismiss the first of these because, without some directing principle, Nature and life are meaningless. As regards the second, the progressive experience of mankind during the historical period has dismissed it. The recognition of law and order throughout the universe, the recognition, further, that there cannot be law and order without some controlling and directing force, makes the third the only possible assumption. We thus arrive at the first great spiritual law of Nature—One God governing all things.

The acceptance of this first great law calls for or necessi-

tates—as Professor Eddington points out,[2] a second, namely, *that He is beneficent*, or, shall I say, *that under His direction Nature moves towards ever increasing perfection.* For, again, any other hypothesis is meaningless. As a corollary to this second and essential conception we are forced to assume that the endowment of matter with the attributes of life, and the evolution of living creatures, are means to this one end.

Realizing the marvellous vastness of the universe thus controlled by the Deity, and that it is only under the very special conditions of temperature, carbon, oxygen and other relationships that man has been evolved on the surface of one of the smallest of the planets, it is wholly presumptuous on our part to regard God as possessing human shape or human attributes. By no effort of our imagination can we picture Him more precisely than as a spirit, omnipotent and omnipresent. We are sensible of this in moments of spiritual alertness and awareness. We perceive His expression in the beauty and wonder of the material world. A sunset may be in technical language a mere collection of coloured lines and spots, but it may bear for us a spiritual significance inexpressible in words. We are convinced that, however it may be accounted for by natural means, it is a spiritual sign and symbol; it betokens a vast, eternal, controlling Power which cannot be expressed or imagined in finite language.

We have said that the student sees Nature moving towards an ever increasing perfection, directed by a beneficent spirit. The evolution of man upon our planet from the lowest forms of amoebic life to the finest product of humanity is proof of this advance, and the development and progress of life in the natural and in the scientific worlds is but another proof. But let us go one step further. If there is advance, there is also failure. How can we reconcile the two? Surely thus. Perfection is seen to be the final end, but pain and suffering are permitted, are indeed within the will and purpose of the Spirit. They are part of the whole plan, and they may be found, if accepted as from an all-powerful love and wisdom, as part of the progressive purpose, as actual means of fulfilling the perfect

[2] In his essay 'The Domain of Physical Science' in *Science, Religion, and Reality.*

end and will of the Eternal Spirit—necessary for the whole plan in its entire fulfilment. And as we take a further view still, we students of science may see that even death is as necessary as life to the final ordering of the universe, for were the world to be inhabited by beings incapable of death, yet subject in the course of ages to repeated maimings, then regression, not progression, would be the result. And while at times it may be difficult to reconcile the ruthlessness of the struggle, the pain, the misery, the pitiful dominance of the strong over the weak, with the existence and ruling of a beneficent Deity, we are forced to conclude that not only is there some wider plan than we can see which permits and uses these elements, but also that this life is not the end : that the endowment of matter with these properties which constitute life has meant the simultaneous endowment of them with something spiritual, which persists after the matter has become broken up and disorganized—*in fact, that the soul is immortal.*

Is the student of science to draw back here? No. The foundation of his spiritual conviction may be found in his natural instincts. 'I am certain of nothing,' said Keats, 'but the holiness of the heart's affections and the truths of the imagination.' In that first line there lies the core of belief in the life to come. The supremest moments of human love have in them something eternal and spiritual, they are of such a nature that I know that the soul which partakes of them cannot perish. Had I no Christian hope I should be assured of my own immortality by these apprehensions, and these movements, breathings as I believe them to be, of the Spirit within us.

> 'Oh God within my breast,
> Almighty ever present Deity,
> Life that in me has rest,
> As I, undying life, have power in Thee.'

It is when, whether as students of science and the natural world, or of religion and spiritual truths, that we are brought into direct contact with these great conceptions of life and death, when we are most baffled by the apparent conflict between struggle and advance, happiness and pain, that we are flung back upon the vast background of the eternal and all-pervading Spirit for satisfaction and solution. Yet it is at this very part

I would say that our progress is arrested. The Spirit is too vast for our finite needs. We need someone we can comprehend, something we can picture. We need, indeed, what we are given in the fulness of time—*Jesus Christ.*

Quite apart from the historical evidence of His being and His sayings, which I hold must be accepted, there is the extraordinarily significant fact that His appearance upon earth coincided with human developments and human needs. So long as man worshipped a tribal or a national god or gods he could endow him or them with human attributes, and with this could experience a personal approach and personal relationships. So soon as such conception of the Deity no longer satisfied, and man passed to contemplate a single God, ruler and controller of the whole universe, not as a human being but as a spirit infinitely beyond man, from that moment do you not see the absolute need there was for one who was *not* impersonal and unapproachable, but for one who was God in human shape, who could as man interpret God to man, whom man through his manhood could understand, whose example and whose teaching made possible the higher spiritual life. Jesus was the great *need* of the world, translating the purpose of the Spirit by His words and His life, translating the unformed longings of the human heart into their true worship and expression. And our earlier assumptions simply lead us to conviction of His reality. He is the living expression of our faith, the final end of our slow and often painful progress in religious belief.

> 'Strong Son of God, immortal love,
> Whom we that have not seen Thy face,
> By faith, and faith alone, embrace,
> Believing where we cannot prove.'

He is the key to all our spiritual apprehension and striving. He is the hope of the world and the certainty of our immortality.

And as He stooped to enter this natural world, so He made use of it. The natural gifts of bread and wine are charged by Him with eternal significance and become instruments of the divine Spirit. For, transcending all else in human experience and acting as the culmination of Christ's message to us, is His ordination of the Blessed Sacrament of Holy Communion. Whatever view a man may take regarding what happened, this

is certain, that in partaking of the bread and wine, and approached in the right spirit, he does enter into communication with the Holy Ghost, and does experience the divine indwelling, and from this onwards through prayer and communion there may be ever closer and closer union of his individual human being with the divine.

I have dwelt at length upon what may be the progress of a rational and ordered mind in apprehending the divine Spirit, and I hope I have shown that it can lead to one end only—Christ. May I conclude by offering you a parallel of which I have lately become acutely conscious. If we read the lives and the writings of the great mystics we shall see that the stages of their ascent may be roughly divided into Christocentric and Theocentric. In the earlier stages many of them confine themselves to meditation upon the life of Christ, His words, His passion, and His death. Farther on, as a natural sequence, they become so absorbed in the life of God, so penetrated with the divine Spirit, that they can hardly find words to express it. The further they are advanced in spiritual apprehension of the Godhead, the harder it is to explain it. So they employ terms of natural imagery, Air, Light, Heat, Fire, Flame—poor and finite still, yet seeking to express the boundlessness and the majesty of the Spirit whom they have come to realise and to know. So it may be, as I see it, for the student of science, though in reverse order. The more and the longer he ponders upon the workings of the Eternal Spirit, the more, in my opinion, will he be thrust back upon the life of Christ as the eternal expression of that Spirit. And conversely, if he dares to build in religion as he does in science, and relies upon the experience he has gained, he will find that he will grow into ever wider and wider knowledge of spiritual truth and spirtual apprehension, so that, like the Theocentric mystic, words and imagery will fail him. Yet, however wide and deep his knowledge of the Spirit's workings, it can indeed only be expressed in *one way*. More and more as the years have passed I become convinced that the love of God is everything, and that if a man possesses this all other things are secondary.

ST. FRANCIS AND TO-MORROW

By G. G. Coulton, D.Litt., author of *Christ, St. Francis and To-day; Medieval Studies*, etc.

IT was thirty-seven years ago, and very nearly *nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita*, that I found myself as Assisi in company with a man who, more truly than any other that I have known, was *anima naturaliter Franciscana*. He had been born and bred in Italy; he had taught me a little Italian through the *Fioretti* and the *Vita Nuova* and the *Commedia*; and he was now on one of his too brief holidays, only a few years before he gave his life for his flock, in a very real sense, as house-master during an epidemic of influenza. Some Malvern pupil or some Oxford man may by chance read these lines and be glad to see the name of Henry Huntington again. In those days the British public knew a little of St. Francis through Mrs. Oliphant, but none of the Franciscan documents were accessible in English, nor would they have paid for the printing. The hotel at Assisi was small and the guests few; true, our visit was in December and January. The visitors spoke more German, probably, than English; upon the table lay H. Thode's recent book on *St. Francis and Art*, left, no doubt, as a parting present. My companion, with his Italian speech and manners, was welcome to all we met, from friar or official custodian to peasant; they were proud and garrulous of their Saint, but not yet so far awakened from primitive simplicity as to draw any clear-cut distinction between the foreign tourist and ordinary humanity. We saw these peasants very much as a stranger might have seen them seven hundred years ago. We helped a woman with her load; how many children had she? 'Five,' she said, '*e uno in corpo*.' We climbed for leaves from the ilex that overhangs the ravine of the Carceri, from whence (among many other places) St. Francis is said to have preached to the birds: the good friar who kept the cell, and whose enthusiasm had kindled us, was pathetically anxious for our lives: 'Take care, my little son, take care!' It was, in its simplicity, a world one can scarcely hope to see again. A few years after this, Professor Sabatier's *Life* came and created an epoch. It fitted in with the other kindred contemporary impulses; with the activities of Toynbee Hall and the Fabian Society, and continental movements which

found a voice in Leo XIII's encyclical on Labour. Mystics had long been looking backward towards the Middle Ages; social reformers were opening their eyes to the bankruptcy of *laissez faire*, and to the fact that our ancestors did, in theory at least, rather subordinate economics to righteousness than righteousness to economics. Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelites had made men turn seriously to early art; the intensive study of Dante, mainly led by Dr. Wicksteed, had been going on for some years among us. Each of these new movements recognized something of its own in St. Francis; therefore the little volumes of medieval Franciscan records translated into English have sold, within the last twenty-five years, literally in hundreds of thousands; more freely, in some cases, than even in their native Italian, and incomparably more than in any other language. It may perhaps be said that this 3rd of October was welcomed more strikingly by the general public in England than in France. And now 'the tumult and the shouting dies'; and what is left? And what will be left a year hence—a generation hence?

The only value of an article of this kind is that the writer should think aloud, and take his readers freely into his confidence. Dissociating St. Francis as much as possible from merely transitory moods and circumstances; forgetting that we have heard him broadcasted and seen him advertised; retaining from the sermons and newspaper articles only what seems as if it may belong to us for the rest of our lives, where do we find the main significance, and the abiding significance, of it all?

First and foremost, there is the astounding and almost miraculous fact that, after seven hundred years, far more people are talking and thinking about this man than during his lifetime. One at least of those who knew the living man, Jordan of Giano, thought him over-rated in those days; he confesses that it was the post-mortem miracles which brought him to full belief.[1] Those modern readers who feel that some of the panegyrics have been in a falsetto key, or who have been rather repelled than edified (as I have known in the case of a very earnest Christian socialist), must yet recognize that we have here something of the same phenomenon as in the Christian

[1] This can be followed now in Miss E. Gurney Salter's excellent translation, *The Coming of the Friars Minor* (Dent, 1926; p. 180).

origins themselves. A man who never condescended to bid for power, and who played far more for reality than for spectacular effect, has exercised enormous, and even in some ways increasing, power and fascination. Time has not withered him, nor custom staled; his memory rises superior to the faults that have been committed and the foolish things that have been said in his name; so that, in present-day society, many of the men and women who are most deeply concerned for betterment, and readiest to sacrifice themselves for the general good, do acknowledge more or less direct inspiration from him. Here, as in the existence of Christianity itself, we get a hard historical fact which demands strict attention even from those who are least sympathetic to its general claims. Those who are most impatient with the miracles, as told in the *Fioretti* or by Celano, must still face the argument with which St. Gregory meets the objection that the Church of his day was no longer working the signs and wonders which Christ promised to His followers (*Mark* xvi, 14 *ff.*). Such bodily miracles, Gregory admits, are now rare, but does not the Church work spiritual miracles? Is it not a 'taking up of serpents' to drive malice from men's hearts? Is it not a greater thing to cure a sick mind than to lay hands upon an ailing body?[2] In the same way, is not St. Francis's continued influence, right down into a world that he never dreamed of, the first and last and greatest miracle of all? It is no mere chance that the very name of Francis, almost unknown until after 1180, was given quite naturally, three centuries later, to the first great philosopher of Protestant England, and that it was probably borne by a score of those men who assembled at Trinity College on the 5th of October to hear the panegyric on Lord Verulam.

But let us look at St. Francis's *corporalia miracula*, as St. Gregory would have called them. Here, again, are things which no serious student can dismiss without consideration. In the light of what we know about other men who have had remarkable influence over animals, we must take these legends of St. Francis to prove at least a personal fascination which survives all legitimate scepticism. Take, for instance, the story of the sermon to the swallows (*Little Flowers*, ch. xvi):

[2] I quote the long argument in full, with others to the same effect from later Churchmen of the Middle Ages, in *Christ, St. Francis and To-day*, pp. 28-34.

> 'At a little town that was called Savurniano, St. Francis set himself to preach, but first he bade the swallows that were twittering keep silence till such time as he had done the preaching; and the swallows were obedient to his word; and he preached there with such fervour that all the men and women of that town minded through their devotion to come after him.'

After making all fair allowance for exaggeration, and, on the other hand, taking into account that this is only one of many similar stories preserved by his loving disciples, is there any sufficient reason for doubting that there is a real basis of truth here, and of very reasonable truth? A stranger, not like other men, comes to a remote village (we shall not find Savurniano in *The Times Atlas*) and begins to preach. The swallows attract attention; he commands silence, and, by that very act, fixes attention upon himself. Then comes his message, direct from Christ, with a consuming fire of sincerity which could hold a pope and his conclave spellbound; and, when the sermon was over, any listener would have sworn to us that not a twitter had been heard from the swallows. If this was what happened (and can the most sceptical, with any show of fairness, deny the probability of some such occurrence?), may we not insist here upon the superiority of the spiritual to the corporal miracle? In this rejoice not, that the swallows are made subject unto you, but rather rejoice because your names are written in heaven. In this spirit we may approach also the vexed question of the Stigmata. For a corporal miracle here, in the strict sense of the word, there is no real evidence; here, and in the Portiuncula Indulgence, if I may venture to say so, Professor Sabatier adopts a method rather hagiographical than historical. He not only speaks of Frate Elia's account and Celano's account as identical, but is actually betrayed by this pre-occupation into a mistranslation of Celano which brings the two texts much closer together.[3] Yet it is even less historical to ignore the distinction between these two accounts than it would be to ignore that between *Luke* vi, 20 and *Matt.* v, 3. In each case we have one version which, though it can conceivably be reconciled with the other, does in fact contain an addition strongly suggestive of tendencious improvement. Moreover, in the Stigmata case we have reason for the gravest suspicions; for the first simple description of the matter is that of an eye-witness, written within a

[3] Ed. 1894, p. 405. *Cf.* 403: 'tous les témoignages sont d'accord,' etc.

few hours of the Saint's death; while the elaborated description is that of a panegyrist who makes no profession of direct observation, and who wrote two and a half years at least, perhaps longer, after the event, at the bidding of a Pope and in view of St. Francis's canonization. No actual eye-witness has recorded any more concerning these five wounds than might be explained by fairly ordinary natural causes. My own belief does, in fact, go farther than this; it may well be the most remarkable case of auto-suggestion on record. Yet the strict evidence does not necessarily take us so far, and those who believe this are influenced less by Elia's letter than by their conception of the Saint's life and character. Whereas thousands of contemporaries admired Francis because of the Stigmata, we marvel at the Stigmata because of St. Francis.

For certainly this was a most extraordinary personality. Even if we managed to persuade ourselves that all the stories told about him are false, we should still have to visualize a person of such charm as to inspire one of the most beautiful series of fairy-stories in world-literature. Renan seldom went deeper or spoke more truly than when he said: 'We have definite evidence that, apart from miraculous circumstances, the real character of St. Francis of Assisi corresponds exactly with the portrait which has come down to us. Francis has always been one of my strongest reasons for believing that Jesus was very nearly such as He is depicted for us by the Synoptic Gospels' (*Nouv. Etudes*, 1884, p. 326). I do not think anyone can read *The Mirror of Perfection*, or the first part of *The Little Flowers*, without feeling that these bring him into the presence of a great reality, in whatever terms he may finally interpret it. On the other hand, I do not think anyone can form an adequate conception of the Saint's personality from any other book, however penetrating and eloquent, without reading either those or some other of the earlier documents, such as Celano's two *Lives*. Only thus can we adequately measure the extraordinary success with which Francis reconciled two ordinarily conflicting impulses—Originality and Obedience. Not, of course, that even he could completely reconcile them; but he probably did so more nearly than anyone else within the history of close upon nineteen centuries. Some of this harmony he was able to hand down to his Order; but, in the nature of the case, it depended

mainly upon personal qualities and personal efforts; therefore many of his followers were original at the expense of obedience, more still were obedient to the detriment of originality. And the whole Order, as an Order, failed altogether in what many people conceive as St. Francis's main doctrine: the frontal and direct attack upon the problem of poverty. The Greyfriars, who were explicitly forbidden by their Rule to touch money, whether directly or indirectly, soon became a body among whom the usurer could generally count on buying absolution when he was rejected by the parish priest. The most rapid growth of usury and other capitalistic manifestations was not before 1210, but afterwards, through the rest of the Middle Ages and beyond. For here the Saint's attitude was impossible except to a few handfuls of exceptional people; and almost equally impossible, in the long run, was his indifference to learning.[4] A strict adherence to the Rule would have meant a retrograde step towards barbarism in this matter. Finally, the Order which he founded did in fact depart so soon and so widely from the lines marked out for it that, within less than a century, four Franciscans were publicly burned at Marseilles at the instigation of their fellows, and two of the mortal crimes solemnly rehearsed at their condemnation were, in plain language, simply refusals to accept those relaxations which had now become almost universal. It had become a crime to adhere strictly and obstinately to the Saint's Rule and his Testament. In the later generations of the Middle Ages, the Friars gave more difficulty than any others to disciplinarians and orthodox reformers; and the Franciscans gave more, perhaps, than the other three Orders. They occupied very much the position occupied, in Pascal's day, by the Jesuits. They were tempted to stress the emotional side of religion unduly; and their learning, very real at one time, had mainly degenerated into superficialities. They were notoriously easy confessors to all from whom money or favour could be expected. Finally, their enormous privileges, their influence at the Papal court, and their close confederation on all points where they had common self-interest, rendered them formidable to their adversaries and practically independent

[4] I do not here forget Fr. Hilarin Felder's contrary plea; the real learning shown in his book emphasizes the insignificance of his results when we weigh them in the scales of history.

of spiscopal or archiepiscopal control. The unique lesson of St. Francis is in his own personality; the main lesson of later Franciscanism is in the besetting dangers of institutional religion.

Yet we can no more dispense with institutionalism than with personality; and for us, as for St. Francis, the question is how to reconcile these two. In his person he teaches us how much more nearly the ordinary man can approach to Christ, if he will, than we ourselves have in fact approached. He did the hardest thing in the world—love thy neighbour as thyself—with the conviction that it was the easiest thing, when once the lesson had been learned; and this conviction he communicated to many others. But the story of his Order warns us against certain natural yet fatal miscalculations. No institution can succeed in the long run which solemnly pledges its members never to change their minds on certain all-important questions. The Franciscan pledged himself irrevocably (and very often in his teens) to ecclesiastical orthodoxy, to celibacy, and to touch no money nor possess any property, even of the most insignificant value. If, twenty years later, he saw any of these things in a new light, there was no hope for him in any direction. He might not retire and live his own new life in accordance with his own new conscience; to his last breath he was bound by that vow of obedience. St. Francis here anticipated Loyola's *perinde ac cadaver*; the disciple must be as passive 'as a corpse.' If he left his convent, Civil Law itself sent him back as a prisoner. The result was, not an Angelic Order, but one in which chastity and poverty and obedience were frequently violated, and therefore all the more stress was laid upon that orthodoxy which could be far more easily kept or feigned, and which had a vigilant and terrible guardian in the Inquisition. Though Francis and Dominic staved off that religious revolution which finally came three centuries later, yet this was at a heavy cost.

But they did stave it off; and, on the whole, my personal feeling is that this was right; the time was ripe in 1517, but 1217 would have been premature. Corruption cried for reform; but reform at that moment might have meant anarchy, followed by a long reaction towards absolutism. And here, perhaps, is a lesson from Franciscanism, not intrinsically most important of all, but of special importance to Modernists. Our temptation is to undue neglect of institutionalism. Study forces upon us a

sense of its weakness; but to realize its strength and its necessity we need self-examination, self-control, and (perhaps hardest of all) self-spurring in a direction contrary to our natural sympathies. An institution which we feel to be inadequate can never be effectively replaced by mere individualism; society necessarily moves forward to combinations of greater and greater complexity. If we ourselves are to press on, in friendly competition, closer to the footsteps of Christ, it must be through some sort of society; we must set up, as against the institution in which we cannot find the fulness of our soul, some other institution in which we can, and in which others can who feel as we do. It need not be so formal or so definitely regulated as that which it seeks to replace; the earliest Christian Church, by the admission of modern scholars of all schools, was less formally constituted than that imperial society in whose bosom it was born, and which it has long outlived. But the institution must have a real objective existence; 'I am a Modernist' must mean something as definite as is consistent with the necessary development of thought from generation to generation; and the sense of brotherhood among Modernists must be as strong as it is among Catholics.

It is possible to feel the need for this without clear vision of the society itself, or of the means by which it will come about. It may be that, after generations of negociations for Reunion, Christians will gradually split into two camps. There will be those for whom Reunion means what it meant to Newman: '"Beggars cannot be choosers," if you and we are to join forces, it must be by your complete submission to us.' Apart from these men will stand those of every creed who realize that, on Newman's lines, present cleavages will only multiply in number, and deepen and widen as they multiply. The strictest Church of the present day is compelled to allow very great variations of belief on matters of supreme religious and moral importance; a Roman Catholic may believe in the salvation of Protestants in a sense almost as liberal as that of Protestants themselves, and yet kneel naturally, without the least *arrière-pensée*, side by side with another who on this point holds with St. Thomas Aquinas and the Blessed Robert Bellarmine. Is it Utopian, therefore, to hope for some future concordat on all questions of Christian dispute, since we have here only a question of degree?

But, in whatever way some such concordat may come, the Modernist is bound to pray for that day, to work for it, and above all quietly to prepare himself for it. This means no abandonment of principle; on the contrary, it means continued self-reminder of a higher principle. It means that, though for the present we can see no decisive move, yet we lie all the while in the trenches, ready to go over the top at the first sound of the whistle.

For there always has been, and always will be, a very real truth in the ideal of calculated and moderate asceticism: of keeping the soul fit for emergencies just as we keep the body fit. Some readers will remember what William James says about voluntary poverty in *Varieties of Religious Experience* (pp. 363 *ff*). As against the ultra-optimistic philosophy which thinks we may safely ignore evil, let us recognize (he says) the fact that asceticism

> 'symbolizes, lamely enough, no doubt, but sincerely, the belief that there is a real element of wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but must be squarely met and overcome by an appeal to the soul's heroic resources, and neutralized and cleansed away by suffering. [The easy optimist never suspects] that he may all the while not be really inside the game [of life], that he may lack the greater initiation. Well, this is exactly what asceticism thinks; and it voluntarily takes the initiation.'

Many of us are only not socialists because we do not believe that socialism, as commonly preached, would work. As economists we disbelieve in the immediate equalization of incomes; but as moralists are we not bound to keep it in view as an ideal, and to accept every step which seems really to lead that way? Can we be sure of that, unless to some extent we test ourselves? And can we effectively test ourselves without some sort of asceticism? The man who makes the lucky discovery, as Pasteur insists, is the man who by years of patience has prepared himself to seize upon fortune the moment she comes within his reach. We cannot make a Saviour of Society, but we can make the paths straight for him. When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith upon earth? That depends greatly upon the further question: Is the social consciousness as strong among Modernists as among Traditionalists? Can we apply to them with equal truth the beatitude of Malachi: *Then they that feared the Lord spake often to one another; and the Lord hearkened and heard it.*

MYSTICISM AND MODERNISM

By The Rev. C. E. Grammer, S.T.D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia.

MYSTICISM is to-day advocated as the sovereign cure for doubt, and the refreshing spring whose waters will renew the youthful vigour of faith. Baron von Hügel in the Church of Rome, Dean Inge in the Church of England, and Rufus Jones, Hocking, and Bennett in America, are only a few of the leaders of a host of writers who advocate its methods and maintain its great value, both for life and also for thought. Certainly it is an experience and method well worth the study of open-minded seekers after truth.

Of course there are many kinds of mysticism. Some of its manifestations and types are clearly pathological, and have their origin in a deranged nervous system. Some are chiefly philosophical and based on an analysis of knowledge; the outgrowth of the conviction that the mind only knows sensations—a discovery that lies at the root of the entire philosophy and the mysticism of India, a discovery which seems to have put an end to all further discoveries in that land.

But the mysticism which I have in mind in this paper is the religious mysticism of the West, a mysticism whose basis is not a philosophy, but an experience. The need that it supplies is not the desire for an explanation of the Kosmos, but the soul's yearning to come into contact with God. It is the mysticism that Rufus Jones has so admirably treated in his *Studies in Mystical Religion*; the type of religion that puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine presence.

It is mysticism of this character that the distinguished writers, to whom I have referred, are advocating as the true road to peace, and power, and the knowledge of God.

It will, perhaps, assist us to quiet the doubt about the validity of the mystical line of approach to the central problem of the religious life, the knowledge of God, a scepticism which will arise when we consider the delusions, fanaticisms and excesses for which mystical revelations have been alleged, if we bear it

in mind that the mystical method is not peculiar to religion, but is resorted to with admirable results in other fields. The method is, in truth, a psychological necessity, and an entirely normal process. It is a way of keeping in our consciousness the totality of things. It is the corrector of the limitations of the process of the analytical intellect. For the method of the intellect is to divide in order to conquer. Its entire procedure is a tearing apart of the unity of things and arranging the conglomerate mass into strata and layers. It rends apart the seamless robe of reality and unravels its warp and woof. It is the mystery of mysteries that reality can be so successfully treated in this fashion. The Higher Reason, what the Germans call *die Vernunft*, from its central keep, watches the logical faculties at their work, and appreciates that it is a process of dissection, and realizes the danger that in the process of life of the whole may be overlooked.

Our method is first to separate by a wide gulf the observer, the subject, and the things observed, the object. How philosophy has laboured to pass over this great gulf! When we divide the 'object' up into various strata, first by eliminating every quality but the categories of number and quality, we have mathematics; then by considering simply matter and motion, and the phenomena of inanimate matter outside the structure of the molecule, we build up a science of physics; chemistry limits itself to the forces within the molecule; botany, to the life of plants; zoology, to animals; physiology, to man's body; man's mental operations are studied in metaphysics, logic, and ethics; his institutions and his history are separate departments of knowledge. Marvellous is the progress achieved in knowledge and in arts and industry by such processes of division, classification, and restriction of attention to separate fields. Innumerable are the sub-divisions into which each of these main divisions is divided.

But these divisions are clearly not reality itself. The philosopher and the artist, as well as the religious thinker, is keenly alive to the fact that in treating nature in this fashion we are using methods that blind us to the interpenetration, close association, general 'dovetailedness' of things. The gain secured by the concentration of attention has a corresponding loss in the vision of the reality. This objective world, divided by the under-

standing into mathematics, physics, and so forth, is no more the world that we experience than the globe with its lines of longitude and latitude is the globe that the mariner sails over; it is a helpful presentation for speculative and practical purposes, but it is not the real thing, which is immeasurably vaster and more complex, and more indigestible (so to speak).

The success of this method is based upon the ignoring of innumerable qualities. To take one outstanding case, there is an entire loss of the category of beauty. The beauty of the flowers is a mere incident in the science of botany, but in our actual life it is their main significance or value. Things in their beauty, and in their harmonious relations one to another, by the constitution of our minds awaken in us a profound and mysterious emotional response. Our heart leaps up when we behold the rainbow in the sky, or the billowy plain of the ocean reaching to the horizon's rim, or snow-capped mountains, or vast assemblies of people, either in a hall, or in the ordered march of parade.

We appreciate instinctively that through the contemplation of things as they are in their totality, in their complexity and unity, we come in peculiarly close touch with reality, by an emotional response. 'This is life,' the beholder exclaims, as he sees the activities of the Chamber of Commerce, or the marketplace, or the football match. 'This is the real thing.'

Here then, through our emotional response to the whole of things as they co-exist in their undifferentiated entirety, we have a way of knowing reality that supplements the method of the analytical reason and restores to us the unity of nature, which the other process mutilates. The methods are supplemental, each to the other; it therefore follows that neither should be permitted to destroy the other. Certainly these emotional responses speak with the accent of authority. Science uses them in its realm, and is content to rest upon the testimony of the emotions that sugar is sweet, musical notes accordant, and colours complementary one to the other. There are surely just as ultimate experiences as the conviction that an argument is sound because the logical understanding feels it to be so. It is basic that our emotional responses, our feelings, are one of the methods of coming into contact with reality.

This exaltation of feeling, from being merely a source of pleasure or pain into a channel of revelation and a means of knowledge, naturally makes the mystic attitude congenial to the artists in all their varied departments of literature, painting, and music. It also appeals to philosophers of a certain type in their efforts to unify all our experiences. There is, accordingly, an artistic mysticism, and a philosophical mysticism. Religious mysticism is only a manifestation in the department of religion of a special method of coming into contact with reality.

It would be helpful to greater clearness of thought if the limiting adjective were always associated with the noun, and we should always speak of religious mysticism, or philosophical mysticism, or artistic mysticism; such analysis, however, is contrary to the whole spirit of mysticism, which avoids all clear analysis, as well of the subject as of the object of consciousness. The name Mysticism without any qualification is used for this method of seeking to avoid the errors of analysis, by confronting the totality of things, and allowing the totality to make its impress upon our receptive consciousness.

Certainly religion, and the knowledge of God, which is the core of religion, is a most appropriate field for the method. If there is a God, He is the supreme reality, since in and by and for Him all things consist. The methods of analysis are certainly much restricted in dealing with a reality that is indiscerptible, that is everywhere in its potency. Since God is the supreme unity, there can be no surer way of coming into contact with things in their totality, than by coming into conscious relation with Him, who is the centre and core of all things. This is the experience which the mystics assert that they have had. They claim that they have become aware of Him; that He has dealt directly with them; that He is no longer to them a probable hypothesis, a logical deduction, an authoritative tradition that has proven helpful and fruitful in practice; He has become an experience, and has been realized as a presence.

Wordsworth reached this mystical sense of God through Nature. In his classical lines on Tintern Abbey, he tells us he felt:

> 'A sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.'

The religious mystic is, however, usually brought to this mystic experience by communing with his own heart, and meditating upon his yearnings for a sustainer, companion, and illuminator. The contrast between his need and the power manifested in the universe usually produces the experience, which Coleridge admirably expressed when he wrote:

> 'A sense o'er all my soul impressed
> That I am weak, yet not unblessed,
> Since in me, round me, everywhere
> Eternal strength and goodness are.'

The fundamental question, of course, is whether this experience is valid; whether it is a delusion, a hallucination, due to nervous defects, or whether it brings us authentic tidings of invisible things.

For my own part, I do not see how we can ascribe authority to the intuitions of artists, and, I might add, of scientists—for many of the greatest discoveries of science have been due to intuitions and mystical insights—and refuse validity to these intuitive responses to the nature of things, in the realm of religion, especially when the experience is undergone by minds that show themselves strong and well-balanced in other spheres, and proves fruitful in life.

Mark you, I say validity and not infallibility. I am not claiming that these experiences authenticate either the theology of the gifted soul that is blessed with them, or the interpretations that the subject puts upon them. These are the statements of the reason about those feelings, and not the feelings themselves. I am simply saying that the mystic is entitled to be believed when he reports that someone touched him, that some breath was breathed upon him, that he was conscious of a Presence with him, that he had a real experience, and not an hallucination.

Certainly it is an experience that, as William James has pointed out, is always felt by the subject to validate itself, though the analytical reason can after a while explain it away as an hallucination, if the subject of it so desires, just as the analytical faculty can explain away ethical distinctions, or the

reality of the external world, if negative conclusions are strongly desired either by passion, or deep weariness of life.

But really, the analytical reason is here not entitled to the final word. Like beauty and nobility, this is a question not of logic, but of susceptibility and experience. It belongs to another realm. For my part I accept it.

Certainly nothing could be sounder than the contention of Rufus Jones that this mystical element is manifest in the religion of Jesus, of Paul, and John. Jesus clearly felt Himself in communion with God, led by God, aware of the Father's will, blessed by the Father's love. Paul was convinced not merely that he had a vision of Christ on the road to Damascus, but that he had a vision of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and that he was so united with the God manifested to him by Christ and through Christ, that Christ might be said to dwell in him, and he in Christ.

Every student of Church History will agree that the revival of the mystical experience was at various times a great quickener of the vitality of religion. In the early centuries through the Montanists, in the Middle Ages by St. Bernard, Francis of Assisi, the Brethren of the Common Life, and the classical mystics of those times, Bonaventura, the Victors in France, and Suso, Eckhart and Ruysbroeck in Teutondom, among the Moravians and the Friends of the Protestant world, and in St. Theresa, Madame Guyon, Fénelon of the post-Reformation Catholic world.

There is on all hands among historians and philosophers a strong conviction that a revival to-day of Mysticism contains a promise of good things. The psychologists point out, with great force, as Bennett has shown in his *Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, that such a reaction in favour of Mysticism after the strenuous intellectualism of over a century is in accordance with a great instinct of our nature, whereby we seek, automatically, to maintain the balance of the mind, as well as the balance of the body. It is more, therefore, than a movement of thought, it is a movement of life, seeking to exercise all its functions.

Most heartily do I accept and endorse such teaching, with this important qualification, namely, that the mystical method of approach to God and reality is only one of several methods,

ınd that it can only be kept sane and helpful if the other methods ıre united with it, just as these other methods are deprived of nuch of their efficacy if they choke up mysticism's 'bubbling ;prings that feed the world.' For if there has been a barren and ıeartless intellectualism in religion, or a blind will-worship, a nere obedient submission to authority, and a mere practice of norality or rites and ceremonies, when mysticism has been crowded out, so there have been wild delusions of mystics and consecration of superstitions by ecstatic visions, and a complete separation of religion from the teachings of history and the claims of morality, when the understanding has been ignored. As Pfleiderer has well said, the history of the religions of India constitutes the final judgment upon mysticism unrestrained and uncorrected.

The reason of the failure is most apparent. Is it not obvious that we have no right to neglect any part of our nature, and in our effort to come into touch with reality and with Him who is the supreme reality, that we must confront the totality of things with the totality of our nature?

We do not consist merely of emotions. We have also an intellect and a will, to adopt the old convenient classification. We think, and will, as well as feel, to put it in more modern fashion.

Mysticism, that is so absorbed in the unity of all things in God, destroys the unity of man when it disparages, as it often does, the testimony of the intellect and will. For it must be emphasized that feeling is not our only point of contact with reality. Through feeling the poet may realize the beauty of the tree:

> 'I think that I shall never see
> A poem lovely as a tree—
> A tree whose hungry roots are pressed
> Upon the earth's sweet flowing breast;
> A tree that looks on God all day,
> And lifts its leafy arms to pray;
> A tree that may in summer wear
> A nest of robins in its hair.
> Upon whose bosom snow has lain,
> Who intimately lives with rain.
> Poems are made by fools like me,
> But only God can make a tree.

But reason also tells us other important truths about the tree,

such as its history and growth, its relation to other trees, t animals, and to man's purposes. That poem does not mak botany superfluous. I shall learn still more about a tree if I tr to climb it, or to cut it down, or to make it bear fruit by diggin about it and spraying it.

How little we should know about steam if we were conten only with feeling its heat and force and did not study its origi and changes; and how much more fruitful our study has bee made by our discoveries through using it.

The same principle holds good in realizing the Suprem Reality—God. It is surely not enough to feel Him in a mysti experience, as a great sustaining Power, on whom we depend nearer than breathing, closer than hands or feet. Our intellec must enquire whether He has not sent into the world grea religious geniuses, to help us to apprehend Him, as He ha granted us great geniuses to teach and lead us in the Arts, i Government, in Science, and in Morals. Our will must fin out by seeking to do His will, how fruitful it is of inwar strength and of helpful solutions. Our analytical faculties mus be encouraged in these explorations. Let them dig a littl deeper, and see whether they will not find God there; God implied in our premises, as well as God at the end of ou arguments; God everywhere.

Let mind take the wings of the morning, the glass of th telescope, the lenses of the microscope, the most delicate con ceivable instruments, let it travel to the uttermost parts of th universe, what can its report be, but even there it finds Him 'Earth with all her myriad voices praises God,' exclaims Cole idge in his hymn to Mont Blanc. Is it not true that all the de partments of our nature similarly testify to God? Surely thi acceptance of the testimony of all departments or faculties o our nature is a marked characteristic of the religion of the Ne Testament. In addition to its mystical element it also has reasonable element and a practical element and a pronounce ethical element, and an element of organization and worship.

It commands us to love God with our mind, and with ou strength or will, as well as with our heart, or emotional nature It appeals to the reasonable testimony of eye-witnesses for it facts, speaks of what eyes have seen, and hands handled, refer

o ancient writers, and to practical tests of fruits, and relies on organization and argument as well as the mystical response for he extension of the Kingdom of God.

I welcome the appeal to the Christianity of the New Testament, because besides its mystical quality, it has also intellectual and institutional elements. It seems to me that the ineffectiveness of Quakerism, in spite of its important contribution to Christendom, is due to the neglect of these other features of primitive Christianity, of these other methods of coming in contact with God.

I hope that the present revival of Mysticism will not fall into their error. I confess that I see many signs of its recurrence. It is the special duty of Modernists, the inheritors of the great tradition that right reason is a road to God, to utter warnings against this one-sidedness.

Experience has shown that that potted extract of man, known as a 'reasonable person,' is not the proper measure of all experience. The mystic, the pragmatist, the humanist has done as great service in pointing out the richness of man's nature and the manifoldness of his endowments. The revolt against excessive intellectualism has been justified. But it is not necessary or wise to swing to the other extreme, and reduce man to a mass of emotions, or if reason is recognized, to place it in a subordinate place and give emotion the helm. The rich variety of our endowments cannot safely be ignored in this way, nor can the sovereign right of reason to preside over our entire nature and harmonize all our faculties be wisely relinquished to the emotions!

Yet this is exactly what the mystics are prone to do. They persist in claiming that their type of religion is the only *vital* religion, and their proof of the existence of God is the only *valid* proof. For example, Professor Hocking disparages all the arguments for the existence of God except the ontological argument which is based upon a mystic feeling of His reality. All the other lines of proof are of no value in his judgment, since they do not awake the mystic response, but only prove an artificer and sustainer of the universe, and not the Absolute; in the opinion of mystics they are of no religious value. Surely this is a very dangerous way in which to defend religion. Ninety-nine

men out of a hundred do not feel any force in the ontological argument. Many people leading consistent Christian lives have never had any vivid mystical experience. Rufus Jones correctly argues that there is an element of intellect in the mystical vision though it is subordinate; it may be claimed with equal truth that there is an element of the mystical response in the feeling of satisfaction that Theism gives; that there is a mystic response in the *satisfactoriness* of the Christian solution of our religious and moral problems. The element is latent, and not predominant, as in the conscious mystic experience.

To tell people that the arguments they rely on to justify their belief in God are worthless and to denominate their piety as non vital because this mystical element is latent and not predominant, sounds very arrogant. This, indeed, is a fault to which mystics are very prone. I believe that such assertions are unwarranted. I hold that those arguments for the existence of God so derided by the mystics—the cosmological, the teleogical, the argument from the moral government to a moral governor, have value, each in its degree, and together possess an overwhelming power. I am convinced that the arguments of Balfour's great Gifford Lectures are sound, and that belief in God is the only rational justification of our aesthetics, ethics, and our confidence in the operation of our own reason. I admit there is a peculiar beauty about the mystic piety. The mystic is one who has been taken into the Father's intimacy. But surely he also is a true son, who accepts the Father's will and walks by faith without the vision. At one time John Wesley argued that there was no conversion without the mystic response in the consciousness of forgiveness, but toward the end of his life he repudiated such one-sidedness, and said that he wondered that people did not stone him when he made such assertions.

As for the mystic exaltation of the Absolute, I can only say with Mr. Balfour, that I have never been able to fuse the metaphysical conception of God as the Absolute, an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution with the God of religion, a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purpose and preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unim

paired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created.

I feel that there is truth in both conceptions, both lines of approach; I wish that I could harmonize them, but if I must abandon one, it will not be the latter, which makes much the stronger and more universal appeal. Such a God satisfies the needs of our will and our conscience. Our unity with Him is a union of personalities and of moral purpose, whereas the mystic union is too often a pantheistic absorption.

After all, religion is with most of us, and for all of us, I take it, most of the time, a matter of faith and not of vision.

Manifest are the defects of an exaggerated mysticism, the delusion of the feelings unguided by the intellect, or by practical experience. It is the mystical element in Evangelicalism that is to blame for the intellectual laziness of that school. Sometimes mysticism wages war upon ecclesiasticism, and treats the Church as an impertinence, and history as an allegory. But often it takes another turn, and consecrates all the dogmas or institutions that lie in the mind of the subject of the experience, at the time of his ecstatic rapture. In truth mysticism lays special snares for the feet of the lazy and the timid, and has contributed very little directly to the increase of religious knowledge, as Pfleiderer has well pointed out. It has been a great teacher of compromise. Men of one-sided emotional nature shrink from any open conflict with the authorities of the prevailing religious system. Content to dwell in the realm of emotion, they shrink from seeking to evaluate these emotions, from drawing out their implications, from checking them up. Whatever gives an emotional thrill mysticism is apt to accept, whether crude dogmas or superstitious practices.

Sometimes the mystics accept the theory that one form is as good as another, and that if we get the response, we need not ask what the intellect may say. So Keyserling, in his laudation of Indian mysticism, reports with approval the conduct of an Indian astronomer, who would calculate an eclipse mathematically, and then, on its occurrence, beat a gong to drive the evil spirits away. 'Quite right,' comments Keyserling, 'mystically, religiously correct.' It seems to me that some Modernists are in danger of following the same line of reasoning, when they

use because of its emotional value a ritual that symbolizes a theology they have abandoned. Certainly such a procedure does not unify our nature, one of the chief aims of religion.

But I must not dwell longer on the dangers of mysticism when it is dominant and removes reason from its proper throne. I emphasize it here, for this warning is one of the chief contributions that Modernism has to make to Mysticism. It supplies it with correctives and helps, and draws out into clear consciousness the implications of its emotions. For no school has so much to confer upon the mystics. They supplement one another. Of course, it follows from this, that no school stands more in need of mystical experience. An intellectual Modernism that despises religious experience is in evil case.

The remedy is to refresh the springs of thought and feeling by waiting upon God, in the cultivation of a wise passiveness, in refreshing the heart with beauty, in communing with the still small voice of conscience, in sitting at the feet of the great mystics, in walking with Him who, on the road to Emmaus, made the hearts of the disciples glow as he opened unto them the Scriptures. This is what we have too often left undone; we need more mystical experience.

Of course it does not follow that we must therefore disparage the intellect and will as sources of knowledge and fields of service. As the ship makes its way through the seas by a combination of the forces of the sail and the rudder, so we shall pursue the right course if we bring our whole nature, and all its faculties, to God. He has not left Himself without witness in our nature, neither in heart, nor mind, nor will. Alone none of them can find Him. The mystic of India either cries out that all is illusion, or smothers himself and God in the All. The intellect unaided by other faculties will either make God Unknowable, or the Absolute. The will will treat Him either as a working theory, or a tradition, or a blind force. Conjoined together they will bring us to theism, to the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. Surely this is the teaching of experience, as well as of reason.

The practical lesson is plain: What God has joined together, let not men put asunder. We must face the totality of reality with the totality of our faculties.

ALBERT HOUTIN

1867-1926.

By The Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A., author of *The Genius of the English Church.*

1. The life of Albert Houtin (1867-1926) covers an eventful period of religious history. It opened when the wave of Ultramontanism which came to a head at the Vatican Council of 1870 was at its height: he saw the ebbing of the tide; the rise and fall of Modernism; and the dawn of the new age which followed the war. *Quorum pars magna fuit*: he played no small part in these events. He was a great diarist, or (if I may coin a word) memoirist; *i.e.* a compiler of diaries and memoirs which will form material for future historians; he wrote from personal knowledge—of affairs in which he had been an actor, and of men whom he had known. He was not always discreet: had he been so, his writings would have lost much both in value and interest. But his answer to his critics on this score would have been, 'You should see what I left out.' He left much unsaid which might have been said without fear of contradiction: he had a flair for fact, a strong natural curiosity, a thirst for knowledge, and a certain native uprightness of mind. Only a few weeks before his death he had been appointed Director of the Paris Musée Pédagogique, an appointment honourable both to himself and to the Ministry of Public Instruction by which it was made. 'At last,' writes M. Loisy, 'he found himself in a position to make long plans and to look forward to the leisure necessary for their realization. It was not to be. Such is our human condition: the universe needs us not.' The words recall Pascal. The fact that so distinguished a man of letters as M. Félix Sartiaux is his executor is a guarantee that there will be neither *suppressio veri* nor *suggestio falsi* in dealing with his letters and papers. There have been cases of recent years in which both have been practised, and in which posterity has suffered an irremediable wrong. The birds of prey have come down upon the carcases; and there has been no Abraham to drive them away.[1]

[1] *Genesis* xv, 2.

2. He came of a vigorous peasant stock of mixed religious traditions. The pietistic predominated: as a boy he was covered with scapulars and medals, and dosed for childish ailments with the miraculous water of Lourdes. The one book at his disposal was the *Lives of the Saints*, which he read open-mouthed. The result was a strange blend of superstition and idealism. Hagiography, he says, decided his vocation, as the Lives of the Paladins did that of Don Quixote; Illusion 'marked him for her own.'

''Tis Sixty Years Since' is Scott's second title for Waverley. In France the gulf which lies between to-day and the Second Empire is scarcely less than that which separated the Scotland of the Regency from that of the Forty-Five. The contrast between Houtin's native village as it was in his boyhood and as it is now is startling. Then it was Catholic; the population as a whole went to mass. Now, he says, only a few children and old women do so. The offices of the church are confined to baptism, marriage, and burial; the habit, or convention, of religious observance is dead. We have parallels to this at home. Conduct, however, does not seem to have deteriorated. Formerly, after mass, the villagers went to the inn, often going home drunk. Now drunkenness and the quarrels to which it gave rise have almost disappeared.

3. In due course he entered the Diocesan Seminary, then under the direction of the Sulpicians. His account of that famous Society differs from the idealized picture given by Renan in *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse*. Its most prominent feature, he thought, was credulity; its special devotion being that to the Holy House of Loretto, miraculously transported by angels from Nazareth, first, it was believed, to Dalmatia, and later to Italy. If its members retained a certain moderation and good sense, these qualities were relative; their Gallicanism was, of course, a thing of the past. The seminary training of the clergy was instituted by the Council of Trent as a preservative against Protestant and other alien infiltrations. The aim of the system is segregation; its method supervision. This is minute and unceasing. For the seminarist, privacy is made impossible; the eye of the superior is about his path and about his bed, and spieth out all his ways. The segregation is

as complete as this supervision can make it. Periodicals, newspapers, serious works on philosophy, science, history or literature are prohibited; the text books in use are meagre scholastic manuals such as the Jesuit Hurter's *Medulla Theologiae*, or the *Institutiones Philosophicae* of Liberatore or Zigliara. Scripture was represented by the *Manuel Biblique* of the Sulpician Vigouroux. It is not a good book, though it is not a ridiculous one; but it was published as long ago as 1878, which dated it. It is to the credit of the existing generation of Sulpicians that a revised, though a very prudently revised, edition by M. Brassac, a member of that society, was placed on the Index last year. What can be the effect of such teaching on those subjected to it? A seminary professor compared his pupils to corn crushed under the millstone. Houtin's comment is, 'I can conceive no similitude more exact.'

4. Solesmes, the modern Cluny as it has been called—for it aspired to play the part in modern Catholicism which Cluny played in mediaeval—was a formative influence in his development. Originally a Benedictine Priory suppressed at the Revolution, it was restored by Dom Guéranger, the author of *L'année liturgique*, and raised to the rank of an Abbey in 1837. It represented a violent reaction against Gallicanism. Its spirit was that of a fanatical and intolerant sect: '*nos principes*' and '*nos idées*' were its watchwords; in the controversy which ended in the substitution of the Roman Missal and Breviary for the old French service books, it was more papal than the Pope and more Roman than Rome. Houtin was sensible of the attraction of the contemplative life, and ignorant of the dangers which beset it. Human nature does not cease to be human, even in the cloister; and Solesmes was at this time a house so divided against itself that the difficulties in the way of his profession happily proved insuperable. The conditions then prevailing in the congregation are almost incredible; they are described at length in *Une Grande Mystique, Madame Bruyère, Abbesse de Solesmes*. The book is a study of certain aggravated forms of religious hysteria; and the propriety of its publication has been questioned. Its justification is, I think, two-fold. It is in the public interest (1) that the mentality of the leading agents in the acute Romanizing of French, and in general of Western,

Catholicism which took place during the pontificate of Pius IX should be correctly estimated; and (2) that, as Illuminism is, and has always been, open to such perversions as those described, their recurrence should be guarded against. The concealment of the reverse side of a life to which enthusiasts easily persuade themselves, or are persuaded by others, that they have a vocation is simply dishonest. This applies to the secular priesthood as well as to what is technically known as 'religion'; what Paley calls 'Lies of Omission' are the worst of lies. The impression left is that of spiritual kidnapping. Houtin felt this strongly. 'To induce anyone to undertake the obligations of the priesthood under present circumstances, I should regard (he says) as the most abominable of crimes.' It is not necessary to compile a *chronique scandaleuse;* an elementary knowledge of human nature and of history is all that is required.

> 'How many tragedies are enacted behind the decorous façade of Catholicism!'

says Father Tyrrell. And Houtin quotes the cry of despair addressed by a disillusioned priest to the Rector of the Seminary who had encouraged him to take the irrevocable step: '*Oh, si j'avais su!* If I had only known. If you had only warned me!' *Si nous avertissions, il ne resterait personne*, was the answer; 'if we did, no one would remain.'

5. After his ordination his duties were those of a *maître d'étude*, and later of Professor of History, at the *Petit Séminaire* of his diocese. During his vacations he visited Spain, Germany, and England, thus obtaining a more general view of the religious situation than he had hitherto possessed. In Spain he noticed the somewhat modified celibacy which, it seemed, prevailed among the country clergy. '*Ils sont tous mariés*,' he was told; 'they were all married.' In England he found the Irish element, so prominent in the Catholic body, unattractive; and noticed what Dean Inge calls its 'almost insane malignity against England.[2] He read the works of Cardinal Newman, which he found uncut, in an East End clergy house, and was moved to tears by the *Apologia*. The Essay on Miracles and the Grammar of Assent seemed to him disquieting; they suggested more doubts than they solved. The disciples of the

[2] *England*, p. 141.

Cardinal may remind us that this was the criticism passed on Butler's *Analogy* by Pitt. He speaks of the 'Leakage,' or drifting away of Roman Catholics, particularly among the poor in the large towns, from their religion; and notices that secessions from the Protestant Churches were on the decline. Baron von Hügel, writing in 1912, also draws attention to this; 'the conversions to Rome, so numerous and remarkable between 1845-1870, have notably diminished in both respects, especially during the last decade,'[3] *i.e.*, that following the accession of Pius X. His experience of the Anglican clergy seems to have been fortunate; he found them 'gentlemen, *et des hommes bien élevés*.' The Anglo-Catholic community of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley, in particular, excited his admiration; he could have thought himself at Port-Royal. The late Father Congreve recalled the *solitaires* of that famous sanctuary; for the first time in his life, he says, he saw that the note of sanctity was not confined to Catholics or to the Catholic Church.

6. He was not yet in touch with the brilliant group of scholars—Duchesne, Loisy and the rest—who were working on critical and historical lines at the Paris Institut Catholique. But similar questions to these which occupied them had presented themselves to him, and produced a vague but deep-seated *malaise*. The scandals of Solesmes, which were dealt with a little later by the Inquisition—for indeed the community had come to resemble a lunatic asylum more than a religious house—had effectually dispelled his velleity to the cloister. The dream was broken; it was clear that the phenomena of which Solesmes had become a centre were pathological; and that a knowledge of the human mind in disease as well as in health was a *sine quâ non* of their understanding. On the other hand, he found the seminary training an 'intellectual castration.'[4] Roger Bacon suffered much, he tells us, 'by reason of the incredible stupidity' of his brethren in religion. Houtin might have said the same of that of the tutorial staff of which he was a member. He was expected, *e.g.*, to believe that the Apostles' Creed was a joint compilation of the Twelve, each of them contributing an article; the Professor of Scripture, while admitting that Jonah could not have been swallowed by a whale of the

[3] *Eternal Life*, p. 435.

[4] *Vie de Prêtre*, 40.

whalebone producing sub-order, insisted on his deglutition by a cachelot, or toothed whale, whose throat measurements (he said) were larger. He found a temporary shelter in what he describes as the *chimère consolatrice* of a coming reconciliation between religion and the modern spirit. What was then known in France as the *Esprit Nouveau* was then in the ascendant; a breath of new life, it seemed, was in the air. In 1901 Leo XIII had published the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, and urged French Catholics to accept the Republic; he was known as *Le Pape des Ouvriers;* there was a break in the sky. It was short-lived. The rally to the Republic was a political manoeuvre; for the rest, the situation was unchanged. Scholarly himself, Leo XIII had a certain sympathy with scholars; and—unlike either his predecessor or his successor—he knew his world; and refused either to condemn Modernism or to break with France. But Popes pass; the Papacy remains. And what distinguishes the modern, or lay, from the mediaeval, or clerical, mind is that it regards thought and its content not from the standpoint of tradition, but from that imposed by the sciences. The question is whether it is possible for the Church to do so. The looser organization of the Reformed Churches enables them to adapt themselves, though not without friction, to their environment: the *differentia* of Christianity, says Rothe, is that it is 'of all religions the most capable of change.' Not even the Roman Catholic Church is, as it professes to be, unchanging; it is only by a large use of the principle of Development that it can be explained. But this development has not been on the lines on which mankind is moving. It has been on opposite lines, and in an opposite direction; the two movements look different ways. Hence the monotonous failure of attempts at reform from within. A reformed, or modernized, Catholicism would lose its hold on human ignorance, and on the backward elements in human nature and society to which it appeals so strongly. Its house would be left unto it desolate; it would no longer be Catholicism, as we know it, at all.

7. 'From 1896,' he writes, 'I was a disciple of Newman. If I was a heretical one, it was in all good faith and security; had not the Pope given him a Cardinal's hat?' Newman was in no sense a Modernist; and it is only with reserves that he can

be described as a Liberal Catholic. But he was a man of genius, and many-sided; a primer both of scepticism and of Ultramontanism might be compiled from his works. Under Pius IX he had been profoundly distrusted at Rome; the Pope spoke of him as *ostinato*—obstinate; and a prelate in his confidence as 'the most dangerous man in England,' one to be 'crushed'—a thing more easily said than done. For Lord Acton he was 'that splendid sophist'; and, whatever else he was or was not, he was one of the most consummate advocates who ever lived. His philosophy of religion has kept Catholics in the Church who would otherwise have found it impossible; his theory of Assent offers a way of escape to those who are unconvinced by scholastic syllogisms; his doctrine of Development to those who recognize the gulf that lies between Primitive, or even Patristic, Christianity and Rome. It may be a question how far it is desirable to keep men in a Church under a misconception of its teaching and tendencies. It is a compromise; and, like all compromises, inconsistent. But it has its uses, and may serve in a transition time.

8. Houtin's first publications were two biographies: (1) *Un dernier Gallican, Henri Bernier*, 1795-1859; and (2) *Dom Couturier, Abbé de Solesmes*. The first brought him into conflict with the party then dominant in the Church—Newman's 'insolent and aggressive faction'; the second with the Matriarchate which had been established at Solesmes by the Abbess, Mme. Bruyère, and Dom Couturier's successor, the Abbot *ad nutum*, Dom Delatte.[5] His next venture was an inquiry into the early history of the diocese of Angers, of which he was a subject; and a little later into the alleged apostolic origin of certain French Churches. In both he had the support of persons of education—*e.g.*, the editors of the *Analecta Bollandiana*, and the Jesuit writers in the *Revue d'histoire Ecclésiastique*. The clergy, however, 'came about him like bees'—and stung. One of the early bishops of Angers was said to have been a certain St. René, who had been raised to life seven years after

[5] So called because, after the unfavourable decision of the Inquisition (1893), Leo XIII, for diplomatic reasons, restored the Abbot and the Abbess to their respective dignities; but did so *ad nutum Sanctae Sedis*—i.e. with the proviso that, in case of future misconduct, they could be deposed without further trial.

death by Maurillus, a disciple of the wonder-working St. Martin of Tours. The story is as obviously legendary as that which connects our English Glastonbury with Joseph of Arimathea—'whom (says Alban Butler) some moderns have placed among its founders.' Houtin's historical doubts, however, raised a storm—if a storm in a teacup—which ended in his leaving the seminary and the diocese. This, it is fair to say, seems to have been his own doing; whether he was well or ill advised, it is difficult to say. He probably felt that it was the beginning of the end; and that it was impossible to work under such conditions. 'No experience,' is his comment, 'is so sad as that of the priest who finds that the dogmatic beliefs to which he is committed are in irreconcilable conflict with facts.'

9. The slope on which he now stood was slippery. 'If you write on Scripture as you have written on the apostolic origin of the Churches,' he was warned, 'you are lost.' The warning fell on deaf ears. When *La Question Biblique* appeared (1902) it was a *succés de scandale*; a clerical reviewer pronounced it 'a pure product of hell.' It is one of the most amusing books ever written; and its humour crops up in the most unexpected places—in the headings of the chapters, in the bibliography, in the footnotes. The heading of the chapter on the Flood is an example:

'Variations on a Bible Miracle.

The Real Miracle; the Flood Universal -	p. 179.
The Flood somewhat restricted - -	p. 180.
The Flood more restricted - - -	p. 189.
The Flood greatly restricted - - -	p. 196.
No Flood at all - - - - -	p. 197.'

Such humour, however, is scarcely of a sort to commend itself either to the French Bishops or to Rome. But the difficulty in dealing with the book was that it was almost entirely narrative. There is little or no comment; the quotations are from approved authors, and are left to speak for themselves. More ridicule, it was felt, would be excited by its condemnation than scandal had been caused by its publication. Leo XIII, who was in the line of the greater Popes, saw that it would not do. Under Pius X, as might have been expected, this difficulty was overcome. *La Question Biblique* was placed on the Index within a few weeks of his accession; and the second volume was

prohibited by the Cardinal Vicar of Rome while it was still in the press.

10. Houtin's belief in Catholicism was now undermined. Till then he had accepted the Christology of the Oecumenical Councils, Transubstantiation, and the institution of the Church and the Papacy by Christ. But the strength of a chain is in its weakest links; and these were fragile. It was certainly startling to find the new Pope committing himself to the statement that 'Marseilles was the port at which, after the Divine Sacrifice of Calvary, the friend and companion of Jesus Christ landed on French soil.'[6] The pronouncement, no doubt, lies outside the sphere of Infallibility. But criticism, for all that, is inadmissible. 'It is not allowable,' says the same Pontiff, 'to limit the province in which the Pope may and can exercise his will.'[7] It was a saying of Cardinal Meignan that 'we are the advocates of tradition.' But *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. It is, perhaps, a condition of this advocacy that there should be a certain verisimilitude on the part of the tradition; that it should have an at least apparent foundation in fact.

11. However good his case, an individual in conflict with an institution seldom appears to advantage. The mote in his eye is seen out of proportion; the beam in that of the institution, civil or religious, is impersonal, it can be brought home to no one in particular; the system covers the men. And Houtin, I think, was one of those people—often very excellent people—who do better outside the Churches than in any Church. His mind was detached; it moved like a machine, looking neither right nor left, but automatically, as it were; and there were temperaments and outlooks which he seemed constitutionally unable to understand. This comes out in his attitude towards Mgr. Duchesne and M. Paul Sabatier. The former, like so many of us, had two personalities. On the one, he was a scholar with a biting wit and an unsparing tongue. On the other, with regard at least to the essentials of religion, he had the simple

[6] The reference is to Lazarus. 'It is an ancient popular tradition that St. Mary Magdalene, St. Martha and St. Lazarus, with some other disciples of our Lord, after His Ascension being expelled by the Jews, put to sea, and landed safely at Marseilles, of which Church they were the founders, St. Lazarus being the first bishop of the see' (Alban Butler's *Lives of the Saints*, July, 22).

[7] Address to the Union Apostolique, November 18, 1912.

faith of his native Breton fisher-folk. He was one of the Patri archs of Modernism; but he believed that the Church could survive its *débâcle*. He was right. It has done so: at what cost who can foresee? To explain Sabatier's interest in Catholic controversies it is not necessary to set him down as a conspirator. A Protestant himself, he was aware that Protestantism had no future in France, and that it was only through the Church that a religious revival could come. He was perhaps not always judicious. But he was rather a sentimentalist than the Machiavelli that Houtin supposed. On the other hand, as if to balance this temperamental one-sidedness, Houtin had an instinctive love of goodness, however strange the disguise under which it presented itself. Examples are his estimate of the Solesmes Benedictines; of that erratic star Père Hyacinthe, and—most remarkable of all—of that *Malleus hereticorum* Pius X. He reflected, however, that the reigns of the Popes of whom sanctity has been a characteristic have been uniformly disastrous to the Church.

12. The side-lights thrown in *Une Vie de Prêtre* on clerical life in France are less edifying than one could wish. Nor is there any reason to question their accuracy. They are not emphasized, but come in *obiter*, and allusively; he says truly, *Je n'ai pas tout dit*. They relate some to faith, some to morals, most to what is perhaps more important than either—character. It was a memorable saying of Mgr. Lacroix during the discussions with Rome which followed the abolition of the Concordat, '*Je crois que dans le catholicisme français les caractères sont encore plus bas que les esprits*'—'the level of character is even lower than that of mind.' The Church of Bossuet was a memory. 'See,' exclaimed Mgr. Mignot, 'to what Dom Guéranger, Cardinal Pie, and Louis Veuillot have brought us! They wished for an infallible Pope, and they have one.' 'The Lord said to Samuel, Hearken unto their voice, and make them a king.'[8]

13. My last letter from Houtin was written on July 24th—only four days before his death:

> 'The Bishop of Birmingham's address which you send me is of great interest.[9] He sees the situation correctly. And, if the Church

[8] *I Sam.* viii, 22.

of England is true to itself, it has less to fear from the new age than the Churches which are committed to Sacerdotalism and Sacramentalism. For indeed a new religious age has opened. Over the vast extent of what was once the Russian Empire national education and religion are in acute antagonism; and the same holds of the Positivist Republic of Turkey. In these countries the Universities are frankly paganised; and in others still nominally Christian they are rationalist. This is a state of things which has no precedent in history. When this new education has had time to produce its results, Christian apologists will have to throw much of their cargo overboard, and to modify their former positions.'

With regard to scepticism among the clergy:

'There are, of course (he says), different shades of it in different countries. The German and the English are slower and less logical than the Latins and Celts. How quickly, *e.g.* Father Tyrrell, the Irishman, reached conclusions to which the Anglo-German von Hügel advanced with difficulty! Frenchmen and Italians, trained in the syllogistic method of the schoolmen, value lucidity above all things.—And consider how much more they have to believe!'

They have. But for all that, it may seem to some of us that

'They see not clearliest who see all things clear.'

14. To those who have not, from circumstances, been brought into contact with it Catholicism is a *terra incognita*: one is constantly struck by the curious ignorance of it which is common in this country—perhaps especially among the clergy. This may make one sceptical about travellers' tales of the religion of savage or semi-civilized peoples. For if persons often of the same race, and at least approximately of the same culture, misconceive one another so completely, how hopeless (it would seem) must be the endeavour of the civilized to come into any real contact with the uncivilized mind. The two move on different lines, from different premises, and arrive at different conclusions. To take a case that has been recently, and perhaps still is, under discussion: for an Infallible Teacher, *union* can mean only one thing, the acceptance of his teaching. Such a Teacher, like Houtin's bishop, 'does not reason, nor refute, nor argue, nor negotiate. He condemns.'[10]

15. It is the fashion to-day to profess a contempt for the eighteenth century. Whatever its limitations, it had a very much greater love of truth than our own. We hear 'the organization of pious fraud'[11] of which Houtin speaks, and under

[9] 'On the Religious Situation in England to-day.' Delivered at Westminster College, June 10, 1926.

[10] *Vie de Prêtre*, p. 248.

[11] *Vie de Prêtre*, p. 313.

which he suffered, defended even in England on psychological grounds. It excites religious emotions, it is said, in those who surrender themselves to it. No doubt. So did a Spanish *auto-da-fé*, which was a religious festival; so probably did the ritual slaughter of Iphigenia by the Argive notables — *Ductores Danaum delecti, prima virorum*: Torquemada and Calchas were both, it may be, pious men. But there is no wickedness or superstition which may not be defended by sophistry of this sort. And we turn with relief to Paley:

> '*Pious* frauds, as they are improperly enough called, pretended inspirations, forged books, counterfeit miracles are impositions of a serious nature. It is possible that they may sometimes, though seldom, have been set up and encouraged with a design to do good. But the good they aim at requires that the belief of them should be perpetual, which is barely possible; and the detection of the fraud is sure to disparage the credit of all pretentions of the same order. Christianity has suffered more injury from this cause than from all other causes put together.' [12]

Veracity: here is the mind and the religion of the eighteenth century at its best. And it is the central thing in what is loosely known to-day as Modernism. It is Veracity, not any system of speculative philosophy, which is the point at issue between Modernism and Tradition. In the last resort the choice is between the two.

THE WORSHIP OF JESUS CHRIST*

THE purpose of this paper is to consider what basis there is in experience for the distinctively Christian conviction about Jesus Christ, namely, that He is unique among men and unique in such a way that we are impelled—and rightly surrender to the impulse—to give Him the obedience and worship and finality for our thought which we should give to God. Whatever else we may mean by the divinity of Jesus, we at least mean that we accord to Him an attitude of mind and spirit which is appropriate to a man's relation to God and not to his relation to anybody else. The question then is, whether there are adequate grounds for thoughtful people to take up this attitude to Jesus and, if so, what are they.

[12] *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, ch. xv. Of Lies.

* Paper read at the Free Church Fellowship Conference, High Leigh, July, 1926.

Hitherto the argument in this Conference has been almost exclusively pragmatic; that is to say, it has been an exposition of the fact that there is that in Jesus which enables men to do something which they need to do and want to do, but which they cannot do on their own. This something has been described as 'triumphing.' Jesus enables men to move through life in such a way that everything, both within and without, falls more and more into harmony; He solves their problems, practical, intellectual, emotional; He is the Way, the Truth, the Life—the way through, the light which illumines, the life which succours from that deepest disappointment of the highest we have it in us to be which is the very definition of death. Now I am willing to grant that this argument has really proved all it was intended to prove. I am willing to grant for the purposes of the particular point that we are considering that Christ *works*; that He triumphed fully Himself and that He enables men to triumph. But how do we get from that to the conviction that God meets us in Him in a quite special way, and to the further conviction—which to many minds really is a further conviction and not merely another way of saying the same thing—that we do right to worship Him as God?

There are people who admit that Jesus is the best guide for humanity, but they will not admit in any sense the Incarnation. There are Unitarians who are convinced that God does reveal Himself in human life and did come in a special way in Jesus, but they will not worship Jesus; that is to say, they will admit *an* incarnation but not *the* Incarnation. Furthermore, I for one have only lived for thirty odd years. I admit that Jesus has been the way and the truth and the life for me so far. But what right have I to assert that He will be so till the end of the chapter? There is, for example, the terrific test of death, which in the nature of the case only comes at the end. How do I know in advance that He will be adequate for everything, not only in my personal life, but in all the history of man? A pragmatic argument of this kind will not, without further working out of its basis and implications, carry you to the worship of Jesus and to an ascription of divinity to Him with anything like the finality of conviction of traditional Christianity. Practical experience cannot justify more than a probability and a hope.

Nor is this so merely on the grounds of rational argument and logical consistency. It is doubtful whether in practice anybody, even the simplest and least theologically minded, ever reaches the distinctively Christian attitude to Christ in any living way merely on pragmatic grounds. Indeed, the reason why so many people are so unconvinced and unconvincing in their Christianity is that they do try to maintain faith in Christ merely on the basis of His capacity to fulfil a pragmatic test. Life seems to triumph over Christ at so many points that faith in Him on these grounds becomes a continuous effort in the end too burdensome to sustain. But this is true not merely of Christian conviction. It is doubtful whether in any department of life anybody ever comes to believe anything or continues to believe anything *merely* because on the whole it seems to work and unify experience.

This last point is crucial. A great deal of theological discussion, especially in Christology, is vitiated because there has been no preliminary enquiry into how and on what grounds we know anything to be real or true, because there has been no clearly thought-out theory of knowledge. Such an enquiry is too long and difficult to enter into here; but one thing at least we may be sure it would reveal, and that is, that into every conviction of truth there enters a coercive element as well as a pragmatic, so that if one or other of these is lacking the mind is restless and refuses that typical re-action which we call conviction and which has a peculiar satisfaction all its own. Let us consider these two elements—the coercive and the pragmatic—a little.

By the coercive element is signified the fact that in any genuine apprehension of truth the percipient is conscious of being forced to apprehend what he does apprehend by a reality which in some sense stands over against him and is independent of his mind and the satisfaction of his desires. In some sense the fact or truth has got to 'hit' him so that he has no option but to say 'that is so'; it must shine in its own light and be there in its own right. Even the out-and-out pragmatist has to admit somewhere a world of fact which imposes itself on you and coerces your acquiescence to itself. For the conception of working only has meaning in respect of ends not yet achieved. If a truth works it must work to some end. But an end not

et achieved, an end which through a false (*i.e.*, non-working) roposition might be missed, implies a world of facts already ven to which adjustment has to be made in the light of what is and not in the light of what we may desire it to be. To ivide propositions into those which work and those which do ot, those which unify experience and those which do not, im- lies an external touchstone in the light of which they are istinguished, which touchstone must be in the end the sheer act.

By the pragmatic element is meant, first, negatively, that en know instinctively that falsehood is on the whole dangerous nd less desirable in its consequences than truth; that, there- ore, some sort of working test is always desirable and a failure o pass such a test is a strong presumption of error. Secondly, ositively, men feel that truth is in some sense a personal good, nd that there cannot be any permanent disharmony between an's essential well-being and the truth of the world in which e lives. In short, his mind is such that he instinctively believes at lies destroy and the truth ultimately blesses. The truth ill make him free, and in the end what makes him really free ust be the truth.

It has been the fault of rationalists to over-emphasize the ercive element in man's apprehension of truth, of pragmatists o over-emphasize the pragmatic element. But both elements are ssential. Man's nature is such that it can never be satisfied by ny doctrine which is merely successful: it must also lay hold of im by its own inherent cogency and force. On the other hand, is nature is such that it can never be satisfied by a doctrine hich merely lays hold of him by coercive force. Sooner or ater it must reveal its congeniality to his whole nature. The oint can be summed up in another way by saying that the dis- nction between truth and falsity really goes back to another nd perhaps even more fundamental distinction, that between creature and his environment. The whole urge of life springs rom the fact that every creature in some sense believes itself o be harmonisable with its environment; yet the environment is iven.

Now let us consider these two elements in relation to Jesus.

irst, the coercive element.

The rendering of worship to Jesus cannot be anything but a

half-hearted pose unless there be that in Him which strikes the mind immediately and coercively into that attitude. No amount of pragmatic test of His adequacy will make up for the absence of that. But if this is to be the impression He makes upon us we must postulate in man a capacity to identify immediately the presence of God in human life, worship being the instinctive response of the mind to such an identification when it takes place. Personally I have no difficulty in affirming such a capacity in man. The enormous vitality of religion all down the ages is not explicable on the ground of a racial discovery that it works. It is only explicable on the basis of the fact that God comes into life and, so to say, 'hits' men with a coerciveness comparable in its own sphere to the way in which the scarlet of a geranium 'hits' the senses. In what way does a martyr when hanging head downwards over a fire discover that religion works? He is not there because Jesus unifies his experience; such a thing needs a lot of unifying. He is there because Jesus 'hits' him, coerces him somehow irresistibly and in His own right.

Now the question is, just what exactly in human experience is this coercive touch of the divine? The view here advocated is that it comes essentially through the breaking in upon our consciousness of the sense of the absolute value of the true, the beautiful and the good realised in personal life. By 'absolute value' is meant that there comes to us the call to seek these things at all costs, even at the cost of life itself. They are not to be put into the balance with anything else whatever. They are sacred. It is in and through his sense, however mixed with superstition, of the ethically sacred that man thrills immediately to the touch of something which calls to him from above and beyond the world and which he calls God. In this view we join issue with Otto and his school. The numinous or the non-ethically sacred is not the fundamental thing in man's awareness of God. The history of the development of religion is the history of the release of the true sacred from clogging and false associations, the ethically sacred from the 'spookily' sacred.

If this is correct, then we have the coercive basis for the place Jesus has in the Christian consciousness. We discern in Him the perfection of personal life, the altogether holy will, the altogether sacred. This is the only means we have of identifying God immediately; when we meet the altogether holy will

we know we meet God. We know intuitively, coercively. It is sometimes urged against certain types of Christological theory that they affirm of Jesus nothing more than that He has the value of God. I can never see the force of this. There is surely an inadequate analysis of the religious consciousness behind the criticism. God confronts us through absolute value. To have the value of God is at once to be God and to be capable of revealing oneself as such coercively to human consciousness.

It is perhaps worth while pointing out that the conception of the sacred as numinous fails to give any coercive basis for the worship of Christ. I fail to discover any sign of the numinous in the impression Jesus made upon men. Certainly He seems to be almost totally incapable of making such an impression now. It may be urged, however, that equally much He fails to make any very pronounced impression upon men of being the realization in personality of morally perfect spiritual life, and that therefore the basis of worship for modern men is equally insecure whether we define the sacred as numinous or in strictly ethical terms. This is a criticism which must be faced.

It is a very real difficulty with many folk that Jesus lived so very long ago and that we can only get into touch with Him through a few exceedingly scanty and not always mutually consistent records. Is it not asking too much, they say, is it not more than a trifle unreal, to tell us to look at Jesus and feel the coercive impression of perfect holiness in Him? There is all the mistiness of distance about Him and we have the merest outline sketch of His life. The first disciples were in a different position.

The answer to these difficulties in the first instance is to point out the very subtle but significant fallacy which is wrapped up in them. That fallacy is that their force largely depends upon the unconscious assumption that Jesus is only a very ordinary human figure after all. But that is precisely the question at issue. These difficulties would certainly hold in respect of any ordinary human figure in the past, but is it certain that there is not that in Jesus which can lay hold of us and impress us, despite the lapse of two thousand years and despite the scantiness of the records? May not His power to do that be precisely part of the evidence that He does stand apart, that quite uniquely in Him God has manifested Himself to mankind?

Let us assume for the moment that what Christianity asserts about Christ is true, and that in Him there is a complete and adequate unveiling of the Divine character and purpose, in which everything has its being and from which everything derives its meaning. What would follow from that?

First, it would follow that the lapse of time and the changes which that lapse has brought about are quite irrelevant to the abiding and verifiable significance of Christ. In proportion as a spiritual fact is true and charged with the mind of God it becomes independent of time and change. Man has to deal with the same divine purpose whether he rides on mules or in motor cars, whether he lives in the year one or the year two thousand. If Christ were only a very partial vehicle of the truth, then the argument that the lapse of two milleniums puts Him out of date and beyond comprehension would have considerable force. But then it is precisely the Christian assertion that Jesus is not partially, but wholly, the vehicle of God's character and purpose; therefore it is illogical to urge in advance against that assertion precisely that which its truth, if it be truth, makes irrelevant, namely, the lapse of time.

Again and along the same lines, in proportion as Christ is what Christianity asserts Him to be, so in that proportion will He of necessity persist in human life as a kind of grain or pattern of it and so will be directly observable in varying degrees by those who care to look for Him even in these days and in the midst of this civilization. I do not want to be vaguely mystical here. I mean something which seems to follow alike in logic and experience if Christ be all that we claim for Him. The point is that it is most emphatically not a question of making a supreme effort of mind and leaping right out of twentieth century England over two thousand years into first century Palestine and sitting at the feet of One Who, however delightful and impressive, is really deeply alien to our nature and our life. That is the kind of idea people have in their minds when they shrug their shoulders at the suggestion of looking at Jesus and feeling the presence of God in Him. It would be a right idea if Jesus were a very ordinary and parochial individual with no special significance. But Christianity says that He has a special significance, that He carries in His spirit the Divine

character and purpose which is behind all history. And what follows from that, if it be true, is that He is a clear and focussed revelation of what the whole of life as you and I have to meet it to-day is a clouded and diffused one. If we are fronting modern life with any sincerity of purpose, and if Jesus be what we claim Him to be, then we must be continually getting blurred impressions of Him one way or another, for all life ultimately expresses God's mind and purpose. To go, therefore, and observe the figure of Christ in the Gospel stories is not to attempt to build up from the beginning out of nothing that which has no prior affinity to us. All sorts of vague impressions, fleeting glimpses of the highest and best way to meet life, half-solved problems waiting for exactly the solution He indicates, joys which we could not quite understand, moral aspirations which we could not quite satisfy, will be already as it were in solution in our minds waiting to assume crystalline form on His figure, making it real and living. For example, no one, it seems to me, can study the problems of modern industry or the history of the rise of it, or can come into any kind of close personal contact either with the difficulties in the way of the solution of industrial troubles or with the kind of employer who has occasionally succeeded in overcoming those difficulties, without having his mind prepared, consciously or unconsciously, for the living realization that Jesus does sum up the eternal structure and grain of life, that He is the way through. Or again, no one can think at all seriously about the problem of suffering and its relation to sin without having his mind and spirit prepared for the Cross of Christ and for an electric and irresistible revelation, which may come quite late in life, that that Cross is the revelation of the very heart of God. If Jesus be what Christianity says of Him, then we have in every modern problem something which in the end must help to annihilate rather than accentuate the intervening two thousand years.

Consider, now, the difficulty of the scanty records. That too falls to the ground if Jesus be what Christianity claims. For if He be that, then His relationship to every human personality must be of a very peculiar kind. He must be in some sense the norm, the ideal, that completed and balanced maturity which every human being by the essential law of his being is, amidst

so many frustrations and failures, striving to achieve. Obviously there is something in every human personality which governs its growth from its first conception and determines that it shall grow into a man and not into a bird or a tiger. This hidden urge which carries the child through all the stages of childhood and fashions him into an adult man, this certain specific normality which must be given its appropriate treatment or the whole personality is thrown out of gear and is unhappy, is God's idea of what a man should be. It is hidden in the heart of every human organism and is the most important thing in it. So also at the heart of every dog organism there is the specific principle of dogginess; at the heart of every cat organism the specific principle of felinity, and so on. The question then is, what is the entelechy of the human organism, its governing idea. If Christianity be true, it is Christ. Christ is perfectly what we are meant to be. In other words, there is at the heart of very human being, more or less frustrated and dammed back, but restlessly pressing upward all the time to a full expression and achievement, a hidden Christ, a Christ within.

But if that be so, consider what it involves. It means that anything like a full-length portrait of Jesus is not necessary. So long as there is enough for His personality to shine through, then the deepest instinct of our nature, the whole law of our being, does the rest. Something leaps out to meet Him, seizes upon Him through the scanty records and fills up the picture from within, saying, 'This is perfect spirit, this is the living completion and fulfilment of every dim vision and motion towards the highest that my soul has ever had.' Spirit answers spirit, deep calls unto deep.

If this be a valid line of thought it means that by identifying the coercive touch of God upon men's spirits with the sense of the ethically sacred we are given a permanent basis upon which to ground a living conviction about Jesus. But if we include the numinous, then we have no such permanent basis, for by definition the numinous has no place in the constitution of our own nature. It is the wholly other.

It should be noted that the position outlined is based upon a tacit assumption, namely, that the perfection of God is some-

how the law of human nature. We are to be perfect as He is perfect. We shall come back to this later.

Second, the pragmatic element.

This is essential to a full conviction of truth. None the less it is necessary to be careful in stating in what exactly it consists. It is an element in all vital religion that God comes to us not only as coercive holiness (a consuming fire), but also as succouring power (my refuge and my strength). But in what sense does He succour us? Not, obviously, by smoothing out difficulties and making things easy. I believe Ritschl is right when he says that the primary succour of God is that He guarantees our sense of being, as personalities, the vehicles of permanent values in the midst of the natural forces which surround us and in the end destroy us. In other words, the primary pragmatic test of God's transactions with us is the extent to which they result in an ever-increasing poise and triumph of spirit which no challenge from the world about us can overthrow. If a man responds to the coercive touch of God loyally, and finds that so responding gives him more and more this indefinable sense of spiritual power and conquest over his world, then he has the fullest conviction possible that he is basing himself on truth and that God is the reality which he has instinctively all through taken Him to be.

Note, however, once again, that this pragmatic test involves the same tacit assumption which we noticed above in dealing with the coercive element, namely, that the will of God is somehow the deepest law of our own being. In His service is our perfect freedom. Also it involves that our highest life is not ultimately opposed by the natural environment in which we live. In response to its challenges and through the succour of God we achieve ourselves and win the victory over our world at the same time.

The application of this to Christology is obvious. If in addition to making an immediate, coercive impression of the divine upon us Christ can in practice produce health of soul and triumph over the world, then, granting the tacit assumption above mentioned and granting the correctness of our analysis of the ordinary bases of conviction in human experience, the affirmation of His divinity is as soundly grounded as anything

could well be. There are, however, further confirmatory lines of argument and experience which have their place in any complete apologetic. Thus we should naturally seek confirmation of our judgment concerning Christ in the consciousness of Christ Himself as revealed in the Gospels. Also a conception of God in terms of Jesus implies a philosophy of the Universe which must be related to science and philosophical thought generally. Along both these lines much can be done which buttresses strongly the Christian conviction. If Christ be the Incarnation of God in any sense at all, He will in the end unify all experience and solve every problem. But we need to know a good deal more about the world than we do know before we can show finally that He does that. Meanwhile, therefore, the position must be otherwise grounded as we have tried to show.

A word must be said in conclusion on the question whether we can say anything worth while on the relation of Jesus to the Godhead. It is my conviction that we cannot. Let us assume again for the moment that the Christian conviction about Jesus is true and that in Him God did break into human life in a unique and final way. And let us suppose that we have the capacity to recognise such a breaking in when it takes place. Then let us ask how much we should expect to be able to explain and analyse the fact in intellectual terms. Surely very little. In the first place there is in the fact of Christ, if it be fact in the Christian sense of it, the enormous incomprehensibility of God. It seems to me to be idle to suppose that the intimate nature of God is ever going to be comprehensible to us. We cannot fathom the mystery of our own being, still less that of the being of God. Yet we are sure of ourselves and of one another, and I do not see why we should not be quite sure of God when He comes. Then again there is the enormous incomprehensibility of the relation of things in time to things out of time. I do not think it is possible for the human mind to think in any but temporal terms, and the task of explicating how the Eternal comes into time must ever be beyond our powers. Yet I do not see why we should not be able to have an intuitive perception of the presence of the Eternal in time, and that in a quite special way, in Jesus. Again, there is the enormous in-

comprehensibility of the relation of things in space to things out of space. God is holy spirit, and it is precisely this which enables us to apprehend His presence in Jesus; but human life is in every direction conditioned by matter and space, and the relation between the two, between spirit and matter, has hitherto completely baffled the human mind. Till we have much deeper insight into this ultimate problem it is hopeless to expect to be able to say much about the manner of Incarnation. Yet the fact of it may be none the less sure, on the general grounds of our surety of anything.

We are not therefore called upon to explain in precise terms the intimate relation of Jesus to the Godhead. The most we are called upon to do is to meet any charge which may be made that the idea of Incarnation is definitely irrational, for we cannot rest in a blank irrationality. In meeting any such charge it will more than likely be necessary to emphasize strongly the truth which lies behind all living experience and which is often forgotten, namely, that the incomprehensible is not the irrational and the indefinable is not the unreal.

In conclusion, I want to go back to the tacit assumption which we saw was involved in our consideration of both the coercive and the pragmatic elements in our worship of Christ, the assumption that the law of our own nature is the perfection of God. There is no means of proving this assumption. It is given in the essential nature of religion. Without it religion would cease to be. If people are disposed to deny it, we can do nothing. Religion cannot begin in a vacuum any more than any other experience. Always there has to be an outer fact, and an inner capacity of apprehending it, and the meeting of these two in a living experience which to the mind concerned is just given immediately and upon which everything else has to be built up. Deny me the right to make this assumption and I cannot get a start with religion at all, and its place and meaning in human history become an insoluble riddle. But give me the right to make it and I can see at least the beginnings of a rational account of religion from the earliest times, and of the culmination of it in our own love and reverence and obedience to Jesus Christ as unto God Himself.

HERBERT H. FARMER.

THE LAW OF INDIRECT SEARCH

> 'The better sort,
> As thoughts of things divine, are intermix'd
> With scruples, and do set the word itself
> Against the word:
> As thus "Come little ones," and then again
> "It is as hard to come as for a Camel
> To thread the postern of a small needle's eye."'
>
> *King Richard II.*

JESUS said 'Seek, and ye shall find,' and yet 'Whosoever seeketh to save his soul shall lose it.' The explanation is, I think, that we are to seek, but not directly.

Man is a unity in trinity: body, soul, and spirit. The three are joined together in the unity of the man, one and indivisible. We can for the purpose of analysis, however, consider the manifestations of each part separately, though body seems to merge into soul, and soul into spirit, as the colours of the spectrum merge into one another.

The body is ultimately dependent for health upon the soul and the soul upon the spirit. Therefore for bodily health we must use the activities of the soul, and for health of soul we must look to the spirit. If this is true, everything ultimately depends upon the possession of spiritual, or eternal, life. It is like a puzzle of which, if you can but fit the principal part aright, the subsidiary parts fall automatically into place. 'Seek, and ye shall find'; yes, but 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.' 'Shall be added,' you observe, not 'seek second.'

The practice of faith-healing is a familiar example of the first part of this law. We all know that the man who spends his time watching for symptoms of bodily disease is already on the road to sickness. So the man who fixes his attention on his own soul, on his sins and failings and (worst of all) his virtues, in the endeavour to save his soul, will not succeed in saving it. But if, on the other hand, we can only achieve the proper orientation of body and soul—body looking to soul and soul to spirit, we shall find that both body and soul will reflect something of the radiance of that spiritual, or eternal, life.

The entrance to this spiritual life is, of course, by the love

and worship of Almighty God. But if this Law of Indirect Search is true, I am afraid that some of our worship is hardly on sound lines. I venture to expand this statement in a parable.

There was a certain King. Not an earthly King, *primus inter pares*, but a King whose subjects were the work of His fingers. His chamberlain reported that two of His subjects were praying.

'What says the first?' asked the King.

'His eyes are fixed upon himself, his needs, and his sins. He has, moreover, presented a long list of things he considers necessary, which he asks your Majesty to grant him.'

'And the second?'

'He is contemplating the greatness and glory of your Majesty. His lips move with words of adoration, of praise, and of thanksgiving. I hear him murmur *"Gratias agimus tibi propter magnam gloriam tuam."*'

'Tell the first,' said the King, 'I have already provided the means by which my children can obtain all things necessary for their souls and bodies. Am I not Love? But those who seek these things directly shall not find them.'

'Tell the second: "Yours is the secret of the Gate of the Way, yours is the one thing needful. You have by the appointed way entered into my Eternal Kingdom. Of further blessing you have no need."'

I think we can see around us abundant indications of the operation of this law. Who is there who has found that which he has sought in life? Men who seek happiness directly find but pleasure. Many of the most valuable scientific discoveries have been made indirectly. Modern chemistry had its origin in the experiments of the Alchemists. Astrology was the mother of Astronomy. I venture the statement that much information regarding the philosophical conception of eternity can be obtained by study of the Differential and Integral Calculus. Men seek money by toil and find drudgery. They seek the service of their fellows and find work and satisfaction. They seek health by studying their bodies and become hypochondriacs. They seek to save their souls and become prigs. They seek God and become saints.

The 'good things which pass man's understanding,' which God has prepared for them that love Him, are a present possession here and now: Eternal Life in the Spirit: Salvation and Harmony of soul: Happiness and Health of mind.

Charles H. Salter.

THE DYNAMIC OF THE INCARNATION[1]

By the Editor.

'The truth that God is incarnate in a humanity which itself in Him dies to sin and lives to God, which is the truth of the New Testament, is not yet that of the Church.'—Du Bose, *The Oecumenical Councils*, p. 283.

'No Christian philosophy can have any value which does not bring the Incarnation into closest relation with the cosmic process.'—W. R. Inge, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 74.

'C'est un des grands principes du Christianisme, que tout ce qui est arrivé à Jesus-Christ doit se passer dans l'âme et dans le corps de chaque Chrétien. Pascal.

I.

IT is customary to speak of the Dynamic of the Incarnation. It is well for Christian teachers to remember that the Dynamic of the Incarnation will depend upon the credibility of the Incarnation, and credibility to-day will depend upon how far the doctrine is comprehensible and acceptable to the modern mind. We also do well to remember that to-day the difficulties in the way of belief in the Incarnation differ in many respects from those of other ages. How can Spirit unite with Matter without defilement? is a question which vexed the mind of the second century but does not vex the mind of the twentieth. The theology of the Great Councils viewed God as transcendent. It conceived of Him as external to His Universe. The modern mind, if it thinks of God, is disposed to think of Him as exclusively immanent. For that mind He is not the Highest, but the Innermost. This way of thinking leads to Pantheism, even

[1] After reading this paper to a clerical assembly my attention was directed to an article by the Rev. H. Edmonds entitled, 'The Christian Idea of Man,' in *The Pilgrim* for July, 1926. I owe to it the quotation from Dean Inge and a reference in *I John*. I wish to commend it heartily as a very helpful and judicious contribution.

There are four small books bearing on the Incarnation which I venture here to commend to those who desire short and untechnical statements.

(1) *Jesus Human and Divine*, by Dean Hastings Rashdall; published by Andrew Melrose (1922).

(2) *The Creative Christ*, by Professor F. S. Drown; published by the Macmillan Co., New York (1922).

(3) *Faith or Fear?* (especially the contribution of the Rev. Harold Anson); published by Macmillan (1916).

(4) *What think ye of Christ?* by Canon Raven; published by Macmillan (1916).

though it be the Higher Pantheism, and in treading the Pantheistic road Christian values are lost. It is better to try to think of God as both Immanent and Transcendent. God in all and all in God.

Extra cuncta nec exclusus,
Intra cuncta nec inclusus.

A sound Christology will therefore try to express itself in terms both of Divine Immanence and Divine Transcendence. Hence while the Incarnation will be thought of as originating with Transcendent Deity, its proof will be sought in the experience of Immanent Deity, and this will lead to the Incarnation being interpreted as the highest form of Divine Immanence. To many contemporary theologians this is objectionable and dangerous, but unless the Dynamic of the Incarnation is to fail in this modern world, it will, I am convinced, have to be presented in this way. Mr. S. F. Davenport in his recent book, *Immanence and Incarnation* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1925), assures us (quoting F. Platt) that

> 'Even when the day dawns, and we dwell in God and God in us, the Divine Immanence then perfected as human nature will be distinct from that displayed in the "Only Begotten Son"' (p. 230).

I should certainly maintain that Mr. Davenport's statement is at least true in this sense, that if we rightly assume that our Lord is in human history not only the first in Whom there is a perfect Divine Indwelling, but that He is also the chief means by which thereafter the Divine Indwelling operates in humanity, He must in that sense be both distinct from and superior to all other human beings. Nevertheless when we study the great theologians of the New Testament, there is much to be said for the view that they conceived of the Divine Indwelling in Jesus Christ as differing in degree and not in kind from the Divine Indwelling in Christians.[2]

[2] This does not conflict with the application of the title Only Begotten Son to our Lord (*cf.* B. F. Westcott's note on μονογενής *Epistles of St.* John, pp. 169-172). Only Begotten refers to 'the uniqueness of the Nature,' and is used of the Divine Wisdom (*Wisdom* vii, 22). Lightfoot in his commentary has an interesting note on πρωτότοκος *Col.* 1, 15, in which he shows that μονογενής is used of the pre-incarnate Word, but πρωτότοκος of the Word incarnate.

II.

Of course any Christian doctrine of Incarnation finds its basis in the Biblical doctrine that man is created in the image and after the likeness of God. In other words: that there is a fundamental affinity between the Divine and the Human. This is assumed by our Lord in His teaching, and not the least influential reason which He urges for men acting in accordance with the noble idealism of His Gospel is that they may become thereby the children of their Heavenly Father. In the subsequent New Testament teaching Jesus Himself is presented as the chief means by which men are enabled to enter into the full privileges of this Divine Sonship. Hence the author of the Fourth Gospel writes in his Prologue:

> 'To as many as received Him, to them gave He the right (or privilege) to become the children (τέκνα) of God, even to them that believe on His Name which were *begotten* not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of (ἐκ) God' (I, 12, 13).[3]

Here it would seem the children of God are begotten by a spiritual birth as is the Only-Begotten Son: their birth, as is His, is dependent upon the will of God and the operation of the Spirit of God.

This oneness of Christ and His brethren is stressed in the *Epistle to the Hebrews:*

> 'For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and through Whom are all things, in bringing many sons[4](πολλοὺς υἱοὺς) unto glory to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For both He that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one (ἑνὸς) wherefore He is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying I will declare Thy Name unto my brethren' (ii, 9-11).

So also St. Paul in the *Epistle to the Romans*:

> 'For whom He foreknew, them He also foreordained to be conformed to the likeness of His Son (συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος) that He should be the first-born among many brethren' (viii, 29).'

[3] The singular here as given by Irenaeus, Tertullian, etc., by which the clause is made to refer to Jesus Christ, I regard as a gloss not only because not well supported textually but also because not in accordance with the characteristic doctrine of this writer.

[4] *cf.* The promise to the redeemed in *Rev.* xxi, 7, 'He shall be to Me *Son.*' This is not *natural* Divine sonship such as St. Paul refers to in *Acts* xvii, 28, for all men have it not. It is *potential* and depends on their accepting the Divine Call.

This thought of sonship to God, St. Paul in the same epistle unites with heirship to God :

> 'We are children of God (τέκνα) and if children, then heirs : heirs of God : and joint-heirs with Christ' (*Rom.* viii, 17).

It is this begetting of the sons of God which furnishes for St. Paul the key to the interpretation of the creative process. This is creation's end and aim. In an inspired sentence St. Paul pictures the whole creation writhing in travail pangs, with outstretched neck awaiting the revealing of the Sons of God (*Rom.* viii, 19).

In the *Epistle to the Ephesians* St. Paul prays that these Asiatic Christians may be filled with the πλήρωμα of God, namely, with that totality of Divine attributes which dwell in Christ Himself (*Eph.* iii, 19 and iv, 13, to be compared with *Col*, i, 19 and ii, 9). It is particularly notable that the Johannine literature which teaches the most exalted conception of Jesus Christ which we have in the New Testament, and makes His doubting disciple address Him as 'My Lord and my God,' teaches also that Jesus Christ and those men who receive Him are His brethren : 'Go to my brethren,' says the Risen Christ to Mary Magdalene, 'and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father : and to my God, and your God' (*Jn.* xx, 17). And we have this echoed in the First Epistle :

> 'Ye see, what great love the Father hath given to us, that we should be called children (τέκνα) of God, and such we are . . . Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet manifested what we shall be, but we know (οἴδαμεν *i.e.* intellectually not by experience) that if He be manifested we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is' (*I Jn.* iii, 2).

Even more apposite are the words in the Epistle where the writer declares that everyone that loveth is *begotten of God* (iv, 7), and a little later speaks of Christ as *begotten of God* (v, 1). He uses of both Christ and Christians, as does *Hebrews*, the ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ of the Nicene Creed, and here united with the passive of γεννάω[5] as in the Creed.

In the light of these passages it seems to me that the great theologians of the New Testament would not have felt the shrinking which later traditionalist theologians feel in present-

[5] *cf.* The use of γεννάω with ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ in the following passages : *I John* ii, 29 ; iii, 9 ; iv, 7 ; v, 1 ; v, 4 ; v, 18.

ing the Incarnation as the supreme example of Divine Immanence. They would not, I think, have rejected the thought—though it had not been so formulated in their day—that the difference between Christ and Christians is a difference in degree and not a difference in kind. It was the wonderful glory of the Gospel, the mystery of the Divine Love which it enshrined, that man through Christ might indeed share His Sonship to God.

Let us admit that such a thought is hard to grasp: the imagination droops before it: to man conscious of weakness and guilt, burdened with animal desires and limited knowledge, it will seem incredible. The Universe is so vast: God, its originating and directive Creator, is so mighty, so inaccessible, so incomprehensible, men can never be His sons. The thought that they can be is only a piece of monstrous human egoism and self-conceit.

> 'There is a story told of a missionary in India who was translating the First Epistle of St. John with the help of his Brahmin teacher. He asked the Indian to translate the first verse of the third chapter, and, when the latter brought it, he noticed that it was changed. "Surely," he said, "you have not translated it rightly." "No, Sahib," the Brahmin answered, "I have changed it," and added, "Sahib, what the book says cannot possibly be true—'children of God'—that cannot be true. I have put there what may be true. . . . 'Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us that we should be permitted to kiss His feet.'" [6]

It is only the thought that God is Eternal Love which makes the message credible, and even then it is not intellectually but spiritually discerned, as St. Paul writes to the Corinthians:

> 'Things which eye saw not, and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man, God hath prepared for them that love Him, but unto us hath God revealed them through the Spirit, for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God' (*I Cor.* ii, 8).

The testimony to this glorious hope was found by the primitive Christian in the gift of the Holy Spirit, and this experience was the witness to him of His Divine Sonship:

> 'Because ye are sons (*υἱοί*) hath God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts (*Gal.* iv, 7).
>
> Ye received the Spirit of Adoption (*υἱοθεσία*) whereby ye cry Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our Spirit that we are children (*τέκνα*) of God' (*Rom.* viii, 15, 16).

[6] I am indebted to the Editor of *Theology* for this story (*Theology*, June, 1925, p. 342).

It is there that you have the real Dynamic of the Incarnation: the operation of the Spirit of Divine Sonship in the human heart.

III.

As the Christian Religion lost its primal radiance this Dynamic of the Incarnation grew weaker, and many other dynamics were substituted for it—not least the terrors of hell and the delights of heaven. However, it did not die out by any means all at once: there are echoes of it in the great Christian theologians and in the Church's liturgies, but those types of theology which we may call Byzantine and Carthaginian evacuated of dynamic value those great titles 'Sons of God,' 'brothers of Christ,' 'partakers of the Divine Nature,' 'heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ' conferred on Christians in the New Testament. Byzantine theology destroyed the conception of the Divine Fatherhood by transforming the Holy Loving Father into an Oriental Despot, in his Divine Impassibility and Regal Transcendence infinitely separated from mankind. Carthaginian theology saw in humanity a corrupt and guilty race damned by the guilt of Original Sin. Both theologies worshipped asceticism in a spirit which was Manichaean rather than Christian, and saw in the Virginity of Mary a necessary condition to the securing of a spotless victim Who by His propitiatory sacrifice on the Cross should rescue mankind from the clutches of the devil to whom that guilty race was properly due. Hence the Incarnation became to the great body of Christians little else than the miracle of the Virgin-Birth: and the Virgin was duly honoured and worshipped with the title *Theotokos* (Mother of God).

IV.

Now whilst the *fact* of the Incarnation is the fundamental thing, and the *mode* of the Incarnation is of but secondary importance, yet it has to be confessed that the *mode* is of importance because it determines in some very considerable measure our conception of the nature of the fact of the Incarnation, and it also determines for modern men the credibility or incredibility of the Incarnation. How many men and women have confused the Incarnation with the Virgin-Birth, and because they have

not been able to believe the latter have rejected the former: but also how many who have accepted the Virgin-Birth as historic fact have been led to take a view of the Incarnation which is poor, weak, artificial and isolated compared with that which is taught by the great theologians of the New Testament? But it will be objected: 'If the Virgin-Birth be an historic fact, it only remains for us to accept it and to take the consequences. Facts are chiels that winna ding.' Quite so, but it is worth while enquiring rather carefully whether it be a fact. I believe that none of the great theologians of the New Testament whom I have cited as exponents of the Incarnation accepted the Virgin-Birth as a fact.

There are at least three Christologies in the New Testament: someone would correct that statement by saying that there are three stages in one Christology.[7] I do not much mind if it be put in that way, but the first statement better accords with the facts. My point is that there are in the New Testament three modes by which the Incarnation is conceived. Let me narrate them briefly.

V.

1. According to the earliest tradition Jesus was born in the ordinary way at Nazareth. He was the son of Joseph, the carpenter, and Mary his wife. A claim that He was of Davidic descent was in existence before St. Paul wrote the *Roma*ns (1, 3) about 58 A.D. How then was He conceived of as being Son of God? The *Gospel of Mark*, which early Christian tradition claims to have recorded the Gospel preached by St. Peter to his Roman converts, relates that at His baptism Jesus was conscious that the Holy Spirit entered into (εἰς) Him, and He heard the Divine Voice say: 'Thou art my Son.' According to Canon Streeter, the best attested Lukan form of the Divine Oracle at the baptism runs: 'Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten Thee,' and this goes back to *Q*, our earliest Gospel source. It

[7] Professor Kirsopp Lake is inclined to think that there are at least four Christologies in the New Testament: (1) the Adoptionist Davidic Messiah, (2) the pre-existent Apocalyptic Son of Man, (3) the Lord of a Mystery Cult, (4) the Incarnate Logos. I am inclined to take this view, but there would seem to be only three ways in the New Testament by which it was thought Jesus became the Christ (c.f. *The Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow*, p. 146).

was this baptismal *anointing* with the Holy Spirit which constituted Jesus the Son of God, the Anointed One, the Messiah, the Christ. Of course 'Son of God' in this Markan narrative means the Christ, the Messiah, the Anointed One, who was to reign over Israel and, as God's Vicegerent, establish His Kingdom on earth. This Christology is enshrined in *Acts* i—xii. There Jesus is a man approved of God unto you . . . anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power (*Acts* ii, 22; x, 28). This, as Professor Lock admits, is the Christology of the primitive Apostolic Church of Jerusalem.[8] The fact that the Ebionites of Palestine, the successors of primitive Jewish Christianity, while acknowledging Jesus to be the Messiah, affirmed Him to be 'a man born from men' (*cf.* Hort's *Judaistic Christianity*, ch. xii), also gives a clue to the belief of the first Christians in this matter. Even when Justin Martyr wrote his *Dialogue with Trypho* certain Christians still held to this belief. The liturgical practice connected with the keeping of the Epiphany, and the Baptism, and the Nativity at the same time is possibly connected with it.[9] It is really surprising that so many traces of this primitive Christology—usually called, rather unhappily, Adoptionist—should survive.

2. After 70 A.D. a second Christology appeared. Luke in the first two chapters of the present Gospel, which are later than his Proto-Luke, provides the Virgin-Birth Christology. He seems conscious that he is telling his reader something new—the result of his research. His reader's natural question: If this be true, how is it we have never heard of it before? he anticipates by writing: 'the Virgin-Mother did not talk about these things; she laid them up in her heart' (*Lk.* ii, 19, 51). According to this account—I assume as against some critics that we have St. Luke's narrative in its original form without interpolations—Jesus had no human father, but was incarnated in a Virgin-Mother by means of a miraculous Divine creative act of the Holy Spirit. This Christology appears somewhat later in St. Matthew's Gospel, but here mainly as a defence against a Jewish attack upon the character of our Lord's mother.

[8] *The Bible and the Christian Life*, pp. 97-113.

[9] See article 'Epiphany' by K. Lake in *Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

Views vary as to the historical value of these narratives.[10] The fact that they conflict with *St. Mark*, a document which they both use as an important source; that they conflict also with one another on important points—*e.g.*, *Matthew* appears to regard Bethlehem as the home of Joseph and Mary, whereas *Luke* makes them seek shelter in the inn: the flight into Egypt in *Matthew* is not easily fitted in with the visit to Jerusalem in *Luke*—is a serious difficulty. It must also be noted that *Mt.* and *Lk.* retain a narrative which asserts that Nazareth is our Lord's native place (πατρίς, *cf. Mt.* xiii, 53, 58; *Lk.* iv, 24), and that *Lk.* also uses a source which on several occasions refers to Joseph and Mary as our Lord's parents (*Lk.* ii, 27, 41, 43, etc.). The genealogies of our Lord in both Gospels, although not in agreement, are yet both regarded as the genealogies of Joseph not of Mary. The Virgin-Birth is ignored in the writings of St. Paul, St. Peter, St. James, St. John, and is not referred to in *Hebrews* and in the early chapters of *Acts*, especially in narratives which are redolent with memories of the earthly life of Jesus. The fact that the early Christians seem to have believed that the Old Testament was full of predictions (*testimonia*) of the incidents of Christ's life, combined with the fact that in the Septuagint Version of it which they used the Hebrew word 'young woman' is translated by 'virgin' (παρθένος) in *Isaiah* vii. 14, may account for the origin of the story. These things, combined with the fact that there is nothing in the records of our Lord's teaching which refers to the Virgin Birth, and, as I read that teaching, much in it which is repugnant to it (*e.g.*, *Mk.* iii. 31-35; *Lk.* xi, 27, 28; *Mt.* xiii, 55), make it very difficult on historical grounds, quite apart from scientific and philosophical presuppositions, to regard the Virgin-Birth as historical fact.

3. The third New Testament Christology appears probably a generation later when Christianity was involved in the work of converting the Greek world to Christ. A new presentation of Jesus was needed. It is expressed in the request, 'Sir, we would see Jesus.' The titles Son of Man, Son of God, the

[10] On this point the books of Sir William Ramsay, Dr. Box, Professor Lobstein, Dr. Vincent Taylor are all worth reading. My own view is that as the Tübingen School put St. Luke much too low as a historian, Sir William Ramsay puts him too high.

Lord Jesus, were inadequate and were all open to misconstruction.

A new title was happily available in Alexandrian Jewish circles and in the Hellenistic philosophical schools. It was the term Logos, used by Greek thinkers to designate the Divine Reason and regarded by the Stoics as immanent in the Universe. It coincided in some measure with the Jewish use of the terms *Kokhmah* (wisdom) and *Memra* (word). This term is used in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel to exhibit the relation of Jesus to the Divine Father, to the Universe, to mankind, and to the Christian believer. Its use, without breaking up the unity of the Godhead in which every Jew and most philosophical Gentiles believed, made it possible to think of Jesus as God on the ground that the Logos, the Divine moral and rational principle to which the cosmos owed its origin and unity and order, dwelt in Him to an unique degree. Moreover, by giving Jesus the title Logos, Reason or Word of God, a fundamental relationship was exhibited between Him and mankind, because it was only by sharing in the Logos that a human being became really human. Thus our Lord, even apart from His having a human body, was related to mankind in the realms of reason and conscience, and of course equally related to transcendent Deity. This Logos Christology made is possible to think of Jesus as both God and Man, and provided a philosophy of the Christian religion wherein the Divine, Cosmic, and Human relations of Jesus could be presented to Greeks. For the modern mind this Logos Christology has enormous advantages: it does not demand the miracle of the Virgin-Birth; it harmonizes and unites the idea of a transcendent and immanent Deity; it shows us mankind as essentially *capax Dei*; it agrees with the modern evolutionary view by regarding the Logos as ever-engaged in creative activity. It even provides a key to the difficult problem of the pre-existence of Jesus. His human personality is not pre-existent; it is the Divine Logos which becomes Man (perfect and ideal Man) in Him which is pre-existent.[11]

[11] This point is brought out, and indeed many others, in that very valuable little book, *Jesus: Human and Divine,* by Dean Hastings Rashdall.

VI.

The Logos-Christology, as we have noted, by being able to be conceived non-miraculously, has for the modern mind one great advantage over the Virgin-Birth Christology: a second great advantage which it has is that it protects the full humanity of our Lord. Whatever the Virgin-born humanity of Jesus may be, it is an abnormal humanity: we cannot say that it is emasculated: we really do not know what it is, because we have no experience of it: we only know that it is different from ours, and that is a very serious thing. It makes us wonder if such humanity could be *humanitas perfecta*. Certainly it suggests that our Lord's temptations, owing to His being *ex hypothesi* without Original Sin or a certain animal or brute heredity in which all normal human beings share, must have been greatly reduced in area. The conviction of the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*: 'He was tempted in all points like as we are yet without sin,' finds no sound support in the Virgin-Birth Christology with its assumed consequence—the breaking of the entail of original sin.

The Adoptionist Christology and method of Incarnation has at least the advantage of protecting our Lord's Manhood. There is, however, a loss of dynamic about it. A good man becoming God: the human becoming divine: that is a very ancient belief. We have it in the case of the Mesopotamian Noah. It is the reward of human merit. It does not grip us like the thought of God becoming Man. It was inevitable that the apostles and the primitive Jerusalem Church should hold a Christology which taught that the man Jesus, Who had companied with them, had become divine: but the harder achievement for faith to hold, that in Jesus God had become Man, has a grip about it, if it can be gripped, which makes a much greater appeal to the nobler imaginative side of Man's nature.

When we have accepted as our working hypothesis the master-thought of all our seeing that God became Man in Jesus Christ, we have by no means solved the many problems of the relations between God transcendent, and God Immanent, and God Incarnate, although Browning's words—

> 'The acknowledgment of God in Christ
> Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
> All questions in the earth and out of it'

night suggest that we have. What we can see in the light of our modern knowledge is that there are some ways of interpreting the Logos-Christology which will not do.

For instance, it is commonly taught by orthodox teachers that Jesus in His earth-life performed the cosmological functions of the Logos. There is no historical evidence whatsoever for this. If it be asked: If He did not, were then those cosmological functions in abeyance? we reply: 'That is quite impossible: it would mean the collapse of the cosmos.' Did He then as the result of a Kenosis delegate the cosmological functions to the Father? When we reason thus we become involved in absurdities, because we are thinking of the Logos as an individual: we are assuming that the whole of this individual Logos became incorporated in a human physical integument. That is grotesque—though it is often presented as orthodoxy and indeed might be orthodoxy if our dogmatic formularies were literally interpreted. Nevertheless it is nonsense to the modern mind.

We know nothing at all about it. The Logos is the thought-symbol by which we conceive of God's rational, moral and spiritual creative activity manifesting itself in a creative process which in its ideal is essentially rational, moral and spiritual. This is supremely manifest in human history in the personality of Jesus Christ. In Jesus we have the Immanent Godhead with us in a fuller and more perfect way than human experience had up till then known it, or has known it since. If it be asked: What is the method by which this Incarnation was achieved? we reply: it would seem to be by the evolutionary method. It was and is a process, indeed an aspect of the divine creative process: it is not an isolated act of God. A friend of mine once wrote a paper with the title: *Christ not a Product of Evolution.*' Now of course I do not mean to assert that Christ was a product of Evolution. Evolution is a creative method, not a creative cause: it is God Who is the final and efficient cause of Creation. The higher form of this creative process is in Scripture described as 'begetting'—this, as I have shown, is used of Christ and of Christians—and in Christian theology the begetting activity of God is assigned to the Spirit of God—Christian theology has never worked out or defined the relation

between the Word of God and the Spirit of God in this activit and would be much puzzled to do so, because we have here Hellenistic theology superimposed on a Jewish one. But I d not know that it is a matter of any practical importance to or who has a firm grasp of the Divine Unity. It is, however, ap to wring the withers of reflective Tritheists.

VIII.

That a perfect Indwelling of God should have been achieve in a human *organon* in the middle, shall we say, and not at th conclusion of the cosmic evolutionary process is a cause vexation and dubitation to philosophically-minded people.

This will not trouble the historian who declines to tread th *a priori* road. All that will concern him is whether there is suf cient evidence for believing that it has happened. All I can sa is that so far as I am concerned I am convinced that it h happened, there is enough evidence to make it a working hyp thesis, and I believe that we shall as the evolutionary proce proceeds have increasing evidence that it is so, and so we sha gain increasing conviction derived from the growing influen of the Gospel of the Incarnation. So far as terms are concerne I think that in its scientific aspect there are considerable adva tages in the method of the process being described in Profess Lloyd Morgan's phrase 'Emergent Evolution.' This brin out clearly two things which the modern mind can regard credible: (1) that the temporal process is the unfolding of Divine purpose, and (2) that this process is not achieved by miraculous irruptionism or intrusion, but is the creative per tration of the temporal by the eternal operating in harmony wi discoverable scientific laws. Thus, as the old belief in *insta taneous* and *miraculous* methods of Creation has been aba doned by Christian theologians in our own day, so I have lit doubt that the belief in *miraculous* and *instantaneous* metho of Incarnation will be abandoned by Christian theologians our sons' day.

Also in thinking of the Incarnation-process we shall n think of it as the addition of a Divine Personality to a hum personality even though we speak of that addition or union being made hypostatically: we shall, I fancy, be led rather

think of it as the development of human consciousness within the sphere of human limitations until it is the perfect reflection of the Divine consciousness. He in whom God is perfectly incarnated sees human life with all its relations and possibilities as God sees it, and acts according to the Divine Will for such an environment. Thus *humanitas perfecta* is the same as *Deitas sub specie humanitatis.*

IX.

For the Christian Jesus Christ is not only He in Whom God became supremely incarnate. He is also the supreme means by which the Incarnation-process is henceforth to be carried on in human history. He is indeed the Way, the Truth, and the Life. In Him the Deity became Man, through Him the Deity is ever-striving to become Man in our cosmic process, and yet not through Him alone. St. Paul beheld a great truth. He realised that although Jesus Himself was at the right hand of God He had His body on earth and that that body—the Christian Church—was the means through which the Divine Incarnation was destined to be carried on and was being carried on. St. Paul looked forward to a time when it would unite all mankind.

Now that society consists of those who recognise the Incarnate Deity in Jesus and who yield themselves to the guidance and power of His Incarnating Spirit.

This Divine Society has two great Sacramental rites which are Sacraments of the Incarnation.

(1) Baptism, the Sacrament of Divine Begetting, by which we receive the *status* of Divine Sonship in the family of God and accept through faith in Jesus Christ its privileges and obligations.

(2) The Holy Communion or Eucharist, the Sacrament of Divine Brotherhood, whereby united in a holy fellowship we offer ourselves to the service of the Divine Father in the Spirit of filial obedience and self-sacrifice which characterised the earthly ministry of our Elder Brother, the Only-Begotten Son.

X.

There is but one other point mental integrity demands that I should not avoid. Is the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ

significant and effective for the whole Universe? St. Paul in his magnificent epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians plainly held so. Of the almost incredible extension of the Universe as revealed to us by modern astronomy, St. Paul knew nothing. For him the stellar universe existed to serve mankind—to shed light upon the earth, to be for signs and seasons and for days and years. The Apostle's astronomy was geocentric and we are compelled to view his Christology against the background of this geocentric astronomy. With our dawning Copernican consciousness we shall probably find ourselves unable to make St. Paul's affirmation. That the incarnation-process, the Divine Indwelling, constitutes the higher stages of the Divine creative method in worlds incredible millions of miles away from this tiny planet of ours, we may well believe. The Word of God, the Divine Logos, has been or will be incarnated there. For however vast the Universe yet the spectroscope reveals it to us as one in its 'stuff,' and so we can readily believe that it is also one in its creative stages; but I think that we can go no further here than the English poet:

> 'There may be other Words for other worlds,
> But for this world the Word of God is Christ'

nor does, I think, Christian Faith demand that we should go further. There is a sufficient dynamic in that view of the Incarnation.

Some perhaps will feel there is loss: others will feel that there is gain in this Modernist presentation of the Incarnation, but both Traditionalists and Modernists can unite without any sense of loss at all in Christina Rossetti's presentation of the Incarnation.

> 'Love came down at Christmas,
> Love all lovely, Love Divine:
> Worship we the Godhead,
> But wherewith for sacred sign?
> Love shall be our token,
> Love be yours and love be mine,
> Love to God and all men,
> Love for plea, and gift, and sign.' [12]

[12] Four lines are omitted from this poem.

THE DUTY OF THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER

By the Right Reverend E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S.,
Bishop of Birmingham.

Jesus saith unto him, Follow me; and leave the dead to bury their own dead. (*Matt.* viii, 22).

DURING the past few weeks I have been enjoying a holiday in the upper part of the Thames valley, on the borders of the Cotswold country. In such an area, unspoiled by modern industrialism, memorials of England's past lie all around. Stone Age burial-places lie near to ridge-ways that must be at least four thousand years old. The Roman roads still run straight across the countryside. Roman ruined villas have not wholly vanished. Beneath tesselated pavements of the second century of the Christian era elaborate arrangements for central heating remain. Archaeologists disinter altars to long-forgotten divinities: they find also slabs of stone on which the Christian monogram shows the early progess of a new form of faith. Some few of the churches in that countryside contain Saxon remains. Norman work is common. In many a church the enduring Cotswold stone makes the Reformation seem an event of yesterday.

As one wanders over this secluded country, which has escaped the grimy touch of the Industrial Revolution, the splendid natural beauty of England impresses itself upon one's mind, and equally one's thoughts are turned to the convulsions of byegone centuries. Always there has been change. Even in periods of apparent stability or stagnation the forces in human society that make for change have been quietly at work. We rejoice that for eight and a half centuries no invader has come to impose by superior strength his policy and thoughts on the native stock. Yet during this long period there has been continuous change. It has come from within. It has been the result of the slow growth of new ideas, of new knowledge and aspirations; and all these aspirations have necessarily had a religious basis. I use, of course, religion in its wider sense to denote the way in which man thinks of himself in relation to the ulti-

mate controlling forces of the Universe. Who or what has fashioned man with his appetites and ideals? What, in virtue of that fashioning, should man strive for? How can he please or placate or serve the God who made him, or work in harmony with the process of which he is a product? As the answers to these questions have varied, man's modes of worship and social strivings have changed. Fears and hopes and enthusiasms have altered. Yet amid eddies of change there has been continuity. The races of mankind are tenacious of their past. New knowledge makes slow progress against inherited tradition. Often, indeed, it provokes violent reactions which slowly but inevitably exhaust their strength.

Since the Norman Conquest the greatest and most far-reaching movement in English history is that which we speak of on its secular side as the Renaissance and on its religious as the Reformation. In this movement a new type of intellectual freedom began. Science was re-born. Modern culture, vast and disunited, has sprung from the free enquiry to which the Renaissance called men. The inspiration of the movement lay in the discovery of the greatness of classical culture. Its religious effect came from the fact that it gave men a new idea of the original content of Christianity as they turned to the Greek documents which form the New Testament. The first result was the repudiation of the pagan element in medieval Catholicism. Men perceived that the existing faith was not pure Christianity as judged by New Testament standards. It was an amalgam of the religion preached by Jesus combined with primitive religious crudities of immemorial antiquity. In all primitive religion we find beliefs which seem to the modern educated man amazingly puerile. The Semites thought that animal sacrifices pleased their tribal god : he smelled the savour of burning flesh and was ready to be gracious to his worshipper. The greatness of the Hebrew prophets lay in the fact that they taught that Jehovah demanded righteousness and purity : ' I will have mercy and not sacrifice,' was the keynote of their message. Even more widespread than such sacrificial notions has been belief in what is best described as sympathetic magic. In this range of fancy men imagine that there are secret connections in the Universe. The god and his totem animal are somehow identified. Words

have power: they excite the sort of rhythm to which supernatural beings are responsive. Precious stones possess spiritual properties. The divine can be brought into the material, and the virtue of a man long dead remains in his bones. Assume that these fancies are facts, and by the use of the right form of words and acts in some service of initiation a right relation between the god and the worshipper can be established. The priest by virtue of his office knows the correct form: his formula works like a charm. And after initiation the worshipper can advance in the favour of his deity by participating in sacred feasts. Elements of this range of ideas prevailed in the mystery-religions which were the most living creeds in the Roman Empire when Christianity began to spread through it. Through the centuries of intellectual decline and stagnation which followed the second century of our era such paganism persisted. It gradually permeated the victorious faith which Paul had preached, and medieval Catholicism was the ultimate result.

Religious degeneration is not, of course, due to deliberate borrowing. It results from the slow and insidious persistency of crude instincts. When men strongly desire a mechanical system of salvation, faith and worship are gradually accommodated to their wishes. The Reformation was the attempt—the successful attempt—to purify Christianity from accretions which naturally belonged to the magical sacramentalism of the mystery-religions. By asserting the priesthood of all believers the Reformers cut at the root of the pretension that the priest had any special supernatural powers. Masses for the dead became a figment of superstition. Transubstantiation was not merely denounced: it was derided as *hocus pocus*. The movement towards such purification was not sudden. Wycliffe had prepared the way nearly a century and a half before the dam burst. The German mystics also had made significant contributions to the same development. Had the movement been merely negative, a recoil from magical sacerdotalism, it would have lacked power. But on its positive side it made a strong appeal to men who were repelled by the evils of the established system. The Reformers affirmed that no system or caste stood between man and God; no sacerdotal culture was required to enable man to win Divine favour. As Jesus taught, it was but necessary

that man should love God and he would experience the Father's love. Between God and the spirit of man who seeks to do God's will there is no barrier. The pure in heart see God. They seek and find. Let a man have the sudden flash of intuition which makes him perceive that goodness, beauty and truth are eternal and supreme in the land to which all spirit moves—let him, in the familiar words, be born again—and he will find communion with God : he will enter on Eternal Life.

Herein was the complete transformation of religion. Mechanical sacramentalism dropped away. Magic became irrelevant. Men recaptured the spiritual freedom which made Jesus suspect by the ecclesiastics of His time. If the leaders of the Reformation did not gain the Christ's moral certainty, unsoiled by compromise, and that spiritual power of His which still flames across the centuries, it was because He was greater than they.

I emphasize this side of the Reformation because it is often wrongly supposed that four centuries ago men merely replaced belief in a system by belief in a Book. It is true that the Reformers accepted the Bible as substantially accurate. They had no science of internal criticism, no knowledge of contemporary history by which its record could be tested, no scheme of physical law based on exact observation. In the Bible they found the religious teaching of Jesus and of the Hebrew prophets who were His forerunners—and they were content.

But essentially they did not change from one authority—the Church—to another authority—the Bible. They meditated upon their own deepest religious experience; they compared it with the teaching of Jesus : and found a great and satisfying harmony. Their argument was not that Jesus must have been Divine because of His Virgin-Birth and miraculous powers : and that, because He was Divine, his authority was paramount. His credentials rested on a far surer basis; they rested, in fact, on His knowledge of God. The Reformers found in Jesus the spiritual insight which satisfied their souls.

To-day I would insist anew that ultimately the Christian faith does not rest on external considerations : its basis is the life of the spirit in man. That is why we can claim that it is final and permanent, religion in its deepest significance. When the flame of the spirit is kindled in a man, when he is converted

or born again, there comes to him the intuition that the Universe is not blind mechanism but the realm of an Eternal Purpose whose Nature is the quintessence of man's finest instincts. God comes to the man, arrayed in beauty, showing love and demanding goodness and truth. So He was with Jesus. And because men find in Jesus the perfection of that spiritual understanding which arises in themselves, they make Him central in their faith.

I would have you realize that not only did the Reformers build on this basis, but that the same foundation lay beneath the great Evangelical movement of the eighteenth century. Wesley and his fellow-workers by the power of their own faith made men comprehend the reality of the spiritual life. They quickened conscience, caused the flame of the spirit to glow in the minds of men : and then pointed to Jesus as the example of that perfection which God desires us all to reach. The human spirit is an enigma in an irrational Universe unless in this life, and in a continuing life after the death of the body, it is possible for us to grow ' to a perfect man, to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.'

It is well thus to recall the past that we may get confidence in the present. We are living in a period of vast religious confusion and decay. For well-nigh a century forces have been at work whose effect is now plainly visible in popular thought. The triumphs of scientific method have been combined with the conclusions of Biblical criticism to make men doubt the truth not only of the first chapter of *Genesis*, but also of many a New Testament narrative. Slowly at first but with increasing momentum the movement has gone on, until now it is difficult to get well-educated youths of character and ability to enter the ministry. The drift from the Churches has been widespread. Within them various types of reaction, products of desperate dives into the past, flourish. Magical sacramentalism, second Adventism and spiritualism are variants of primitive beliefs whose day is past : each is a symptom of religious decay.

What, then, does the future hold? I personally am convinced that we cannot reject the conclusions of experts working with a single-minded devotion to truth. To do so is to make religious faith seem incompatible with thoughtful enquiry. And, if often the conclusions of experts are probable rather than

certain, we cannot build on beliefs which always need the benefit of the doubt. From special pleading and obvious reaction the best of our young people turn impatiently away. A generation ago they doubted the first chapter of *Genesis*: now they are not prepared to accept such a simple statement of belief as the Apostles' Creed. Plainly the alternatives of religious evolution or religious decay lie before us.

What is the path of religious evolution? I find it in the words: 'Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their dead.' We need to cease from elaborate and unsatisfying attempts to defend doubtful positions. We must return to, and develop in its modern implications, the basis of faith on which alike the Reformation and the Evangelical Movement rested. There is no doubt as to the character and quality of the spiritual insight of Jesus. His teaching as to God's nature and as to man's duty and destiny is brilliantly clear. From His spiritual intuition sprang the conception of the Kingdom of Heaven: here the object of our striving, elsewhere our final home. Is there nothing within us which responds to such teaching? I say that, so far as the life of the spirit is a reality in any man, there is something which draws him to Jesus and makes him find in the Lord's spiritual certainty a compelling authority.

It is on such a basis that the best Modernists among us are working. They let the dead bury their dead, and seek to present the Christian faith as the gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven. Modernism is not a negative intellectualism. It appears to ecclesiastical obscurantists to be so because Modernists place loyalty to truth, as our generation has reached it, above any lesser loyalty to institution or tradition. But Modernists are, as I have sought to show, heirs of the Reformation and the Evangelical Movement. For that reason the gulf between the Modernist and the modern Evangelical has practically vanished. And moreover Modernism, by virtue of its very basis, produces the piety mingled with pity and humour which is the natural outcome of a living faith. If our past history is any guide to future developments, such Modernism marks the new direction of our religious evolution. As an understanding of it spreads we shall get one of those periods of spiritual enrichment which cleanse and uplift human society.

Some doubtless will contend that the end of such a movement is utter scepticism, doubt as to the existence of God or the power of prayer, denial that there was any value in the teaching of Jesus. I think that those who have such expectations are completely mistaken. They forget that human civilization is built upon an instinctive striving for goodness and truth. Man is differentiated from the lower animals by his spiritual perception and aspirations. The life of the Spirit is a reality within man; and, just in so far as his spiritual insight is pure and strong, he is drawn to Jesus, and finds in our Lord freedom from cloying superstitions and inspiration to develop his finest faculties.

The man of science does not present to us a Universe which is spiritually inert. He makes an abstraction useful within its own range; but, by the very eagerness of his pursuit of truth, testifies to the spiritual ideal which gives momentum to the progress of knowledge. Wider in range and far deeper in insight was the understanding which constitutes the revelation of Jesus. Loyalty to His understanding led Him to the Cross: but he did not die in vain.

BOOK REVIEWS

ENGLISH MODERNISM*

Dr. Jacks has been fortunate in securing Professor Gardner to provide the volume on Anglican Modernism for his series on 'The Faiths.' Professor Gardner has not only been intimately associated with the Modernist movement in the Church of England, but has in no small degree helped to shape the course in which it has travelled. The book traces the rise of Modernism very largely to historico-critical research in the region of early Christianity, and also to a revived interest in, and an intelligent attempt to understand, the facts of religious experience. But if history and psychology have played their part in creating the new attitude, philosophy has not been neglected, although individual modernists have adopted various standpoints. Professor Gardner, as his other books have made clear, and as he here quite openly confesses, is an unabashed Pragmatist, or as he prefers to term it, an 'Activist,' though he calls the word Activism 'a barbarous compound.' 'The idea is that in all creation the cause of life and development is an immanent spirit, working from within; and in the same way all the manifestations of human life in the individual and society are the result of the activity of human spirit and will, not without the aid of the great Creative Spirit.' Although the philosophical problem of the objective truth of religious ideas has occasionally been evaded by pragmatist thinkers,

[1] *Modernism in the English Church.* By Percy Gardner, Litt.D., LL.D., F.S.A. (Methuen. 5/-.)

Professor Gardner faces the question quite frankly, especially in Chapter VII on *The Validity of Religious Experience,* which is indeed the crucial question nowadays. His contention is that 'absolute existence, objectivity out of relation to human faculties and human experience, cannot be strictly proved as regards any of the things of which we become aware in the course of living.' It is through dealing with things, when we are actuated by will, that we become convinced of their existence, and not by any process of logic. 'It hence appears that the whole sense of objectivity, whether of the world of nature or of the world of other selves, is produced not by the working of the intellectual powers, but by the force of energy and will.' And with regard to our knowledge of God, this 'is gained in the same way as our knowledge of the natural world and the world of human beings.' He is discovered 'by His independence of our wishes and His opposition to our wills,' He becomes 'a stubborn reality with which we have to reckon.' Religious experience bears the same relation to the spiritual life which the senses bear to life in the visible world. 'In strict logic we cannot pass beyond the phenomena to realities, either in the world of sense or in the world of spirit.' 'We have the same right to believe in a real and objective Deity that we have to believe in our house or our city, in our friends or our relations.'

A philosophy of religion such as the foregoing tends naturally to attribute secondary importance to those intellectual constructions and interpretations of religious experience which we term theology. 'The function of intellect in religion is rather regulative than constitutive, rather relative than absolute.' In fact Professor Gardner frankly declares that 'the intellectualist systems of theology are out of date. The ground has been cut from under them and they must decay.'

We fear that those who criticise Modernism as being based on the idea of the mere relativity of all our notions will find their worst misgivings substantiated in this book. But for ourselves, while appreciating the attractiveness of relativism, as cutting the ground from beneath dogmatism, we doubt whether Anglican Modernists as a body would consent to range themselves, in this particular matter, at the side of Professor Gardner. They would be too alive to the dangers of a relativist position. We are inclined to think that the old idea, which was the strong point of the Scholastic theology, that reason or revelation does present us with truths which are not merely relatively true, *i.e.* not true only for human beings, but true absolutely, has a very great deal to be said for it. We hold that pragmatism and activism have been a part of the vogue of thinking in biological terms, a vogue which we believe is now definitely on the decline. The day of Bergson and William James is probably past, and theologians should be very chary of allying themselves with those brilliant exponents of anti-intellectualism. The Modernism which has a future will not be based on scepticism, even on a very refined and subtle scepticism. The struggle for survival amongst ideas will weed out those that are not pretty rigidly based on fact. Religion will never get 'acclimatised to the atmosphere of relativity,' or, if it does, there will be a fine fat crop of superstitions to deal with. The demon of intolerant obscurantism will not thus be cast out; we shall open the door to worse things. A pragmatist apologetic is a dangerous instrument, and will wound the hand of him who uses it.

Professor Gardner is of course right in insisting that theology is secondary; for theology, even liberal theology, cannot create religion, it is religion that must produce theology. Some Modernists seem to imagine that the *only* obstacle to a revival of religion amongst us is the lack of a

ew theology; Professor Gardner does not fall into this grotesque error. He realises that the chief obstacle to religion at present is religious indifference, the extent and depth of which it would be almost impossible to xaggerate. There are now no 'reservoirs of spiritual force' because no ne has the inclination or opportunity to stop and think. Everywhere is din nd hurry (p. 163). When religion has a chance, theology will have a hance, but not before. J.C.H.

A NEW APOLOGETIC.[1]

It is generally recognised that the attitude of men of science towards piritual values has changed considerably during the past generation. Those who doubt this should read Professor Whitehead's recent *Science nd the Modern World*. Yet the religious situation has not benefitted to early the extent that might have been expected. Although there may be ess ground for it, there is probably a good deal more agnosticism and cepticism among the general public than was the case thirty years ago. The fact is that the men of science cannot do everything: they may display wish for an *entente* with religion, but unless they are met half-way an nderstanding is not likely to result. Canon Streeter places his finger on he spot when he writes:

> 'Towards a clearing up of issues the representatives of Science have made their contribution. They have thought out and proclaimed to the world a new theory of the nature and limitations of knowledge in the sphere of pure Science. It is time that the same thing should be attempted from the standpoint of Religion. To match the philosophy of Science a new philosophy of Religion must be found' (p. 31).

There can be little doubt that he is right. The pragmatists, it is true, id attempt to supply this new philosophy of religion, and their work led to more clear realisation of what were the essential needs which religion an satisfy. Yet somehow this school failed to establish the objective alidity of religion. A possibility still remained that the very congruity of eligion with our psychological needs proves religion itself to be created by ose needs—a subjective realisation of the inmost dreams of the heart. ragmatism failed to face the problem of Reality, an issue which no philoophy of religion can evade. The question, Is religion *true?* is bound to resent itself sooner or later.

Yet even this question is less simple than it sounds. What is meant by eligious truth? Is there not such a thing as poetic, or as aesthetic, truth hich is different in kind from scientific truth. And may not religious truth e in the same way *sui generis?* May a thing not be true for religion, even hile being untrue, possibly, for science or for history? Some such position s this was the one adopted by some Roman Catholic Modernists, and it ay be regarded as a variety of the post-scholastic view that a thing might e false for philosophy and yet true for theology—which leaves the road pen for scepticism and obscurantism.

What seems to be pretty well recognised by students of the philosophy f religion, to whatever school they may belong, is that religion is conrned primarily with *values*; and, as a consequence, the objective validity f religion stands or falls with the objective validity of human values. A umber of writers on the subject (and amongst them perhaps the most enetrating of all—Höffding) are disappointing in that they seem to leave e problem of value itself unresolved; they leave values hanging in mid-

[1] *Reality.* By Burnett Hillman Streeter. (Macmillan. 8/6 net.)

air, like the tortoise upon which Hindu speculation rested the elephan upon which rested the world.

The usual modern correlation of science and religion which takes scienc as concerned with facts, and religion with values, may be, and probably is on the right lines. But the matter cannot be left there; the relation of fac to value has to be considered, and this unfortunately is a metaphysica problem. Metaphysics, like Cacus, lies in wait for us everywhere, an emerges from its cave just when we least wish to see it.

The situation has changed somewhat since Höffding wrote. 'Fact itself has been discovered to be rather a difficult term to define—hardly les difficult, perhaps, than 'value.' It is now realised that what science give us are diagrams rather than facts—its view of reality is highly abstract And, according to this view, the poet or mystic is concerned, not wit value only, but with diagrams of a rather different order—far richer in con tent, and of the nature of pictures. The poet's subject-matter may thus b far more concrete than that of the man of science. In fact the usua estimate has to be reversed. It is the poet who deals with realities, th man of science with figments, *i.e.* artificially simplified patterns of reality In this connection we venture to quote Professor Whitehead (he has jus quoted the lines 'Ye Presences of Nature in the sky, etc.'):

> 'In thus citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish to make i that we forget how strained and parodoxical is the view of natur which modern science imposes on our thoughts. Wordsworth, to th height of genius, expresses the concrete facts of our apprehension facts which are distorted in the scientific analysis. Is it not possibl that the standardised concepts of science are only valid within narro limitations, perhaps too narrow for science itself?'[2]

This is about the point where Canon Streeter steps in. After quotin Einstein, Professor Eddington and Mr. Bertrand Russell as to the attitud of modern physics, he says (p. 30):—

> 'To make my position quite clear, I will state it in another way The main conclusion of the school of thought I have referred to ma be summed up by saying that what Science gives us is a *Representa tion* of Ultimate Reality, and that this Representation is one that ma be likened, not so much to a picture, as to a diagram. On that way o putting it, the position I am maintaining is the counterpart of thi conception. I suggest that what Religion gives is also a Representa tion of Ultimate Reality, but one that is of the nature *not of a diagra but of a picture*.
>
> 'If the case is so, it follows that Science and Religion each give Representation which without the other is incomplete. An analog will illustrate my meaning. I wish to explain something about Veni to a friend who has never been there, and there are readily accessibl both the plan of the city in Baedeker's guide and Turner's famou picture. Which will be the most useful? It depends entirely upon th immediate object of our conversation. If my sole object is to show hi the exact position of an hotel which I recommend, the plan is what want, the picture is worthless. If I wish to prove that Venice is we worth a visit, or if my aim is to suggest to him an attitude of mir which will enable him to get the most profit from a visit, the picture the thing. But if I want to convey to him the best idea I can of th place as a whole, I shall use both plan and picture.'

[2] *Science and the Modern World* (1926), p. 118.

In brief, the contrasted Representations given by Science and Religion re both required for the fullest possible apprehension of Reality. One is ot fact, and the other fancy. They are both fact: and if there is a difference in the degree of truth involved in either, it would be the religious epresentation that would be the more true, as expressing the fuller aspect f reality—the picture has a fuller content than the plan. But, anyway, eligion and Science are both concerned with *truth*, and with reality.

It follows that a particular religion (*e.g.* Christianity) is true 'if, and in roportion as, the quality which it expresses is actually existent in, and haracteristic of, Reality.'

Is the Christian 'myth,' if regarded as a picture of reality, a true cture? Or does it, as Feuerbach and Schopenhauer held, picture something which we should dearly like to be, but which is not, true?

To answer this question involves an examination of the nature of reality s revealed to us in the creative process of nature, and also in our own onsciousness (the only point where we can see things 'from inside'), and, deed, in the facts of human experience in general.

> 'To reach a true conception of Reality we must combine in a single comprehensive scheme all that can be discovered along each of two ways of knowledge. First comes the investigation of the material Universe by the methods of pure Science. Secondly, there must be carefully controlled inference as to the nature and quality of that indwelling Creative Life which is partially expressed in all living organisms. In man that Life finds expression in an intenser, and therefore probably a more representative, form; and this is also a form of which we have direct knowledge in our own inner experience.
>
> 'To use this knowledge to interpret Creative life is, I frankly admit, in effect to *personify* the Power behind things . . . But to personify the Power behind things is not, as so many fear, a "pathetic illusion"; it is a necessity of thought . . . I have argued that individuality is the synthetic focus of the living organism, and that in the ascending scale of evolution individuality and freedom increase as life reveals itself in forms ever intenser and more highly organised. Analogy suggests that this principle applies also to the Life in the Universe.'

Thus, if the Christian 'myth' pictures the Power behind things as a erson, a Father, it is giving us a true picture.

But the idea of a personal God is not the whole content of the Christian *ythus*, which is infinitely more rich. In a word, does the crucifix (altogether part from the historicity of the event for which it stands) stand as a true icture of the essence of reality, of the nature of God? Or is it, as many ave thought, a protest (unavailing but noble) against a Reality indifferent human struggles and to human pain? The fundamental question, upon he answer to which depends the issue whether Christianity is or is not ue, is this: In the Cross of Christ do we catch 'focussed in one vivid oment, the eternal quality of Creative Life?'

It need not be supposed, however, that Canon Streeter, that expert in he critical study of historical sources, evades the issue whether the 'myth' or is not, in point of fact, history. The chapter 'The Christ,' one of the est in the book, deals with this. It cannot be summarised, but a characristic passage may be given:—

> 'We cannot long reflect on the life and character of Christ without perceiving that it is a perfect embodiment in concrete experience of an ideal principle—the principle of Creative Love. It follows that the

thinker who wishes to frame a conception of the Universe must regar the occurrence in history of such a life as a phenomenon of uniqu importance. The life of Christ is a fact; no theory, therefore, of th Universe can be intellectually watertight which is inadequate to explai this fact. And when a principle has been realised in concrete ex perience, we must ask how far it is representative of an element i Ultimate Reality. The fact of Christ, the actual emergence upon th stage of history of the transcendent personality, is an empirical phen menon which challenges explanation. For every effect we must assum a cause adequate to produce it. If the personality of Christ is th effect, is it not reasonable to infer, in that Infinite Creative Life whic we must assume as cause, a character in which Love is an essenti element?'

And if this be true, it is a truth more important for us than any othe for

'Neither the physical nor the metaphysical, neither the rational nc the aesthetic quality of the Infinite is what we are most concerned t know. But what, for lack of a richer word, I can only call its "moral quality is a piece of knowledge which affects our every act and ever hope, which gives character to our every aspiration or achievemen More than that—the moral quality and purpose in the Infinite are nc only that element in It which it is most important for us to know; the are also (if they exist at all) intrinsically the most important thin about It, they must constitute what Greek thinkers called its *οὐσία* c its "essence," *i.e.* that which makes It to be what It is.'

We have adopted the method of supplying copious extracts from thi book; but they have been, necessarily, from the argumentative portions One might write another notice and emphasise those wise sayings whic reveal a deep sympathy with human nature and a wide experience of lif united with long and anxious reflection upon its problems. The book is on to be bought and read, and is characterised by a complete absence of can Reality is a good title for the work—that quality pervades it throughou This is the sort of Modernism which would rejuvenate English religion, it could get a hearing. J. C. HARDWICK.

HERETICS, SAINTS AND MARTYRS.[1]

Heretics, Saints and Martyrs! The grouping is far from fantastic. A our author notes (88), purity of morals in mediaeval times was often re garded as a sign of heresy and punished at the stake.

It is not on these lines, however, that Dr. Palmer's book proceeds. Hi theme is the principles of spiritual religion, set out, not systematically bu inferentially, in the attractive form of humanized Church history, and th 'cases' from which we are to deduce a new theology are selected partl with a view to their over-emphasis. This is an original feature of th book: our author assumes rightly that ideas are best studied and evaluate in those who have worked them to death.

Secondly, his chapter on the period of the Reformation deals not wit Luther, Zwingli, Calvin or the Humanists, but with the spiritual forbear of all Nonconformity, *the Anabaptists*. The poison of political asps wa not under their lips: they were pure religionists, who, as Professor Rufu

[1] *Heretics, Saints, and Martyrs.* By Frederick Palmer. (Harvard University Pres 1925. Oxford University Press. pp. 256. Price .)

Jones has said, flung out ideals which have been guiding stars for us ever since, and who went to death in terrible fashions because they were resolved to *make the world fit their vision.* It is a story well worth telling, and Dr. Palmer's version of it makes fascinating and instructive reading, the more so because it runs contrary to the popular view of the Anabaptists as moral no less than spiritual anarchists. But Dr. Palmer is not obsessed by his thesis and tells with quiet humour many stories of the eccentricities of his heroes. Thus, in Appenzell, this religious epidemic took the form of fulfilling literally the command of Christ to become as little children, 'many persons, male and female . . . throwing apples at each other, having their faces washed . . . jumping up and down, and clapping hands' (17). The following incident, quite in the vein of the Hebrew prophets, is a parable of Anabaptism. Arrested for running up and down the streets of Amsterdam in a condition of primitive simplicity, they replied when commanded by the magistrates to dress : 'We are the naked truth.' Their leading idea was, in fact, the inspiration *at will* of the individual, the far-reaching implications of which in a new doctrine of God and man, free from any but an ethical dualism, has too often been obscured by the vagaries, tragic and amusing, of 'inspired' individuals. The bread of the Spirit seems indeed often almost unleavened.

Perhaps it was some such reflection as this that led Dr. Palmer to follow up his essay on the Anabaptists with one on the little known but highly important thirteenth century Abbot *Joachim of Flora,* who 'passed his initiation into sainthood by living for a long time at the bottom of a well' (63). His great and lasting claim to fame was his conviction that there is a 'closer relationship to Christ than that of worshipping him as a historic being' (91). He prophesied that this new kind of relationship would be universally effected by an outpouring of the Spirit in the year 1260. Nothing cataclysmic happened, however, so that many spiritual reformers since his time, with a little manipulation of the date, have been able to interpret the prophecy as of themselves. Alas ! that we only know in part and prophesy in part : that which is perfect has not yet come : but the three perils of spiritual religion remain—pantheism, sentimentalism and antinomianism.

Pantheism was the danger of *Angelus Silesius* (Essay III), a seventeenth century mystic who developed Eckhart at his boldest.

Sentimentalism may perhaps be laid to the charge of *Isaac Watts* (Essay IV), a hymnologist of the Pietistic Movement in England in the eighteenth century. His theology was a harsh Calvinism, but "a kindly heart compelled him, as it has done so many others, to modify illogically its severities . . . As we look over his most repellant lines we shall find almost all of them bathed in an atmosphere of feeling' (175).

> Nature has soft but powerful bands,
> And reason she controls,
> While children, with their little hands,
> Hang closest to our souls.
>
> Thoughtless, they act the old serpent's part.
> What tempting things they be !
> Laid low, they twine about our heart
> And draw it off from Thee ! (157).

The next dark corner in Dr. Palmer's Portrait Gallery of the Church of the Spirit contains the picture of one who allowed nothing 'to twine about her heart and draw it off from Thee'—*S. Perpetua.* Hers is a moving

story, and we are glad to have it told in full. It well illustrates the principle expounded by Dr. Jacks in *Heroes of Smokeover* that 'the higher goal you aim at the more wrong you have to do in getting there.'

In the last two essays (V and VI) Dr. Palmer makes his theme more explicit by giving us side by side the conceptions of *Mani* and *Jesus*. The other characters in the book all swing between these two poles, and the lesson we are meant to draw is that Redemption is the law of the full development of man's personality and not in his annihilation in God.

R. D. RICHARDSON.

THE EXPERIENCES OF AN ORDINAND.[1]

Hilary Down, 'one man out of any five, who will pass you in the street to-day,[1] under the influence of an attractive army chaplain, decides while still a subaltern on the Western Front to offer himself for Holy Orders in the Church of England. Taught to believe that 'the real authority that can legalise change is just the minds of men,' Hilary enters a High Anglican Theological College in the cathedral city of Widdering, where he finds the atmosphere that of an 'asylum of lunatics': nor are his fellow-students congenial companions for a young subaltern of the Royal Engineers, being drawn largely either from the ranks of 'devoted servers at extreme churches,' or from 'shop-counters.' During his training at Widdering Hilary 'displaced the adventure of religion for a game of love,' but this did not prevent him from offering himself for ordination. He obtained a title at St. Boniface's, Mannersley, a fashionable watering place in the Widdering Diocese. Here, under the genial rule of Archdeacon Buckrose, a rich man, furnished with ability, 'who dearly loves the Church of England, and is therefore a Broad Churchman,' Hilary tries to carry out the duties of a curate in a residential parish. His fellow curates—middle-aged cynics with tiresome wives and small children—kill all the enthusiasm of the young deacon, and so we are not surprised to learn that he decides to retire into lay life, before his ordination to the priesthood. Mr. Ernest Raymond has given us another novel which should be read by all who desire a knowledge of the mind of the post-war young man, and an account of what a certain type of theological college can achieve to produce the wrong kind of clergyman. We hope that it has been, or will be, read by every bishop on the bench. Nor should the shelves of our theological colleges fail to find a corner in which this book may rest. No doubt Hilary Down had not the right temperament for the difficult post of a suburban curate; he might have done better in the slums; but Widdering was certainly not an ideal training ground for any normal young Englishman of the educated classes, although it may be capable of turning many a raw young server into a priest who is much more anxious to Romanize the Church of England than to Christianize the English nation.

BASIL BUCHANAN.

THE WEEK.[1]

It is possibly the association of the week with the Creation story in Genesis that lends to the institution for our minds an inevitableness which does not rightly belong to it. While the year, month and day are certainly based on astronomical measures, the week is probably quite artificial, marching on its course regardless of both sun and moon. In the book

* *Wanderlight.* By Ernest Raymond. (Cassells. Price 7/6 net. 1924.)

* *The Week: an Essay on the Origin and Development of the Seven-Day Cycle.* By F. H. Colson, formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. (C.U.P. Pp. 126. Price 5/-. 1926.)

before us Mr. Colson begins indeed by recognising the existence in Babylonia and Persia of a 'lunar' week (a variable subdivision of the month), but proceeds to distinguish it carefully from the 'continuous' week which we know. He goes on to discuss three forms of continuous week: the Jewish, the old Roman (periods of eight days marked off by *nundinae*) and the Planetary.

The first main step in the argument is the explanation of the order of the planets in the planetary week. Whereas the natural order of the planets for ancient astronomers was Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, a different order appears in the days of the week—Sunday, Monday, (*Mardi, Mercredi, Jeudi, Vendredi*), Saturday. This order is shown to be based on the astrological system of 'chronocratories': each day is named after the planet regnant in its first hour. Thus the planetary week has the hour as its unit and is independent of the Jewish week with its unit of the day.

Why now does the week begin with Sunday? The writer inclines to the view that the popular mind connected Sabbath-observance by the Jews of the Diaspora with its own inclination for business on the ill-starred day of Saturn. The two days would become equated, and the strict abstention of the Jew would strengthen the more or less vague aversion of the Gentile.

An important section is devoted to fuller consideration of 'the driving force behind the week.' The institution of Sabbaths, *nundinae*, and such days of relaxation, is fairly easy to understand; but why should the rest of the week come to have been mapped out also? In summing up the evidence, Mr. Colson feels justified only in answering that it was because of a belief in astrology, known to have been widespread, though we cannot estimate its precise strength. One might, however, go farther and develop the writer's reference to 'shopkeepers' by finding a contributory influence in the increasing demands of a commercial civilisation. As the Sabbath, the rest-day of the ever-multiplying Jewish communities, became more and more identified with the day of Saturn, the non-Jew would find the astrological day-names useful in counting up to the Sabbath. Later the day-names would come to have a general value in regulating the routine of business. This hypothesis is in line wih Mr. Colson's important emphasis on the entirely unofficial character of week-observance. Hence an institution which was not propagated by official usage has probably won its way by usefulness as a commercial convention.

There is an interesting discussion of the Christian *Dies Dominica*. Why was it placed on the first day of the week? The writer questions on psychological grounds the view that it is a weekly commemoration of the Resurrection. Man's instinct in these matters is 'intensive'—he prefers to hold a big celebration infrequently rather than small celebrations at closer intervals.

The final section contains an analysis of the day-names in the modern languages. Some of these languages have adopted all the pagan names, though most substitute the Christian names for Saturday and Sunday. Welsh is in the former class; this shows that Britain received its week (as we should have expected) from a pre-Christian Rome. English also is in the same class, but it has Teutonic equivalents for all the Latin names except Saturday; from this fact interesting speculations might start. Irish is in the second class—plainly the week reached it from a Christian source.

This book is attractively produced, but an index or analytical table of contents would have been helpful in recalling the steps of the argument.

C.G.C.

DEMONOLOGY.

There are those who hold that it is better to believe too much than too little, and that credulity has been of greater benefit to mankind than scepticism. Credulity abounds. It almost rivals that of the ordination candidate who professed a faith in all things visible and invisible. Superstition is far from dead. In a recent book, entitled *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology,*[1] we have excellently set out the solemn buffoonery of the nineteenth century French demonologists. Tatian may claim that Christ has set the world free from ten thousand demons, but there is a Christian world which goes on seeing human life obsessed by the devil and his hosts of materialised spirits, fiends, incubi and succubi, reinforced by stealers of consecrated Hosts and secret Manichaeans celebrating Black Masses in the disguise of Freemasons. These in their turn are routed by exorcists or, failing them, by pious adepts able temporarily to dematerialise themselves. Readers of Bram Stoker's *Dracula* know all about it. But there apparently are people who seriously contemplate the world through this cloud of phantoms, and believe that Evil exists behind the universe in the form of a personal anti-god. To them the devil is not a personification but a personality. Discarnate beings who were never men serve his ministry and inflict themselves upon humanity, while human beings (who, one would suppose, never will be men) perform a ritual in his honour and become masters of hidden power by his help. All the stories of witchcraft to this view are not only true as records of the follies of men and women (that is, they are not only true historically, which most people would admit), but they are true metaphysically, in their attitude to Truth itself. That is to say, there is a science of witchcraft. We are actually living among demons who perform the atrocities they have been imagined to perform.

In the nineties of last century this kind of thing was popular in France. The story of Léo Taxil and the demon-woman Diana Vaughan has been told by the master-hand of the historian H. C. Lea. Some may know an extensive and solemn piece of buffoonery, *Le Satanisme et la Magie,* by Jules Bois. It professes to be a historical treatise on demonology and contains an even more solemn preface by the novelist Huysmans, who ended his days as a Trappist monk. There is an immense modern French literature of this class. It would, however, be a mistake to take it seriously. It practically all proceeds from three causes, anti-clericalism, pornography and a passion *pour ébouriffer les bourgeois.* Nevertheless people do take it seriously. The following are casual extracts from *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology.*

> 'Again and again in these cases we meet with that uncanny quota, by no means insignificant and unimportant, which seemingly admits of no solution save by the materialisation of evil intelligences of power' (p. 97).
>
> 'In many instances it is certain that the Principle of Evil incarnate was present for the hideous adoration of his besotted worshippers' (p. 133).
>
> '. . . there was a manifestation of supernatural intelligences from the pit' (p. 145).
>
> 'The New Testament evidence for the reality of magic and divina-

[1] *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology.* By Montague Summers. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. 12/6. 1926.)

tion is such that it cannot be disregarded by any who accept the Christian revelation' (p. 191).

'Demoniac possession is frequently presented to us in the New Testament, and we have the authority of Christ Himself as to its reality . . . If Christ were divine, how came He to foster and encourage a delusion? Why did He not correct it? Only two answers can be supposed, either He was ignorant of a religious truth or He deliberately gave instructions that He knew to be false . . . To a Christian either of these explanations is of course unthinkable' (p. 203).

'The opinion of the Cistercian Dom Robert de la Trappe, who, whilst acknowledging that the demoniac possessions as detailed in the New Testament are *de fide,* supposes that all other cases are to be attributed to fraud or disease, must be severely censured as regretably rash and even culpable' (p. 271).

The phenomena which the presence of a diabolical hierarchy is postulated to explain are mainly two—(1) cultural witchcraft with the ritual of the Sabbat, and (2) demoniac possession. That the Sabbat was a ceremony of frequent occurrence down to the seventeenth century is beyond dispute, as is the fact that its rationale was mockery of the rites of the Church. Its features may be gathered sufficiently from one example out of the hundreds recorded between the fourteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth century. The following is from a case tried at Bordeaux in 1594.[2]

Jean Boscheau confessed before the Parlement of Bordeaux that when a girl she had been seduced by an Italian. On the eve of St. John at midnight this man took her to a field where he made a circle with a holly stick, muttering words which he read out of a black book. At this there appeared a large horned he-goat, completely black, accompanied by two women and a man dressed as a priest. The he-goat asked the Italian who the girl was, and being told that she had been brought there to be made one of his people, he required the Italian to make the sign of the Cross with his left hand, and ordered all to come and salute him. This they did by kissing his back. The he-goat carried between his horns a black candle, lighted, at which the rest of the company lighted candles they carried. As they made their reverence, money was thrown into a bowl. On another occasion when the woman was at the same place, the he-goat demanded a lock of her hair. This was given to him by the Italian. On a Wednesday and Friday in each month a general chapter met at Puy de Dome. She had herself been present there times without number with more than sixty other persons, all of whom carried black candles which they lighted from that carried by the he-goat. To his own he applied a light he took from under his tail. All present then formed in a round dance, backs to the centre. In this meeting Mass was said according to their use, backs turned to the Altar. The celebrant (whom she named) wore a black chasuble without cross. He elevated a slice of horse-radish coloured black instead of the Host, and at the elevation all cried, 'Master, help us.' In the chalice water took the place of wine . . . At the meeting the duties of sorcery were assigned and each gave account of tasks performed. These tasks were poisoning, bewitching, healing by charms, destroying crops and similar crimes.

[2] Cited by J. B. Thiers. *Traité des Superstitions qui regardent les Sacrements.* (Avignon. 1777. Vol. II, p. 231.)

After the early seventeenth century the Sabbat disappears. Its characteristic features survive in the very improbable Black Mass alleged to be offered to Satan by sporadic groups of solemn diabolists. The only authenticated example of this is the sacrifice of an infant performed as a love-charm by the Abbé Guibourg for Madame de Montespan, mistress of Louis XIV. If Satanic Masses have ever been celebrated outside the riotous imagination of French novelists, their significance is to be sought not in the dominion of demons but in the spirit which moves a boy with a piece of chalk to obscenity. The meaning of the medieval Sabbat is another and more sober problem. Michelet (*La Sorcière*) thought it was the protest of the oppressed commons against the predominant Church and nobility, in other words the compensation of an inferiority complex. Miss M. Murray (*The Witch Cult in Western Europe*) surmises that it concealed a primitive Nature religion surviving *sub rosa*. This theory has not been welcomed by authorities on folk-lore. Moreover the priapic element in the Sabbat, upon which attention is often fixed, is not probably as important as appears. The tone of all mediaeval life was vulgar. Mediaeval obscenity means nothing. The feature of the Sabbat that is really significant is that under its cover a variety of criminal offences, from poisoning to cattle-maiming, were planned. The Sabbat may well have been a piece of foolery, eventually derived from an old cult, but it was probably used to hatch evil deeds, devised and performed by minds and hands that were only too human. It is not uncommon for neighbours to-day to quarrel and carry their grievances to the law. The vindictiveness of the illiterate in the middle ages was certainly no less. They went to the Sabbat with their grievancse, most of them believing firmly in demons. Less simple souls who did not share the belief played on their superstitions and themselves acted the devil. The meaning of the ritual of the Sabbat—if it had a meaning—remains obscure. But plainly, while the worse elements in human nature have not disappeared, the spread of enlightenment has been fatal to any but human demons. The Satanic visitors existed as such only in the imagination of ignorance.

Demoniac possession is in the same position, save that belief in its continued occurrence is more seriously held. The diseases of the human mind remain mysterious, but it will be generally admitted that alienists and psychologists have dealt with them more successfully and (what is more important) more intelligently than exorcists.

The spiritual view of life in the hands of its worst adherents is always in danger of denying itself. Neo-Platonism sometimes degenerated into theurgy. Christianity suffers from those whose devotion to the spiritual makes them want to dematerialise the material. A disease of the brain to such appears too materialistic a force to injure a personality. They therefore assume a demon. Mere passions appear too carnal an enemy to wreck a soul. They therefore create a devil. The effect of such a temper is to forget God and to belittle man.

E. J. Martin.

TWO BOOKS ON JESUS CHRIST.*

Both these books by American writers are concerned with the influence which Christ has always exerted upon men, and each urges that we can construct a 'better world' only by getting into closer contact with the

**The Inescapable Christ.* By W. R. Bowie, with a preface by the Very Rev. W. R. Inge. (J. Murray. 6/- net.)

**The Aim of Jesus Christ.* By W. F. Cooley, Ph.D. (Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 7/6.)

spirit of Jesus. But in the one book we are made to feel the presence and hear the authoritative commands of a living person while in the other we feel the cold atmosphere of the death-chamber and we stand trying almost in vain to salve the good memories from the *débris* of failure.

Dr. Bowie's work deserves the careful attention of everyone who takes life's problems seriously. It is written in a bracing style and, while it offers many criticisms, it does not avoid difficulties but seeks to be constructive.

Tired of the hypocrisy of the past and disillusioned by catastrophe, men are crying out for reality. But there are many and different planes of reality, all of which have their part to play in the tasks of life; and if we are to co-ordinate them 'the reality which we must reckon with is that spiritual force of goodness which brings us face to face with God' (p. 21). Again, the spirit of the age prompts men in their yearnings after self-expression; but self-expression will be a feeling in the dark unless we seek its meaning in the example of Jesus, who, having by constant communing with God come to a deep knowledge of himself, sought to express that self wholly in terms of the well-being of others. 'Through love and sacrifice, he entered into that larger self of the whole human race which needs redemption, and made *that* the field of his deathless self-expression' (p. 36).

While the writer insists on the abiding value for religion of the institution and of the loyalty which guards it, he makes some trenchant remarks about the feebleness of a blind orthodoxy or of an equally shallow negative acepticism. 'Ponder that teaching which the Church hands on to you . . . but remember always that the only vital use of creeds and formulated doctrines is to inspire you to reproduce the spiritual experience to which they testify' (p. 86). The Church as the Body of Christ, the fellowship of the faithful, can provide the only effective way of concentrating our energies on the many problems of the modern world. Membership of that Church implies our belief that the mind and the outlook of Jesus can solve our problems. It was his aim to bring all men to a belief and trust in God as strong as his own, a belief which would inspire our every action; and the strength of his influence rests on the fact that the nearer men approach to his example the more they become convinced that he was right.

Dr. Cooley, however, explains the power which Christ exercises over his disciples in another way. Jesus, he finds, obtained popularity just because he championed the cause which his countrymen had at heart; he pinned his faith to the crude apocalyptic expectations of his age and sought to establish the new Messianic Kingdom in Palestine as an organised political institution. 'The main features of Israel's Kingdom-expectation, apocalyptic and institutional as that was, were accepted by him quite without question. He, too, looked for a socio-political *institution* set up on earth and centred in Jerusalem' (p. 73). Of course, his teaching had other elements—'the higher morality, naturally, is not lacking'—but it was not the major interest but a means to an end. By the ride into Jerusalem, he meant to offer himself definitely as Messiah, but rejection brought his life to an end in tragedy. Some 'Resurrection appearances' kept the Apostles' faith alive, but gradually their hopes underwent change and the belief arose that the Kingdom for which they waited was either unseen (mystical) or in heaven (spiritual).

We confess to a feeling of disappointment after reading this book. Despite the writer's statement that in his work 'the ethical interest is dominant' and his attempt to show that the importance of Jesus rests

ultimately in his humanitarian activities, we feel that all else is crowded out by the impassioned attempt to show the illusions of Jesus. No doubt Christ shared some of the apocalyptic ideas of his age; but such facts as are known do not point to the fever of excitement or the homogeneity of these beliefs which the writer assumes. In what is admittedly a work of much care and scholarship, a little more exact definition might have prevented what we feel to be confusion of terms—at least it might have given some meaning to a 'literal socio-political institution' and have shown why this is necessary to a *sovereignty*.

Again, although we are warned to avoid literalising the tropical speech of the East (p. 17) the writer occasionally shows little imagination but much literalism. Must we believe, for example, that in the sayings about feasting in the Kingdom Jesus looked forward to a literal Messianic banquet (pp. 67, 96, etc.)? Some, we know, hoped for a real feast on Leviathan and Behemoth; but Paul could hold a less literal view—'The Kingdom is not eating and drinking.' Why must we conclude that Jesus was less imaginative? And we are told that the reply to the request of the sons of Zebedee for positions of privilege in the Kingdom shows that 'Jesus tacitly accepted their view.' Let us then take our Lord's answer *quite* literally. They had asked for positions of authority in the Kingdom—in which Jews expected the Gentiles to be subservient to them. But he rebuked their ambitions; they were to be servants and not rulers. Were then the Gentiles to be the rulers in the Kingdom?

Jesus, in fact, showed little concern for the *organisation* of the Kingdom—it was ἐντὸς ὑμῶν and that was sufficient. What did interest him supremely was the *kind of people* who would be members of it. Throughout his ministry he had a passionate love for men and women—a love which, as they became his followers, transformed their lives. This it was, and not any delusive hopes, which convinced Paul; else how explain the fact that Paul became the more convinced of his Master's exalted position the more he recognised the falsity of apocalyptic hopes? Dr. Cooley clearly recognises this moral urge in the life of Jesus and in his last chapter he pleads for the return of the Church to loyalty to the aim of its Lord. But he seems to reach that position by a series of contradictions which undermine the value of his book.

J. P. H.

MIRABILIA.

Rome, it is said, always uses her proselytes to win over their still erring brethren. Apparently this method is favoured elsewhere, for the author of the book of Psychical Research was 'a contented agnostic till the facts led me away from that position to a sincere belief in essential Christianity.' It seems that 'essential Christianity' centres round *survival*, and its connection with Spiritualism. The writer quotes with approval the belief of Myers that without these 'metapsychic facts' there would 'a century hence probably not be an educated man who would believe in the Resurrection of Christ, whereas with these facts there will probably be none who disbelieve it.' Hence, he attempts to make clear to the average reader what these 'metapsychic facts' are—'what classes of facts are really substantiated, with the conclusions to which they point' (p. xx).

**Psychical Research, Science and Religion.* By Stanley de Brath. (Methuen and Co. 7*6*/.)

**Death-bed Visions.* By Sir Wm. Barrett, F.R.S. (Methuen and Co. 3/6.)

The exposition which follows is lucid and sincere, though the writer occasionally allows himself to be sidetracked into irrelevant issues. And if, as is claimed, 'the facts are not controversial,' the inferences made from them will seem to many, unnecessary or insecure. He divides his material into subjective facts—telepathy, hypnotism, etc.—and objective facts such as the curious wax gloves moulded by 'ectoplasmic materialisations' or the other photographs of ectoplasmic forms—that 'tenuous substance' which emanates from certain mediums in a trance-state and 'which assumes animated forms . . . having to sight and touch all the appearance of life' (p. 25). All these are illustrated either by photographs or by selected evidence. There follows a plea for official scientific recognition of the strange phenomena brought to the fore in Psychical Research; and then a confused chapter on the 'Connection with Christianity' in which the writer alternately attacks and joins hands wih 'Modernism.' It is a pity that the book ends in this way.

In the other book the late Sir William Barrett had collected a few well-attested instances of visions seen from the death-bed. Their interest is enhanced by the great variety which the author chose, his object being to meet possible objections as to hallucinations, etc. Hence he grades his cases attaching most importance to those in which the dying person was unaware of the previous death of the one whose spirit-form he sees. The value of the book lies, as it was intended to do, in its cumulative evidence.

There is much material in both books which, based as it is on genuine research, cannot be ignored or scorned merely on account of its strangeness. Life in the modern world seems largely an adventure in which

'. . . may be wildest dreams
Are but the needful preludes of the truth.'

J. P. H.

SHORT NOTICES.

Men of Destiny (J. R. Coates, S.C.M., 3/6) is a simple but inspiring study of some of the outstanding characters of the Bible narrative. It is written with a view to stimulating an appreciative understanding of the Scriptures and it recounts in dramatic form some of the critical experiences which belong to the coming of Christianity. Mr. J. G. Jameson, in *The Bringer of the Good News* (Nisbet and Co., 3/6) complains that the influence of Jesus is less strong than it should be because men have not yet understood what his message was: ninety-nine out of an average hundred men still define the Kingdom of Heaven as 'a happy land far, far away,' whereas Jesus' idea of the Kingdom was 'the spiritual or divine interpretation of the universe . . . the world as centred and united in God' (p. 103). If Jesus won men's ears by the beauty and humour of his style, he attracted their hearts by his own presentation of what he meant by the Kingdom, a meaning which we have to some extent preserved in our 'ideal of a gentleman.' There follows a careful enquiry into why Jesus met his death, an enquiry all the more interesting because the writer is a barrister-at-Law. The book is a pleasant and helpful study.

In *Those Early Days* (Murray, 7/6) 'Tychicus' offers a simple exposition of the first half of the Acts of the Apostles suitable for the 'theologically un-learned.' The writer desires to make the reader see those early characters as their friends saw them, 'without their halos.' It is rather confusing, however, to read repeatedly of 'Joshua the Nazoraean, *W*hom

. . . '; would not an earlier atmosphere have been created by Jesus, *whom* . . . ? ' The writer's method is to give a brief introduction to and a free translation of the text followed by a discussion and summary of the various points raised. This makes the reading rather disjointed, but a glance at the verbal caricature of Stephen's speech (pp. 130-1) shows that the author can mingle instruction with much humour.

J. P. H.

CORRESPONDENCE

ADVENT TEACHING.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

As through the ages saints have joined in the cry, 'Oh come, oh come, Emmanuel,' how many different pictures must have been before their minds! We, to-day, find that the picture handed down to us by our fathers has lost its value because it literalised old wording in a way in which we doubt if even its earliest users did. No doubt some minds have always revelled in imagining material details, but need we take it for granted that the majority of those who used apocalyptic language did so? Devout Jews looked forward to a Messianic banquet, and when one apocalyptist writes of the serving of Leviathan to provide the meal, and when our Lord, speaking of the wine at the Last Supper tells His friends that He will drink it new with them in the Kingdom of God, we admit that the words chosen in either case have their origin in the same idea, but the idea has followed widely divergent paths. Still, this very fact that our Lord did use old Jewish formulae to teach spiritual truth, brings us back to the point that even if we reject all the pictures of a former age, we, as moral and spiritual teachers, must have some picture to present, and, if our teaching is to carry conviction, there must also be some clear meaning in our own minds for the words we use. What do we mean when we say 'He shall come again to judge both the quick and the dead'?

There are three ways to-day in which we often speak of the 'coming of the Lord' not one of which by itself fills the canvass, but if the main thoughts of each are combined and if the result is checked by the essential idea which underlay the first Coming; something will emerge, which, though shorn of the grandeur of apocalyptic imagery will prove an inspiration, and will carry us through the times of stress and darkness and nerve us to struggle on till the goal is won, thus fulfilling the *raison d'etre* of apocalyptic. Some tell us that the coming of the Lord means the Spirit to abide in the heart of the individual believer; yes, but this is not a large enough picture, nor is it enlarged ten thousand times, as Professor Barry writes, 'It is absurd to think that any one of us can mirror Christ's Spirit in the world.'

Others speak of a blessed life with all saints beyond the grave, yes, but this does not fulfil the words shall come 'again,' the former manifestation was in this human sphere, though, of course, not limited to it, and it seems necessary that where the wrong has so persistently made itself seen the right must triumph. If it is said that we have passed here from the idea of the 'coming' to that of 'judgment' the answer is that the two cannot be separated. As the writer of the Fourth Gospel has so clearly shown,

wherever and whenever the Christ comes, be it to individual or to nation, there is judgment, a standard is set up by which all things are judged. 'He shall come again' must connote more than that Christ comes to take His own, His select, to enjoy spiritual life in a spiritual sphere.

Another meaning given to the words is, that the coming of Christ is the setting up of the Kingdom of God on earth; this wording brings in both the ideas lacking in the other two, the social idea, and the idea that the rule of God will be manifested in this creation; if this world were not capable of embodying the rule of God it would surely not have been possible for it ever to have been pronounced very good.' Why this wording has not won wider acceptance is probably due to the fact that it has often been combined with the belief that progress is inherent in the nature of things, and that all will be well in the end for everyone, thus leaving no room for discrimination between 'quick and dead.' But when we think of the consummation of the Kingdom, we still must think of judgment, as there always have been those who have not obeyed the will of God so it would appear that when the Kingdom comes with power there may still be those who, through their own choice, have no place in the Kingdom, those who, because they are worthless, are outside. It has been said that to take this view does not allow for the omnipotence of God, but if creation necessarily implies the self-limitation of God, will not that self-limitation be there till the end?

Now let us look back. When Christ came to earth nearly 2,000 years ago, God was seen and known tabernacling among us, using human nature to express the Spirit, but though Christ's human body in Palestine was a perfect vehicle of the Spirit, yet it was only a first manifestation, limited by place and race, it was expedient that He should go away, there was something better in store. *When there is formed on earth a Society, a Body of Christ perfectly and continuously manifesting the Spirit, then surely Christ will be on earth again.*

So we look forward until 'we all attain to a full-grown man, to the stature of the fulness of Christ,' so we hope for 'the manifestation of the sons of God,' 'the Day of our Lord Jesus.' We may use with the Fourth Evangelist the term 'last day,' although his use of it in a book in which the whole conception of the coming of the Lord is spiritualized has caused difficulty to commentators; for when humanity has been shown to be capable of being a perfect vehicle of Spirit, has not the goal of humanity been reached? What further need will there be for physical life or death? The Father's purpose in creation will have been accomplished, death the last enemy shall be abolished, then cometh the end, when Christ shall deliver up the Kingdom to God, even the Father.

Does such an eschatology touch our daily lives? Surely yes, we have a hope, the fulfilment of which the work of each generation hastens or retards. We know Christ is coming. Every Advent we are reminded that it is ours, if we claim membership in His Body, to fill up the valleys and to make the rough places plain, and led by the indwelling Spirit to prepare in the desert a highway for our God. The words of first century Christians still have meaning for us, 'every one that hath this hope in him purifieth himself' and thus 'judgment begins at the house of God.' Because we have this hope we brace ourselves for further effort and at the same time we cry to one another, 'Rejoice, rejoice, Emmanuel *shall* come to thee O Israel.'

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MODERN BIBLICAL TEACHING.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,—For the last three years a body of scholars of various denominations under the above title has, in conjunction with the University of London Extension Board, given sessional courses of twenty-four lectures on the Old and New Testaments at University College, London. The success of these lectures shows that there is at the present time a widespread desire for guidance in the systematic study of the greatest of all classics, the Bible. Perhaps nothing is more productive of religious unsettlement than a half-knowledge of the results of modern biblical criticism, and clear teaching in this matter is now a real need. The University Extension Movement has recently included within its scope subjects dealing with the scientific, literary and historical aspects of religion such as can be treated without touching on denominational or party differences, and there can be no question but that the whole field of biblical scholarship is specially suited to be treated in this way. This committee is very anxious to draw the attention of secretaries of local committees for Extension lectures to this important subject of study. The University Extension Boards are generally sympathetic and would, we think, invariably supply it if it were asked for. The lack of demand from local centres is, we believe, largely due to the fact that the possibility of University training in Biblical subjects is not yet generally known. The Divinity Lectures Committee is anxious to supply information with regard to procedure, finance, etc., to any local committee who may care to communicate with me .

MISS CARTHEW, M.A. (*Acting Hon. Secretary*).

6 Albert Place, W.8.
27th November, 1926.

P.S.—The Committee's London lectures recommence after Christmas on the following dates for three further courses of twelve weeks each by Miss M. S. West, B.D., B.A., as follows :—

Old Testament : Mondays, January 17th to April 4th, 1927, at University College, London, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 6.30 p.m.

New Testament (Gospels) : Tuesdays, January 18th to April 5th, 1927, at Dr. Williams' Library, Gordon Square, W.C., at 6.30 p.m.

New Testament (Acts, Epistles and Revelation) : Fridays, January 21st to April 8th, at University College, London, Gower Street, at 6.30 p.m.

The first lecture of each course is free. Fees for the term of twelve lectures, 21/-. Teachers and weekly wage-earners, 17/6. Present students of University Colleges, 3/6. Single lectures, 2/6.

THE NEXT MODERN CHURCHMEN'S CONFERENCE.

The 1927 Modern Churchmen's Conference will be held on August 22—29 at the University Settlement in Selly Oak Park, near Birmingham. The subject chosen for consideration is *The Modern Movement in the English Church.*